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Abstract 
 
Countries that come out of the “gray zone” during “third wave democratization,”  
as ambiguous as they may seem politically, may not be a manifestation of a failed 
democratization attempt. Rather, their “hybrid” characteristics, portraying neither a full 
democracy nor outright authoritarian practices entrenched in the system, may plausibly 
serve as a panacea to governing, especially in a troubled state. 
Many studies that have depicted the “hybrid” political system have focused more 
on its conceptualization and typology rather than how this kind of regime actually 
performs and functions. However, studying this regime type only at its surface does not 
help us to understand the in-depth nature of a hybrid regime nor its political setup. A 
thorough assessment is needed for this purpose. Therefore, this case study evaluates the 
performance of the hybrid political system that is practiced in Malaysia. 
This study assesses the two democratic principles of popular control and political 
equality, using the assessment framework prepared by the internationally based 
intergovernmental organization, the International Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA), whose aim is to support sustainable democracy around the world. 
The method prepared by International IDEA was based on the claim that “democracy is 
not an all-or-nothing affair” but is a shifting continuum. The IDEA method acknowledges 
that the democracy practiced in some countries is not perfect and is subject to the 
country’s historical experiences, demographics, cultures, and realities. 
 iii 
This study’s results suggest that having partially practiced democratic principles, 
with support from semi-authoritarian apparatus, produces a political system with both 
positive and negative components that both facilitate regime transition and 
democratization as well as reinforce regime incumbency and dampen democratization. 
This study shows that, ultimately, the interactions between the positive and negative 
components may produce balancing mechanisms that help to strengthen both the 
regime’s persistence and the country’s resilience.  
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 1 
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study 
This case study presents an “ambiguous” political system1 that is neither fully 
democratic nor outright authoritarian. Countries with this type of political system are 
described as “third wave democratization” and are typically viewed as being in the 
process of regime change toward democracy. Malaysia is a paradigmatic case of a 
country with the hybrid political configuration of a partly democratic system with 
authoritarian practices. However, for many years, Malaysia has managed to endure. 
Praised for its high economic growth, political and social stability, the country has proven 
to be the anomaly in democratization studies.  
The unconventional political system practiced in Malaysia defies the claim that 
the country will undergo a linear and teleological journey under the democratization 
process until it reaches the consolidation phase. Proponents of democratic transition 
describe a country of this kind as an unstable “halfway house.” Instead, Malaysia 
manages to remain persistent and resilient in the face of challenges and political 
turbulence. 
In discourses on comparative regime studies, Malaysia is categorized as a “semi-
democracy,”2 “quasi- democracy,”3 “flawed democracy,”4 “partly-free”5 country, and 
                                                 
1
 The term political system will be used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
 
2
 William Case, “Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change,” Pacific 
Affairs 66, no. 2 (1993): 183-205.  
2 
“syncretic state”6 that is “neither democratic nor authoritarian”7 but is both “responsive 
and repressive”;8 the most general term given, hybrid regime,9 portrays the common and 
neutral description of regime studies on Malaysia. These categorizations are 
unconventional to what is accepted as a normal political system. 
The Research Paradox 
To the dismay of democratic proponents, an “ambiguous” regime such as in 
Malaysia is supposed to be in transition to becoming fully democratic, as proven by some 
success stories of regime transition cases, such as Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico. A 
country like Malaysia has almost all that it takes to transform to being a fully democratic 
country with all the “preconditions,” such as persistent economic growth that produces a 
broad middle class, high educational and income levels, and a large industrial working 
class. Bottom line, Malaysia has all that it takes to be in the “zone” of what Huntington 
(1991) claimed is likely to transform into being fully democratic.
10
 
                                                                                                                                                 
3
 Zakaria Hj. Ahmad, “Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society,” in Democracy in Developing 
Countries: Asia, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1989), 347-81.  
 
4
 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) has categorized Malaysia as a flawed democracy, ranking 81 in 
2007. The latest EIU ranked Malaysia 64, shows “improvement” in democracy but still categorized as 
“flawed” based on the level of genuinety of the democratic process.  
 
5
 The Freedom House, a renowned organization, has ranked Malaysia as “partly free” on the rating of “4” 
in the country’s level of civil liberties in 2011. 
 
6
 James V. Jesudason, “The Syncretic State and the Structuring of Oppositional Politics in Malaysia,” in 
Political Oppositions in Asia, ed. Garry Rodan (London: Routledge, 1996), 128-160. 
 
7
 Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
 
8
 Harold Crouch, “Malaysia: Neither Authoritarian nor Democratic,” in Southeast Asia in the 1990s, ed. 
Kevin Hewison, Richard Roison, and Gary Rodan (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1993), 133-158. 
 
9
 Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes,” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 21-35. 
 
3 
The irony is that the “political configuration” entrenched in the Malaysian regime 
works in contradiction to the ideas of a liberal democracy. The case of Malaysia, as with 
many other countries in the developing world, has made analysts and proponents of 
democratic transition theories question their paradigm. Carothers (2002) wrote a thought-
provoking article claiming that the transition paradigm has lost its significance as a 
universal paradigm for understanding democratization.
11
  
Case (2005) claimed that Southeast Asia is a region that sets the compound of “a 
great storehouse of historical and contemporary hybrid regimes.”12 In the region that 
analysts claim to be most recalcitrant,
13
 Malaysia is an interesting subject and a 
paradigmatic case of the “ambiguous” regime.14 As a case study, Malaysia is important 
because the country is a paradox in democratization theories. Having almost all of the 
attributes and preconditions
15
 of a democratic government, the fact is that Malaysia is 
everything but fully democratic. 
                                                                                                                                                 
10
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 62-63. 
 
11
 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy, 13, no. 1 ( 2002): 5-
21. 
 
12
 William Case, “Southeast Asia's Hybrid Regimes: When Do Voters Change Them?” Journal of East 
Asian Studies 5, no. 2 (May-August 2005): 215. 
 
13
 Donald Emmerson has called Southeast Asia the most recalcitrant region to liberal democratic reforms. 
Nevertheless, some country cases in this region (e.g., Malaysia) continue to stand out as a puzzle of 
political development. [Donald K. Emmerson, “Region and Recalcitrance: Rethinking Democracy through 
Southeast Asia,” Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995): 222-248].  
 
14
 Marina Ottaway has given the label ambiguous to regimes that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal 
democracy with some formal democratic institutions with limited respect to civil and political rights. 
However, these regimes also practice some illiberal authoritarian traits in their systems. [Marina Ottaway, 
Democracy Challenged : The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2003)]. 
 
15
 Malaysia stands out as something that is inconsistent with the conventional ideas of regime transition to 
democracy, such as theorized by Lipset in 1959. A country that, despite imitating a model of the 
4 
This thesis depicts Malaysia as a partially practiced democracy that is “flawed,” 
in order to connote the condition of democracy in Malaysia for simplicity purposes; 
however, the term actually means a democratic system that is not practiced in its full 
sense.
16
 More accurately, the term “hybrid” signifies the mixed nature of Malaysia’s 
political system, which combines the attributes of both a democracy and an authoritarian 
system.  
The “hybrid regime,” defined by Karl (1995),  emerged at the turn of the twenty-
first century as the most widespread political system in the world.
17
 The Malaysian case 
also seems to fit comfortably into the categories proposed by O’Donnell and Schmitter 
(1986), who distinguish between liberalized authoritarianism (dictablandas) and limited 
democracy (democraduras).
18
 
Political Hybridity: Analytical Challenges 
The term “hybrid regime” represents the paradox of the democratic transition 
paradigm. It indicates the “messiness” of democratization linear ideas against the political 
realities. The hybrid political system is ignored by democratization proponents because of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Westminster type of governing, along with successful economic growth with a growing middle class, 
shows little to no progress toward becoming a fully democratic country. 
 
16
 According to Economist Intelligence Unit Democracy Index, in flawed democracies, basic civil liberties 
are still respected but they are limited. There are illiberal practices in other aspects of democracy, such as 
limited media freedom, low levels of political participation, and underdeveloped democratic political 
culture. In addition, “flawed” also could present democratic deficits that are generally described by analysts 
as illiberal practices that disregard some important democratic main principles. Nonetheless, the flawed 
democracy does not violate the democratic procedural of election. [Larry Diamond, “Is the Third Wave of 
Democracy Over?” Journal of Democracy 7, no. 3 (July 1996); Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal 
Democracy,” Foreign Affairs 76, no. 6 (1997): 22-43; and Wolfgang Merkel, “Embedded and Defective 
Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58.] 
 
17
 Terry Lynn Karl, “The Hybrid Regimes of Central America,” Journal of Democracy 6, no. 3 (1995): 72-
87. 
 
18G. O’ Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 9. 
5 
its flawed characteristics. However, the hybrid system’s obsession with democracy and 
democratization within studies about regime change might be a way to account for the 
lack of broader systematic comparative studies of hybrid regimes and their peculiarity.
19
 
The assumption is that these “ambiguous regimes” are still in a transition process; hence, 
no attention is given to their peculiar nature.  
I have mentioned that Malaysia is a paradigmatic case of a country emerging from 
the “gray zone” of the democratization process. Analysts and strong proponents of 
democracy have acknowledged this “zone” and the problems that come out of it. 
According to proponents of democratization, countries that are situated between the 
continuum of authoritarian and democratic spheres, practicing partial liberalization, are 
not stable and will not persist. Huntington (1991) acknowledged the plausibility of 
countries that are emerging from “third wave” democratization, calling them a “halfway 
house” that will not stand.20 He argued that these kinds of regimes have stalled in the 
democratization process because of the “flawed” practices of democratic principles. 
Putting weight to that analogy, Przeworski (1991) wrote that regimes with partial 
liberalization are inherently unstable until they reach the goal of full democracy.
21
  
In sum, scholars of democracy agree that the characteristics of a hybrid regime 
that  combine democracy and authoritarian traits are contradictory, which renders them 
unstable. As hybrid regimes persist throughout the world, as shown by Malaysia and her 
                                                 
19
 Jonas Linde, “Into the Gray Zone: The Recent Trend of “Hybridization” of Political Regimes,” The 
Quality of Government Institute Department of Political Science (Working Paper Series, University of 
Gothenburg, Sweden, April 2009). 
 
20
 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 137. 
 
21
 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 58. 
6 
closest neighbor Singapore, analysts like Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way agree that it is 
about time “to stop thinking about these cases in terms of transitions to democracy."22 In 
reality, these regimes are not transitioning anytime soon, but will persist through their 
political configuration, which is maneuvered democratic institutions with illiberal 
practices and control. 
Some analysts say that the political system of regimes practicing partial 
democracy is defective and that they will not necessarily transition into a full democracy. 
For example, Wolfgang (2004) argued that a “defective” democracy is not necessarily a 
regime in transition. Depending on their political power, social economics, and cultural 
entrenchment in their political system, these regimes can establish themselves for a 
longer time. He stated that this is the case when specific democratic defects are supported 
by political power, socio-economic and socio-cultural contexts and developed within a 
mutually supportive coexistence of environment and a partial control mechanism.
23
 
Jayasuria and Rodan (2007) saw “hybrid regimes not as imperfect versions of 
liberal democracies but as possible political regimes in their own right, with their own 
internal dynamics and qualitatively distinct institutional forms.”24 They argued that 
political regimes need to be identified and explained in terms of the organization of 
conflict through various modes of political participation; that the idea of hybrid regimes 
in general falls short in explaining why and how regimes take the forms they do.  
                                                 
22
 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A Way, “The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 
13, no. 2 (2002): 51. 
 
23
 Merkel Wolfgang, “Embedded and Defective Democracies,” Democratization 11, no. 5 (2004): 33-58. 
 
24
 Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation 
in Southeast Asia,” Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007): 773. 
7 
“Halfway” and “diminished subtype” regimes depicted as deficient have certain 
prior institutional benchmarks of liberal democracy, yet no identifying cause for the 
apparent institutional dysfunction or deficit.
25
 Rodan (2004) argued that political regimes 
need to be identified in terms of the relationship between their institutions and the 
management or containment of conflict. The form and nature of inclusion of political 
participation into the mode of hybrid governance is abridged by the transition theory’s 
obsessive focus on the institutional functions of a democracy;
26
 this theory is an advance 
on the simplistic formulations of a linear transition to a liberal democracy.  
 “Hybridity” As an Analytical Tool to Manage Conflict 
Current literature on “hybridity” discusses a peace-building program in which 
hybridity is used as a tool to provide a more accurate view of the dynamic diversity of 
ideas and practices that can contribute to peace-building and aid programs.
27
 According 
to MacGinty, “Hybridity is both a process and a condition of interactions between actors 
and practices. It is a process of social negotiation, conflict and coalescence and can be 
found in all societies and social interactions.”28 MacGinty recommends the concept of 
hybridity because it can help to detect the complexities and flexibility of internationally 
                                                 
25
 Kanishka Jayasuriya and Garry Rodan, “Beyond Hybrid Regimes: More Participation, Less Contestation 
in Southeast Asia,” Democratization 14, no. 5 (2007): 775. 
 
26
 Ibid. 
 
27
 Roger MacGinty, “Statebuilding, Peacebuilding and Hybridity” (Short paper prepared for Critical 
Statebuilding Workshop, Swedish Defence College, 5-6 May 2011). 
 
28
 Roger MacGinty, “Hybridity and Hybridisation: Beyond Top-down Meets Bottom-up” (Paper prepared 
for HCRI Manchester/Bradford, Seminar 22-23 June 2011). 
8 
supported peace-building efforts. The concept may not be a panacea to settle conflicts, 
but it offers a simplicity in attempting to understand a complex phenomenon.
29
 
This discourse on hybridity is still new, and the idea of hybridity can be used as 
“dynamic model of conflict management in action.” Liberal state-builders30 regard the 
hybrid form as a “policy failure.” While hybrid forms of statehood, business, politics, and 
culture may be odd, dysfunctional, and seemingly unfair, acknowledging the working 
mechanism could actually be useful for peace-building and conflict management. 
This study analyzes the conventional view that halfway-house regimes are 
unstable. This hybrid political system is found in many new democratic countries, 
especially those coming out from “third wave” democratization. However, the democratic 
elements and authoritarian support system of a hybrid political system do not necessarily 
contradict each other; rather, this odd political setup can be mutually supportive. 
According to Crouch (1996), Juan Linz claimed that these “ambiguous” political systems 
cannot be adequately understood as a kind of regime that is situated at the midpoint along 
a continuum between democracy and an authoritarian system. Rather, these regimes 
should be understood as their own kind, with peculiar characteristics that distinguish 
them from either democracy or an authoritarian system.
31
 
In regimes like Malaysia, which is given semi-democracy or semi-authoritarian 
labels by experts, there is a need to understand that Malaysia has an integrated and 
coherent political system with its own peculiar characteristics. Therefore, it is necessary 
                                                 
29
 Roger MacGinty, “Hybridity and Hybridisation: Beyond Top-down Meets Bottom-up” (Paper prepared 
for HCRI Manchester/Bradford, Seminar 22-23 June 2011). 
 
30
 Ibid. 
 
31
 Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5. 
9 
to study, more precisely, the interrelationship between the democratic and authoritarian 
traits, so that such regimes can be conceptualized as regime types in their own right.
32
 
This study, therefore, does not seek to add another adjective, such as “façade” 
democracy. Rather, this study’s purpose is to assess the partially practiced democracy 
itself and its performance in a “hybrid” state. 
Hybrid Political Mechanism in Malaysia 
Different political setups with hybrid elements of democracy and authoritarian 
attributes work differently in regimes around the globe. In Malaysia’s hybrid political 
system, the political configuration shows how the positive components of democratic 
principles (e.g., elections) and the negative components of a control system (e.g., 
electoral gerrymandering) are used simultaneously in Malaysia’s political setup. The 
electoral system in Malaysia may appear to be a façade, but it is important for the 
regime’s incumbency. On the other hand, a manipulated election can open opportunities 
for opposition parties to contest the incumbent and to give a strong competition. 
Case (2006) argued that “elections … are not intended to produce turnover but 
instead to provide feedback, registering fluctuations in support so that governments might 
adjust their policy course but never leave office.”33 Analysts and critics of Malaysia’s 
political regime have frequently highlighted the gerrymandering of constituencies in 
order to favor the incumbent government and its mal-apportionment; which explains why 
rural constituencies are disproportionately represented, because Malay-Muslim 
                                                 
32
 Harold A. Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 5. 
 
33
 William Case, “How Do Rulers Control the Electoral Arena?” in Electoral Authoritarianism: The 
Dynamics of Unfree Competition, ed. Andreas Schedler (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), 95-112. 
10 
populations are greater in the rural districts.
34
 The Malay-dominated ruling elite 
constructed the electoral system to virtually ensure that they could not be removed from 
power. 
Elections in Malaysia are “Janus faced.” On one side, they are used to legitimize 
the incumbent party through manipulation and gerrymandering of the electoral system, 
denying democratization. On the other side, elections can actually open opportunities for 
the opposition parties to gather support, through electoral votes; thus, the possibility of 
more democratic openings. In Malaysia, this was proven during the 2008 and 2013 
general elections. However, the existence and persistence of the hybrid mechanism that 
works in Malaysia’s political system seems effective in preventing a transfer of power 
through election.  
Institutions of Control in Malaysia  
It is not just the electoral system that favors the incumbent government, who has a 
wide range of political controls to restrict opposition parties and dissidents. The 
mechanism of control serves as a state apparatus to protect the ruling government from 
the opposition parties’ interference on government business. Thus, these control 
mechanisms are institutionalized, and are often justified as necessary for maintaining 
order and stability in the plural society that is Malaysia. 
The most important part of this machinery of control has been the Internal 
Security Act (ISA), a legacy from the colonial era that has permitted detention of 
suspects (up to two years and indefinitely renewable) without proving their guilt in a 
court of law. ISA was so notorious that it symbolized the “illiberalism” of democracy in 
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Malaysia. The removal of ISA has been a key demand of the Reformasi movement and 
civil society. In September 2011, Najib Razak, Malaysia’s sixth premier, announced the 
repeal of ISA and three emergency declarations.
35
 
The Strong State  
According to analysts, the strong state and its apparatus are used by the ruling 
elites allegedly to constrain the voices of dissidents who supposedly will pose challenges 
to the regime. Because the state is very strong in Malaysia, the regime can afford to 
loosen its grip without losing control. Slater and Fenner (2011) argued that state power is 
the stringiest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes’ staying power, that states 
are the ultimate institutional weapons in the authoritarian arsenal,
36
 and that the most 
durable regimes are those that either stay out of trouble or have a proven track record of 
putting trouble behind them.  
In Malaysia, we have seen stability whenever the regime has survived a 
monumental challenge. Along with its lengthy time of ruling, the regime has exhibited a 
constant outcome of institutional continuity. Malaysia’s hybrid regime is exceptionally 
durable not because of the lifespan of the political party, but because the regime has 
steadily managed massive socio-economic transformations without altering their most 
important institutional structures. Whether crises have been economic or political, they 
have been few and rare in Malaysia; even when crises have happened, they have been 
ably contained and effectively resolved. 
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In Malaysia’s hybrid system, the state has responded to political tensions by 
strengthening its authoritarian control. For instance, immediately after the ethnic riots in 
1969, the state exercised its control apparatus by launching the emergency provisions of 
the Constitution and implementing the Internal Security Act (ISA). These riots were the 
main event that changed Malaysia’s political configuration; state power was extended 
and the control system was tightened.  
These control mechanisms that were a winning situation for the incumbent 
regime, nevertheless, were a setback to the democratization process. In 1987, Premier 
Mahathir faced off challenges to his premiership by employing the Internal Security Act 
(ISA) against members of organizations and groups who were critical of the 
government’s policies. Hence, despite the state’s acquisition of authoritarian powers, the 
system was far from fully authoritarian.
37
 
The government in Malaysia exercises strong authoritarian powers to safeguard 
its political stability and continued domination of the Malay elite. However, 
countervailing social forces and regular competitive elections restrain its power and make 
the regime sensitive to popular pressures; so, it often responds to challenges with a 
combination of both repressive and responsive measures. For example, Prime Minister 
Najib Razak repealed the Internal Security Act (ISA) in June 2012 after relentless 
pressure from the masses and international communities. This act from the premier 
showed a sign of give and take in the system.
38
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Dominant One-Party System 
The control apparatus in a hybrid political system is deeply institutionalized. 
Milton Esman (1973) termed this kind of control system as being “institutionalized 
dominant” and suggested that this method is basically a coercive network of controls with 
the purpose of maintaining hegemony and that it is often highly sophisticated and deeply 
institutionalized.
39
 Malaysia is a highly institutionalized hybrid regime. According to 
Mauzy (2006), one of the reasons for the resilience of the dominating party in Malaysia, 
the United Malay National Organization (i.e., UMNO), also known as the Alliance, is 
that it is a well-institutionalized party that reaches down through an extensive system of 
branch chapters and leads up to district, state, and national organizations.
40
 One 
characteristic of the hybrid regime in Malaysia is that there is a blurring of the line 
between the party and the state; when Malaysians talk about the party, we usually mean 
the state and the government. 
The dominant one-party system is a complex scenario under the hybrid setup. 
According to Jesudason (1995), dominance is a self-conscious process and the dominant 
party cannot be ignored as a strategic actor in the governmental system. We cannot 
confine ourselves as structural-determinists in understanding the dominant party; nor can 
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we merely see coercion and repression as key devices used by the ruling elites.
41
 As an 
analyst and student of comparative government, I suggest that we not see hybrid regimes 
as only a manifestation of a failed democracy and form of authoritarian control. 
Pempel’s (1990) work on uncommon democracies in Western Europe advised that 
this kind of uncommon regime type contains useful ideas because dominant parties can 
act as institutions that shape the social structure as much as they are constrained by it. He 
demonstrated that dominant parties are dynamic organizations that do not necessarily 
decline over time. They are capable of creating new social bases of support, or 
abandoning old ones in order to stay in power.
42
 
In Malaysia’s hybrid political scenario, the UMNO-led Barisan Nasional (BN) 
dominant party has made significant achievements to sustain its central power due to its 
effectiveness in responding to the grievances of its key constituents, the voters; their key 
advantage is help with the masses from their patron-clientele relationships. UMNO can 
be assured by its political culture of support, especially the ethnic Malays who help the 
dominant party sustain its political power. The mechanism that works in the Malaysian 
hybrid system is that the dominant party, UMNO, provides a patron-clientele relationship 
to the Malays. This is considered a legitimate practice in the political system. In response, 
the Malays vote for them in general elections. 
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Patron Clientele  
Political management in Malaysia fits the model of ethnic patronage. This 
practice refers to complex patronage networks between the political establishment and an 
emerging, mostly Malay, business class. The ruling party in Malaysia almost always 
enjoys the advantage of the 3M’s—money, media control, and party machinery.43 The 
key to the dominant single-party (in Malaysia, UMNO) is patronage and money politics.  
To provide patronage obligations, UMNO and some of the other Barisan 
Nasional parties are deeply engaged in business and have cultivated close and 
overlapping ties with the leaders of business and commerce. UMNO owns, or controls 
through proxies, all kinds of businesses, from a major newspaper group, to mining, 
television, and the state’s largest construction company. Many government no-bid 
contracts have been awarded by the Cabinet to UMNO-linked companies, and well-
connected UMNO members are often awarded privatized assets.
44
 
Analysts argue that The New Economic Policy (NEP 1971-90) and privatization 
policies breed cronyism in the government and benefit politically well-connected groups 
of the new rich who are nurtured by government patronage and preferential treatment. 
Political patronage and clientelism play a prominent role; an increasingly authoritarian 
and centralized Malay political elite employs the financial resources of the state to 
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distribute control of major economic enterprises to a small circle of dependent cronies 
and quasi-entrepreneurs, often by methods that are shrouded in secrecy and corruption.
45
  
In a hybrid system, the patron-clientele networks are carefully weaved by the state 
through its apparatus in the name of fixing the imbalances in the socio-economic 
structure. The paradox is that, on one hand, state intervention reasonably promotes 
economic growth and political competition (mistakenly assumed as democracy); and on 
the other hand, state intervention is a sign of deeper authoritarianism.
46
  
Elite Strategies 
One should not underestimate the role of agency, specifically the political elite, in 
determining how the regime works in Malaysia. The elites bargained during the 
consociational era in Malaysia’s political collapse during the May 13, 1969 ethnic riots. 
The UMNO Alliance’s disastrous outcome demonstrated that consociational inter-ethnic 
compromises were less effective for the Malay ruling elite as a means of maintaining 
their political power. This was one of the most crucial reasons the Malay ruling elite 
sought an alternative mode of regime maintenance and shifted toward a more hegemonic 
control, which led to the unambiguous UMNO-led Malay dominance.
47
 
According to transition theories, strategies of the elites involve negotiated 
agreements between ruling elites and opposition elites, which move common perceptions 
of self-interest toward accepting democracy as the best possible regime form under given 
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conditions. Elite strategies for democratization do not apply to Malaysia, whose ruling 
elites are well-known for their strength and cohesiveness. Some analysts claim that the 
patronage-system practice in Malaysia contributes to the elites’ cohesiveness and their 
support of the dominant party, whose crucial task is to maintain the loyalties of in-groups 
by guaranteeing their long-term interests.
48
 
Thus, elites’ strategies for regime change in Malaysia do not apply to the 
transition theory, which suggests that democratic transition is the result of elites defecting 
from the incumbent’s party.49 This highlights the importance of patronage and the elite 
cohesion in Malaysian politics. Beatriz Magaloni (2006) wrote that hegemonic parties 
must have distributed ample spoils in order to deter elites from splitting.
50
 
Internet and New Social Media 
Controlling laws that limit civil rights and freedom of the people are not totally 
hopeless when, at the same time, the Internet media are free from regulation. In Malaysia, 
the term “netizens” is given to those in the society who rely on social media for news and 
communication because the conventional print and broadcast media are tightly controlled 
by the ruling government. This condition enables the people to get alternative media 
sources for information and freedom of expression. Grievances among the Malaysian 
communities were inflamed through an unprecedented intensity of Internet usage and 
new social media (e.g., bloggers, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and others). The Internet 
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media have become the most important source of independent political information in 
Malaysia.  
 The advantage to “netizens” is that the Internet is not controlled by the 
government, which has kept their promise made during Mahathir’s era not to impose any 
control on Internet communications media for the sake of attracting foreign direct 
investments into Malaysia. This loophole has worked to the advantage of Malaysians, 
especially those in the opposition parties who seek alternative media to disseminate their 
information.  
The Internet-democracy relationship is not absolute, said Best and Wade (2009).
51
 
In Malaysia, the issue is whether the Internet media can have an impact on 
democratization or not. Since the Reformasi movement in late 1990s, the Internet has 
been used for socialization and mobilization, but mainly as an alternative media for 
information. Bottom line, the Internet and new social media so far are a positive means of 
social movements in Malaysia. 
Civil Participation 
The liberal position on civil society proposes that the general welfare of a society 
and the process of democratization are enhanced if groups, organizations, and 
associations act as a buffer to prevent the state from assuming too much control of the 
society. In Malaysia, the discourse on civil participation is linked to the larger question of 
democracy. In a society with a hybrid political system, political participation or contest is 
often minimized by ensuring that the civil society is under the hegemony of the state. 
Dissent and opposing views are curbed and challenges are suppressed with the use of 
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controlling laws.
52
 In Malaysia, the issues are not so much about the forces of civil 
society challenging the state’s power and control, but how the state dominates the civil 
society and its activities, rendering it ineffective for further democratization and regime 
transformation. 
Peaceful Social Mobilization 
In Malaysia, pressures for change did not originate from the elites, but from the 
citizens.
53
 According to Lee, ethnic politics is no longer considered the main factor that 
shaped Malaysian politics. Ethnic politics was weakened by the new politics, 
encapsulated by the Reformasi movement. Reformasi opened the door for the opposition 
to challenge UMNO-led ethnic politics.
54
 Reformasi was initially born out of the people’s 
anger at Mahathir’s ruthless treatment against his deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim. 
After that, Reformasi eventually turned into a more generalized protest against 
corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and the government’s abuse of power.55  
These developments reflected a significant element of political transition in 
Malaysia along three dimensions: (1) They signified a substantial erosion of UMNO’s 
legitimacy in society. (2) Reformasi not only galvanized multi-ethnic support; it also 
brought to the fore universal issues based on the need for governance reform, especially 
for greater accountability, transparency, and rejection of corruption and cronyism. (3) 
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Anwar’s crisis galvanized new forms of social mobilization in the country, the people’s 
demand for good governance and checks on government power.
56
 This thesis suggests 
that social mobilization should increase the likelihood of democratization and triggering 
regime change in Malaysia (see the HINDRAF and BERSIH movements in chapter six.) 
Another interesting issue in the transition literature is the connection between 
democracy and uncertainty. The process of establishing a democracy is a process of 
institutionalizing uncertainty and subjecting all interests to it. According to Karl and 
Schmitter (1991), the transition period is a subject of unforeseen contingencies, unfolding 
processes, and unintended outcomes.
57
 This is the stage where the hybrid regime 
emerges. Despite not reaching the finish line of the democratization race, hybrid regimes 
are showing resiliency. In stark contrast with arguments of their fragility and instability, 
they are able to survive the challenges.
58
  
The survivability of hybrid regimes can be traced back to the very combination of 
authoritarian and democratic traits entrenched in their political system. The problem is 
that analysts focus too much on trying to conceptualize these diminished
59
 democratic 
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types of political regimes and categorize them under specific conceptual democratic 
thresholds, in order to differentiate them from fully democratic regimes.
60
  
There is not much focus in the literature on evaluating how countries with limited 
practices of democracy actually function or why particular countries. So, this thesis 
suggests that we not view hybrid regimes only in terms of the failure of transition 
theories or the unsuccessful process of democratization. Instead, rather than focus on a 
flawed practice of democracy, analysts should start analyzing how the hybrid political 
setup works to sustain and stabilize a particular regime type. I suggest that in order to 
understand how these regimes work, and their characteristics, analysts must evaluate 
these regimes’ performance.  
To date, the literature has focused little on measuring hybrid regimes, making this 
study and assessment of “ambiguous regimes” highly relevant, especially regarding 
countries such as Malaysia that are thought to have been failing the democratization 
process. Now it is time to assess the hybrid character of Malaysia’s political system, its  
functions, and how it works. 
Measuring Democratic Quality in a Hybrid Regime 
Measuring the quality of democracy is the latest field in democratization studies. 
Liberalism has won and democracy has been expanded around the globe. The new 
concern is the quality of these new democracies. Przeworski (2010) wrote that having 
followed liberalization, transition and consolidation, we have discovered there is still 
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something to improve, and that is democracy.
61
 Some analysts claim that the goal of the 
new literature on democracy assessment and measurement is to learn what makes 
democracy better or worse and to provide insights, to policymakers and other agents of 
reforms, on how democracy can be improved and strengthened in their countries.
62
 
The Challenges 
The problems with democratization and regime transition theories are when they 
focus too much on issues of regimes transitioning to democracy and consolidation, rather 
than putting attention on how the regimes actually work even without being fully 
democratic. The hybrid regime is generally described by transition experts as unstable 
and peculiar and, thus, deserves extra attention in the literature. How can we know how 
they really function without evaluating their performance? This is the challenge taken on 
by this study, which assesses and evaluates the performance of the so-called odd and 
ambiguous regime with flawed democratic practices.  
Democratic transition scholars have explicitly or implicitly been adamant about 
regimes such as Malaysia, who will one day transform into a liberal democratic system. 
This is not surprising since the nature of these theories is teleological. I argue that an 
ambiguous political regime like Malaysia may not necessarily transform to be fully 
democratic, but that does not mean there will not be opportunities for that goal to happen. 
This is because the political configuration entrenched in the regime through its hybrid 
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mechanism will somehow facilitate openings for more democracy, while simultaneously 
hindering its development. 
Political uncertainty is particularly high among developing democracies that are 
contributing to this puzzling empirical pattern. This is one of the main challenges in 
designing a framework of research on regime change. It is hard to predict when there are 
elements of uncertainty; however, we can still put hope in our predictions by analyzing 
characteristics to forecast the possibilities of outcomes. Many analysts claim that 
democratization is a multi-faceted phenomenon
63
 and that uncertainty surrounds the end 
goal of the democratization process itself; therefore, it is imperative to use the right 
analytic approaches in order to understand the issues and problems surrounding the 
democratization process, its success stories and its failed efforts. Assessing the quality 
and problems of a democracy has been the object of numerous studies. However, despite 
the existing extensive literature, the multi-dimensional character of understanding 
democracy and measuring its quality have made this study extremely difficult and 
challenging. 
For these reasons, this study does not advance specific master variables to be used 
as units of analysis. Rather, I list factors that I think are significant to be the explanatory 
variables to describe and explain some answers from the assessment questions. From this 
analysis, I hope to show how these factors influence, either positively or negatively, the 
democratization process in Malaysia. Key factors such as the electoral institution, 
Internet media, and the peaceful social movement, are positive factors that can facilitate 
democratic openings. Factors such as the strong state, dominant single-party system, 
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coercion (in the form of repressive laws), manipulated electoral system, ineffective 
middle class, patron-client list practices, and weak civil societies, are negative factors that 
hinder the development of democracy and regime change.  
If it is hard to place Malaysia in a clear-cut category between democracy and 
authoritarianism, it is even more difficult to perceive the direction in which its political 
system is moving. As explained previously, the link between the transition paradigm and 
elements of uncertainty about the end results contradict the claim made by proponents of 
transition theories, like Huntington, who wrote that a regime in transition toward 
democracy will normally go every way, and if it does not, it is unstable.
64
 Ironically, the 
Malaysian political system has been balancing between the traits of liberalism and control 
since before its independence from the British, and these characteristics have remained 
unchanged until the present. 
Some hybrid regimes’ institutional apparatus and their relation with the behavior 
of political actors can affect the political system in the long run, either positively or 
negatively. That said, this study reminds us that even a partially practiced democracy 
with a certain political configuration and setup can plausibly provide an institutional 
framework that is capable of guaranteeing an opening for democracy development and 
possible regime change. However, there still exists grounds to question the stability of the 
hybrid institutional arrangements. 
This research chooses to advocate for better governance. I believe that whatever 
ground our political setup is based upon, without good governance it is pointless. Good 
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governance not only addresses democratic government; it is equally important to a hybrid 
government. 
In recent years, the economic and political turmoil in Malaysia have reached the 
climate of citizen discontent. Issues of bad governance are the main factors that have 
brought Malaysians to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in protest to demand more democratic 
openings and good governance from the incumbent regime. The Malaysian ruling 
government is blamed for failing to meet the needs of the poor, disadvantaged, and 
marginalized minorities in a seemingly highly inequitable society.
65
 
Regarding citizen discontent with government performance, this study suggests to 
continue pushing for good governance. Accordingly, this study opens the door for 
discussion of the possibilities to make hybrid regime studies an independent field in 
comparative regime literature, rather than a subfield of diminished types of democracy in 
democratization literature. 
The objective of this study is to evaluate the partially practiced democracy in 
Malaysia and to find out how it actually works in a hybrid political setup. This study also 
hopes to identify the strengths of the hybrid setup, as well as to acknowledge weaknesses, 
discrepancies, and areas of limitation that need to be improved. This study attempts to 
show how some principles of democracy and authoritarian practices are mutually 
engaging to prepare the ground for regime stability and endurance. 
On the basis of these factors, the hybrid regime seems to function not in spite of  
but because of the combination of democratic and authoritarian institutions and the 
combination of incentives and deterrents that result from their interactions. It is also 
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reasonable to claim that hybrid regimes can be both stable and unstable in relation to the 
incentives and deterrents. In addition, it is plausible to claim that the institutional 
apparatus and the mechanism that balances the positive and negative components of 
democracy, in a hybrid regime can somehow provide a ground for equilibrium. 
Thesis Statements 
The hybrid regime in Malaysia may not necessarily transform to be fully 
democratic, but that does not mean that there are no opportunities for progress in 
democratization. This is because the political configuration entrenched in the regime 
through the components of democracy (e.g., regular elections, elite strategies, Internet 
and social media, peaceful mobilization) will somehow facilitate openings for more 
democracy, destabilize the regime, and trigger a possible regime change. On the other 
hand, the political configuration in Malaysia’s hybrid system can also facilitate negative 
components of authoritarianism; such as, control system, strong state, electoral 
engineering, dominant one-party system, and patron-clientele practices that can hamper 
the democratization progress and sustain regime incumbency and resiliency. 
This study provides a comprehensive assessment of the democratic principles 
practiced in Malaysia. One of the goals of this study is to show how democratic traits of 
popular control and political equality work in a political environment that is partly 
democracy with authoritarian control and how they function as a survival strategy. In 
addition, this study provides valuable insights as to what makes regimes in the gray zone 
worth studying. 
The aim of this study is not to create another adjective to describe countries in the 
gray zone. Rather, it is to describe a new dynamic in democratization literature, that a 
27 
“defective” democracy can actually work in a troubled country. The goal of this 
assessment is to shed light for future research of a sustainable hybrid regime type in 
studies of democratization and comparative governments. 
 
Figure 1. Positive and Negative Components of Democratization in Malaysia’s 
Hybrid Polical Configuration 
 
 
Methodological Framework  
The research framework used for this thesis to assess democracy was proposed by 
the well-known non-profit organization that promotes democracy around the globe, the 
International Institute of Democratic and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Their method 
focuses on assessing two democratic principles: (1) popular control, and (2) political 
equality. 
In the democratization field, students and scholars alike are fully aware how 
contested the concept of democracy is. No universal concept of democracy has been 
28 
produced so far in comparative politics history. Thus, according to the International 
IDEA framework, popular control and political equality are the basic principles at the 
root of democracy. These principles clarify how democracy is supposed to work on 
behalf of the people, as well as determine how democratic institutions, mechanisms, and 
values should function for the people. The framework states that the people should 
ultimately control (popular control) what the decision-makers do in their name, and that 
everyone should be equal in exerting that control (political equality).
66
 
According to Professor Weir (2008), International IDEA’s framework does not 
just look at the formal relations between democratic institutions (e.g., Parliament, the 
executive, the judiciary); it goes deeper, into the fabric of the society, the people, the 
local government, the electoral system, and popular participation, to evaluate the 
country’s culture of democracy.67 The framework combines a commitment to the 
fundamental principles of democracy, mediating values related to these principles, and a 
comprehensive range of questions about democratic performance.
68
 International IDEA 
stands on the ground that democracy is not perfect. In terms of the assessment framework 
and within International IDEA’s general orientation toward democracy as an ongoing and 
an evolving process, it is entirely to be expected that democracy is not an “all or nothing” 
affair, so that certain features may be better developed than others and assessing the 
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quality of democracy necessarily requires a multidimensional approach that can provide a 
more nuanced and context-specific “performance profile.”69 
The democratic ideals endorsed by proponents of democracy may be interpreted 
differently and convey overlapping meanings, depending on who is doing the assessment 
and which part of the world they come from. Thus, the International IDEA framework is 
a citizen-led assessment that insists that only citizens and others who have lived in the 
country being assessed should carry out the assessment. This is because only the citizens 
of the country are the best source of experiences to tell the country’s history, the people 
and society, the culture and their experiences with democracy, in order to shape its 
democratic principles.
70
 The objective is to set the future of democracy in the hands of its 
own citizens and not outsiders. 
This method is robust, practical, and universally applicable. It has been tested all 
around the world in new and old democracies, in developed and developing countries. 
Since the year 2000, more than twenty countries
71
 have been assessed using the IDEA 
framework. I used this approach for this study based on two factors: (1) IDEA’s approach 
is open-ended research with flexibilities in measuring democracy. There is no compulsion 
for an objective conclusion expected at the end of the assessment. The assessment 
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questions are robust and do not confine the assessor’s responses into limited areas. (2) 
The framework is open for further modification to suit local surroundings. With this in 
mind, the assessment approach is useful for those who are facing similar complexities in 
approaching an ambiguous political system, such as in Malaysia.  
The IDEA framework helps to identify challenges in order to strengthen the 
country’s method of governing and reform if it is needed. I hope the assessment findings 
will help to inform and educate citizens on the quality of democratic processes as well as 
the progress and weaknesses of democracy in their country. In addition, I hope the 
assessment findings will provide some points of contribution to the existing literature of 
countries that are in the gray zone and that are commonly partly democratic. 
How the Framework Works 
The International IDEA framework is constructed based on two fundamental sets 
of democratic principles:  popular control and political equality. From these two 
democratic principles, the framework derives seven mediating values:
72
 participation, 
authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, and solidarity. 
According to International IDEA, in order for these to be achieved and realized, they 
have to be adhered with a series of requirements that need to be placed via institutional 
means. The combination of these values, their requirements, and institutional means is 
outlined in Table 1 below. The democratic principles (i.e., popular control, political 
equality) and mediating values are used to construct the four main pillars of the 
assessment framework, each of which has a series of subcategories of assessment (see 
Table 2). Each of the subcategories has an overarching question and a series of search 
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questions (a total of 90)
73
 (see Summary of the Framework, Figure 1). This study 
excludes the fourth pillar of democracy beyond the state because (1) Malaysia’s political 
accounts are very much influenced by the domestic politics rather than international 
factors, and (2) international influence is not intense in Malaysia, compared to other 
countries in the region.
74
  
How To Get the Data and Information? 
This study attempts to assess and answer the fifteen overarching questions
75
 
prepared by International IDEA using qualitative and quantitative indicators. The 
answers are in a form of analysis via descriptive-analytical approach.
76
 For this 
assessment, I collected varieties of statistical indicators on democracy, development, 
human rights, and governance, in order to provide answers to the search questions across 
the different subcategories of the four main pillars. Alongside these quantitative 
indicators, which are necessarily limited, this research includes qualitative summaries of 
the key aspects of Malaysia’s democracy, organized using the subcategories and pillars 
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(see Table 2). Data and information on discourses of Malaysian politics were gathered 
through secondary sources from libraries and Internet research; including scholarly works 
from academic journals, newspapers and magazine reports; and analysis of Malaysian 
politics forums, the Malaysian Human Rights Commission, Amnesty International, the 
U.S. Department of State, UN Special Reports on Malaysia, and NGOs, as well as 
blogger sites such as Malaysiakini.com, MalaysianInsider.com, and Aliran.com, all well-
known as reliable online political sources. 
Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter one introduces the research framework and highlights the issues in the 
democratization and transitions paradigm. It contains the issues and paradox of the 
subject of “regime transition” in Malaysia, and discusses the framework of evaluating the 
“democracy” practiced in Malaysia. This introductory chapter also includes the three 
claims made about the regime in Malaysia. 
Chapter two mainly focuses on the theoretical approaches that were relevant to 
this study. It demonstrates the main approaches of democratization studies; such as 
modernization theories, historical structuralist and transition theories, the background of 
third wave democratizations, and some works that discuss “hybrid” regime resiliency. 
The latest trend under democratization studies on how to measure the quality of 
democracy is also discussed. 
Chapter three highlights the trajectory of Malaysia’s politics and the important 
dates since independence to the present. This trajectory is in the form of time lines of 
Malaysia general elections since 1955. 
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Chapter four covers two assessment subjects: (1) assessment of the issues of 
nationhood and citizenship in Malaysia, and (2) assessment of the rules of law and access 
to justice. This is to show how elements of democracy are intermingled with authoritarian 
practices in Malaysia’s political system. 
Chapter five covers the assessment of the conditions of civil, political, economic, 
and social rights. It shows that some democratic rights are constrained by the practices of 
authoritarian control in Malaysia.  
Chapter six covers the issues under Malaysia’s free and fair elections and political 
parties. The objective is to see how these democratic institutions are practiced in a hybrid 
political environment. 
Chapter seven covers the subject of the government’s effectiveness and 
accountability, the role of the military and police, and an assessment on corruption in 
Malaysia. Chapter eight covers the assessment on media and political participation. 
Chapter nine covers the assessment on government responsiveness and decentralization. 
Chapter ten analyzes the overall performance of the so-called flawed democratic 
practices in the Malaysia’s hybrid political system, and discusses some findings from the 
assessment, such as the importance of “good governance” indicators. A general policy 
recommendation is highlighted and a projection of the regime’s future is discussed. 
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Table 1: Mediating Values, Requirements and Institutional Means of Realization 
 
 
Source: Democracy Assessment: The Basics of the International IDEA Assessment Framework
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 International IDEA, Handbook of Democracy Assessment (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2003), 5. 
Mediating 
Values 
Requirements 
Institutional Means of 
Realization 
Participation  Rights to participate 
 Capacities/resources to participate 
 Agencies for participation 
 Participatory culture 
 
 Civil and political rights system 
 Economic and social rights 
 Elections, parties, NGOs 
 Education for citizenship 
Authorization  Validation of Constitution 
 Choice of officeholders/programs 
 Control of elected over non-elected 
executive personnel 
 
 Referenda 
 Free and fair elections 
 Systems of subordination to 
elected officials 
Representation  Legislature representation of main 
currents of popular opinion 
 All public institution representative of 
social composition of electorate 
 
 Electoral and party system 
 Anti-discrimination laws 
 Affirmative action policies 
Accountability  Clear lines of accountability, legal, 
financial, political, to ensure effective 
and honest performance civil service 
and judicial integrity 
 Rule of law, separation of 
powers 
 Independent auditing process 
 Legally enforceable standards 
 Strong parliamentary scrutiny 
powers 
 
Transparency  Government open to legislative and 
public scrutiny 
 Freedom of info, legislation 
 Independent media 
 
Responsivenes
s 
 Accessibility of government to 
electors and different sections of 
public opinion in policy formation, 
implementation and service delivery 
 Systematic and open procedures 
of public consultation 
 Effective legal redress 
 Local government close to 
people 
 
Solidarity  Tolerance of diversity at home 
 Support for democratic government 
and popular democratic struggles 
abroad 
 Civic and human rights 
education 
 International human rights law 
 U. N. and other agencies 
 International NGOs 
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Table 2: Main Pillars and Subcategories in the State of Democracy Framework 
Main Pillars Subcategories 
 
Citizenship, Law, and Rights 
 Nationhood and citizenship 
 The rule of law and access to justice 
 Civil and political rights 
 Economic and social rights 
 
Representative and Accountable 
Government 
 Free and fair elections 
 Democratic role of political parties 
 Government effectiveness and 
accountability 
 Civilian control of the military and police 
 Minimizing corruption 
 
Civil Society and Popular 
Participation 
 Media in a democratic society 
 Political participation  
 Government responsiveness 
 Decentralization 
Democracy beyond the State  International dimensions of democracy  
 
Source: Beetham, D., Bracking, S., Kearton I. and Weir, S. 2002
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Figure 2. Summary of the International IDEA Framework
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Framework (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008), 13. 
Democratic Principles 
 Popular control 
 Political equality 
Mediating Values 
 Participation 
 Authorization 
 Representation 
 Accountability 
 Transparency 
 Responsiveness 
 Solidarity 
Framework Structure 
 
Citizenship, law and rights 
 Nationhood and citizenship 
 The rule of law and access to justice 
 Civil and political rights 
 Economic and social rights 
 
Representative and accountable government 
 Free and fair elections 
 Democratic role of political parties 
 Effective and responsive government 
 The democratic effectiveness of Parliament 
 Civilian control of the military and police 
 Integrity in public life 
 
Civil society and popular participation 
 The media in a democratic society 
 Political participation 
 Decentralization 
 
Democracy beyond the state 
 External influences on the country’s democracy 
 The country’s democratic impact abroad 
Search Questions 
15 Overarching questions 
75 Specific questions 
90 questions in total 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Approaches and Relevance 
When the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, Fukuyama published his famous 
thesis about the end of history and the last man.
80
 This claim is not worthless, because 
history witnessed a surge of countries embracing democracy, one after another like the 
domino effect.  
Over forty countries have gone through this transition between 1974 and 2005, 
with an increase from forty to eighty-nine countries becoming democratic.
81
 However 
democratization studies are not without issues. Since the surge of democracy in the 
1990s, now in the new millennium, the trend has shifted toward evaluating countries that 
have flunked the process of becoming fully democratic. 
Understanding Democratization 
This chapter demonstrates important approaches in democratization studies and 
their relevance to this dissertation. Democratization studies are very interesting and rich, 
because their discourses cover almost the entire field of comparative politics. Also, they 
display problems and success stories of comparative democratization not only in 
developed countries but also countries in the developing and less-developed regions.  
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In this chapter, I show and explain four approaches to understanding how 
democratization works: (1) modernization, (2) structuralist, (3) third wave, and (4) 
transition or agency approaches. Along with these approaches, I also highlight the issues, 
limitations and usefulness of these approaches in order to grapple with the problems of 
the democratization effort in Malaysia. In addition to approaches, included in this chapter 
is the latest trend in democratization literature that is studied for measuring the quality of 
a democracy. 
Modernization Approach 
This theory is an attempt to theorize democracy in relation to Western capitalist 
ideology. This approach began in the mainstream literature of comparative politics in the 
1960s and 1970s.
82
 It underlines the particular variables and components of what make a 
democracy. This process assumes a lineal and untroubled relationship between capitalism 
and democracy; and tends to alienate other factors, such as history, ethnocentricity, and 
the sensitivity of countries outside the western hemisphere. The modernization approach 
focuses overtly on structural factors to explain democracy, since it is based on capitalist 
economy. In comparative politics, the modernization approach invites a widespread and 
active response from critics in this field. Critics argue that modernization theorists ignore 
the particular developmental processes of the Third World; their assumptions are based 
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on the experiences of the Western world, and they made this the platform for others to 
follow.
83
  
The most important theory that defines modernization studies, supported by 
proponents of democracy, was Lipset’s theory of social requisite to democracy. Lipset 
established the theoretical link between the level of development of a particular country 
and the plausibility of it becoming democratic. Lipset stated that the more well-to-do a 
nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy; that a country is more likely 
to be democratic if its socio-economic structure is advanced and developed.
84
 Critics 
argue that Lipset’s research may have a high degree of correlation between a high level 
of economic development and being democratic; however, this correlation does not mean 
a causation of democracy.  
Among prominent critics of Lipset’s thesis were Adam Przeworski and Fernando 
Limongi
85
 who demonstrated that modernization only helps existing democracies to 
survive and does not help democracy to emerge.
86
 Przeworski agreed that the 
conventional empirical observation of validating wealth can sustain a democracy in 
wealthier countries; however, wealth and gradual economic growth do not bring 
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democratic transition from autocracy. Nevertheless, wealth remained strongly related to 
democracy, and its relationship with democracy is probabilistic.
87
  
For instance, Lipset’s theory is irrelevant to be applied in certain countries in 
Southeast Asia and Latin America. Przeworski is right to claim that economic growth 
does not cause a regime to transform to democracy. Evidence from Latin America (post-
World War II) further refutes the thesis of modernization theory. Instead, economic 
progress in that region was associated with the persistence of authoritarian regimes.
88
 
Analysts describe the regimes that emerge in the midst of economic modernization as the 
new authoritarianism. 
 In Malaysia, pressures from economic growth have had a reverse impact. The 
Malaysian state has been formally democratic since independence; however, it has 
become increasingly authoritarian, especially after the incident of ethnic violence in 
1969. Analysts argue that socio-economic development demands changes to democracy 
as well as for authoritarianism.
89
 Therefore, in Malaysia, conditions of economic growth 
are determined by state control over the economy and entrepreneurial class. Thus, 
economic growth and its relations to democracy depends on the ruling elites’ 
commitments to democratic transition, which is hardly the case. Malaysia shows that 
greater economic development has been accompanied by more authoritarianism; which 
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suggests that economic development does not fit the Lipset hypothesis, thus rendering 
economic development neither necessary nor sufficient for democratization. 
David Apter argued that democracy as an end should not be pursued at all levels 
of modernization since it can bring about destabilization to the political process in 
underdeveloped societies.
90
 Similarly, Huntington in his most prominent work
91
 criticized 
and nailed the prevailing modernization theory that argued that capitalist development, 
instead of generating stable democracies, affects stability in developing countries. For 
Huntington, rapid social change produces mass political demands,
92
 which existing 
constitutions find hard to contain; and this results in jeopardizing order in a society. In 
this context, according to Huntington, economic development increases political 
mobilization at a faster rate, thus leading to instability.
93
  
Fukuyama claimed that modernization ignores the particular development 
processes of the Third World; and that, extrapolated out of the experiences of the 
Western world rule for the entire planet, is also inherently ethnocentric. The critique from 
the left says that modernization theorists have enshrined an ethnocentric European or 
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North American model of social development as a universal one for humanity to 
follow. 
94
  
Structuralist Approach 
Historical structuralism is the macro approach to understanding democratization. 
Similar to modernization, which emphasizes economic structure and development of 
democracy, the structuralist approach focuses on long-term historical patterns, such as 
colonial heritage, the state, class, societal fractionalization,
95
 political culture,
96
 and 
international influence.
97
 The difference is that the modernization thesis concentrates 
more on short-term calculations of democracy; whereas, the structuralist approach 
explains long-term predictions of democratization.
98
 According to Teorell (2010), the 
structuralist approach is distinguished from other approaches in that it explains 
democratization progress independent of human agents or actors.
99
  
The state-centered view under the structuralist approach is part of the academic 
response to the excessive focus on the society-centered view toward understanding 
democratization.
100
 According to statists, the “society-centered” perspective is outdated 
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and the state should be the new actor to explain policies and political activities. Important 
writings on the state, such as Bringing the State Back In by Skocpol et.al. (1985), 
emphasizes the state (in a Weberian
101
 sense) as an explanatory variable in its own right 
to dictate the organization of a society itself.
102
 Structuralists use states to explain state 
relations with social classes and how they interact over phases of time in history in 
shaping a political system.  
In Malaysia, the state structure itself became an important explanatory variable 
for understanding how democratization works, or stalls, in Malaysia. Dan Slater (2012) 
called the situation in Malaysia a strong-state democratization.
103
 According to Slater, 
state power in Malaysia has served as the main source of the absolute-power mechanism 
in order for a regime to maintain its incumbency. Thus, the regime in Malaysia will strive 
hard to make sure that they will not lose political control over the state apparatus. 
However, the extent of the arsenal used by the regime in Malaysia, to sustain its power, is 
far greater than would be considered normal and acceptable in a fully democratic country. 
Thus, we can understand why the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) in Malaysia has not lost 
any general elections since independence.  
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Jesudason
104
 (1995) claimed that the position of the state in Malaysia as a statist 
democracy that represents the situation where power holders have much of the leverage 
in determining the rules of political competition, and that allows the incumbents to 
entrench their dominance in the society without employing a high degree of coercion. 
This point is interesting because the concept of a state in Malaysia overtook Weber’s 
definition of a legitimate use of physical force; hence, it marks the characteristics of 
Malaysia’s political system of semi-authoritarian.105  
Institutionalism Approach 
Under the structuralist approach is the institutionalism approach. Some analysts 
claim that studies on institutions are related to agency
106
; others, like Teorell (2010), see 
that institutionalism still bears a strong relevance to structural theories of 
democratization.
107
 Also, institutional explanations as determinants of democracy can be 
seen under areas such as forms of government, electoral system, constitutional 
frameworks, and regime types; these examples are relevant to an institutional explanation 
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that is exogenous to human agency.
108
 I include the institutionalism approach under the 
historical structuralist approach to explain further the roles of institutions as one of the 
many variables for explaining and analyzing democratization and, possibly, also regime 
transition in Malaysia. 
The Social Forces and Democratization 
A seminal work by Moore (1966) provides a milestone for a socio-historical 
understanding of democratization. Structuralists like Moore focus on factors that are 
distinctive to particular cases, like his comparison of the eight major countries Britain, 
France, the U.S., Germany, Russia, Japan, China, and India.
109
 The studies focused on 
how historical accounts of the roots of democracy and dictatorship have influenced 
democracy in the modern world. One important claim that Moore has made is that the 
bourgeoisie class was an important variable that can bring democracy in a country: No 
bourgeoisie, no democracy.
110
 However, later research found that in developing societies 
the middle class does not necessarily work to the advantage of a democracy. For 
example, in Latin America, the middle class actually supports the militarized dictatorship, 
instead of working toward a democratic system.
111
  
Lipset’s middle class and Moore’s bourgeoisie both support the structuralist 
approach, explaining how democracy is achieved. However, this connection is irrelevant 
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in some areas, such as Southeast Asia. In Malaysia, for example, a huge portion of the 
middle class supports the authoritarian regime, instead of demanding regime 
transformation. Thus, the claim that growing the middle class creates pressures for 
democracy is questionable, at best. The middle class in Malaysia is relatively large, but 
they are divided along ethnic lines. Government policies that positive discrimination 
responds more to the demands of Malays has alienated ethnic non-Malays. Thus, the 
ethnic divisions in Malaysia have forestalled any unified middle-class or working-class 
action against the dominant regime.
112
 A divided and a weak middle class in Malaysia 
renders them ineffective to push for democracy or to resist authoritarian government.  
The strength of the structuralist approach is that it is more grounded and 
explanatory and it provides comparisons across countries and regions. Yet, critics claim 
that this approach is old school and obsolete for explaining regime change. They 
acknowledge agents like classes and states, but they do not sufficiently explain 
institutions, individuals, and elites as agents of change. Their view on structures has 
determined that outcomes are too simplistic and predetermined, thus lack of a micro-
foundation. 
Third Wave Approach 
Samuel Huntington,
113
 the great scholar of democratization, named the post-
1974
114
 period the “third wave” of global democratic expansion.115 This prompted him to 
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write the Third Wave theory
116
 to validate those events. Since then, Huntington’s wave 
theory has been widely accepted as providing a basis for analysis. In addition to 
confirming the liberalization of many countries, he acknowledged that the wave also 
involves countries that are not fully democratized, some which previously had made the 
transition but reversed back to non-democratic rule.
117
  
The Third Wave theory
118
 was not, however, a manifestation of a broader cross-
cultural modernization process that eventually would encompass all societies, but one 
rooted in a particular set of cultural values inherited from Western Christianity
119
; also 
that the dissemination of the ideologies of democracy will have positive implications 
from transnational activities. This is where the problems are realized regarding 
Huntington’s Third Wave theory in particular, and the democratization paradigm in 
general. Huntington is criticized due to the weakness of the Third Wave theory’s 
assumption that democratization is the result of positive transnational activities. 
Historically, even though the origin of modern democracy may be rooted in Western 
Christianity, globalization and the West do not represent the vanguard of a universalizing 
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democratic movement.
120
 In addition, critics say that Huntington’s prediction narrowly 
focuses on untainted elections instead of including effects of the fallacy of electoralism. 
Critics also say that by overemphasizing the global aspects of democratization, 
Huntington has ignored actual causes for democracy that seminally involve the 
configuration of domestic politics of nation states; including historical legacy, institution-
building, class structure, civil society, and the power of state.
121
 The important factor that 
comes out of the democracy third wave is that ambiguous regimes got stuck in the 
continuum between authoritarian and full democracy. 
Transition Process-oriented Agency Approach 
In response to the relative inability of modernization and structural approaches to 
explain the third wave democratization processes, new literature on democratic transition 
emerged in the 1980s, adopting an agency or process-oriented approach. This literature 
emphasized the importance of political actors and their ideas and ability to interact with 
each other (incumbent and opposition) to peacefully bring about a democratic transition.  
A huge part of transition theory has focused more on the strategic choices of 
agents or actors such as political elites. According to Howard and Roessler (2006), elite 
strategies and “incumbent-opposition dynamics” are more important to “competitive 
authoritarian” regime than structural factors for determining political liberalization.122 
However, the agents/elites approach on democratic transition is irrelevant to Malaysia, 
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because there is no obvious cooperation between the ruling elites and opposition elites 
when it comes to negotiating a regime transition. The ruling elites have so far remained 
strong and unified under the regime. It is the opposition elites that are weak, due to 
different ideologies.  
Transition theory emphasizes the importance of political change and focuses on 
liberalization, transition, and consolidation. Rather than focusing on economy, history 
and development as in the modernization approach, the transition school believe that it is 
individual actors such as elites (either from the incumbents or the oppositions) who are 
responsible for regime transition to democracy. This is where the problem lies. Too much 
focus on agents neglects other variables that are also part of explaining how and why a 
regime succeeds or fails to become democratic. 
Rustow (1970),
123
 one of the main critics of Lipset and structural literature in 
general, claimed that they neglect the micro or genetic aspect of how democracy comes 
into being.
124
 To address this neglect, Rustow came up with a model of democratization 
that emphasizes certain stages/phases that a country must go through from authoritarian 
to democratic rule. These phases are: the preparatory -> decision-> habituation.
125
 
Many recent works on transitions have continued this emphasis. Twenty years 
after Rustow, O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) came out with strong research on the 
relevance of political actors as agents in democratic transition in Latin America. In other 
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words, what matters is not that political elites have a normative commitment to 
democracy, but that they are willing to accept it as a compromise. Huntington (1984) and 
Karl (1986c) likewise argued that democracy has been an unintended consequence and 
that political elites have viewed democracy as a means of realizing other objectives.
126
 
Critics and analysts argue that the transition stage of democratization is regarded 
as a period of great political uncertainty; that regimes can reverse, re-becoming 
authoritarian rather than transforming into fully democratic. According to Karl and 
Schmitter, the transition period is a subject of unforeseen contingencies, unfolding 
processes, and unintended outcomes.
127
 This is the stage where the hybrid regimes 
emerge; instead of going through the end process of democratization, these regimes get 
stuck in-between the continuum.
128
 
One of the interesting issues in the literature is the connection between democracy 
and uncertainty. Przeworski’s contributions have highlighted the uncertainty of 
democracy. The process of establishing a democracy is a process of institutionalizing 
uncertainty and subjecting all interests to uncertainty. In an authoritarian regime, some 
groups, typically the armed forces, have the capacity to intervene whenever the result of a 
conflict is contrary to their program or interests. In a democracy, no group is able to 
intervene when outcomes of conflicts violate self-perceived interests. Democracy means 
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that all groups must subject their interests to uncertainty.
129
 This tradition stresses the 
uncertainty and possibilities that surround transitions to democracy. 
130
 
The wave of democratic optimism after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
triumph of capitalism around the globe, has given way to more somber appraisals about 
the current condition of democratic systems in the developing world. There is a growing 
awareness that elections alone do not guarantee the full quality of a democratic system. In 
addition, only a few countries that were supposed to transition to democracy have 
actually reached the stage of consolidation of the system. Instead, most of the countries in 
Africa, Asia, and ex-Communist states, have come to occupy an uncertain middle ground 
between complete authoritarian and full democracy. Some have even reversed back to 
becoming authoritarian. 
These so-called ambiguous democracies have been variously described as flawed, 
illiberal
131
 or more generally hybrid regimes
132
; what Ottawa 2003 claimed was an 
ambiguous system that combined rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy … with 
essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. Academics and policymakers have 
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focused increasing attention on the challenges and dilemmas of these gray-zone 
countries: hybrid regimes.
133
 
Resilient Hybrid Regimes  
While others in democratization studies have attempted to analyze the failed 
process of democratic transition, lamenting regime defects with façade democracies that 
disguise authoritarian practices; others claim that these regimes will not stand and that 
‘‘liberal authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not 
stand.’’134 How is it that so many countries around the world, Malaysia being a classic 
example of a regime with mixed/ hybrid system,
135
 have endured for more than fifty 
years?  
Much discourse in the transition literatures discusses how a country can be 
democratic and end up with a democratic consolidation. However, not many have given 
thought to regimes of this kind that have endured challengers and critics and have 
thrived; not only surviving, but are stable and resilient. The transition paradigm limits the 
further understanding and reality of regimes in the gray area. These limitations in the 
democratic transition paradigm should be given some reflection. 
Regimes like these are not in a transitional mode; they are here to stay. According 
to Hobson (2003), the assumption that the current status of regimes in the gray area is 
only temporary and the idea that they will eventually become either a democracy or 
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reverse back to authoritarianism is problematic. He does not agree that regimes at this 
stage should be called democracies, because these regimes do not meet all the definitional 
criteria of what a democracy is. For those who assume that these regimes will end up 
reverting to authoritarianism, serving the teleological pitfalls and normative judgments, 
Hobson further argued that viewing these regimes from the dichotomy of a “democracy + 
elections’ mindset” obscures the real nature of these entities. Only by removing this 
mindset can analysts progress toward a fuller understanding of what these regimes truly 
are.
136
 
Merkel (2004), in his analysis,
137
 showed that defective democracies are by no 
means regimes in transition. They tend to form stable connections to their economic and 
social structures and are often seen as considerable parts of the elite population and as an 
adequate institutional solution to the specific problems of governing effectively. These 
regimes will remain for a long time, he says, as long as there is equilibrium in the 
system.
138
  
Brownlee (2007) commented on regimes that are partially democratic and 
partially autocratic, which Huntington labeled halfway houses. Instead of being unstable, 
wrote Brownlee, this kind of regime has, in fact, become “a fortress – not a way station 
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but a way of life.”139 According to Brownlee, comparative scholars have thrived on 
political change, especially the installation of democracies after years of dictatorship. 
However, Brownlee also stressed that, in order to explain regime change, regime 
continuity should be taken into consideration as well.
140
  
Since the end of the Third Wave theory, there has been increasing skepticism 
about the outcomes of many regimes that were thought to be in transition. The gray-zone 
and hybrid regimes seem to be dominating the condition of those countries, especially in 
the Third World. Bogaards (2009), in his study of hybrid regimes, claimed that the 
prospect of democratic consolidation for these kinds of regimes are farfetched; thus, that 
these regimes must be considered a type of their own rather than categorized as regimes 
that are undergoing the process of transition.
141
  
Dan Slater (2009) argued that, in order to study a regime, one must directly 
observe how stable and resilient to challenges and crises those regimes have proven to be 
over time. Slater described Malaysia as a regime with endurance capacity; not because it 
has lasted more than five decades, but that it is durable because it has shown a 
remarkable capacity to manage conflicts.
142
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Countries in the gray area have been given many labels, such as “partial 
democracy,’’ “semi-democracy,’’ “façade democracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “soft 
authoritarian,” “competitive authoritarianism,” and “electoral authoritarianism.” To date, 
there are many emerging interests in the studies of this ambiguous regime type, and my 
project is one of them. This study, therefore, will fill the opening in the democratic 
transition discourse on why a regime can remain a hybrid and survive for a long period of 
time without reaching the destination of becoming democratic or fully authoritarian. 
Measuring Democracy  
The wave of democratization around the world in recent decades has brought 
about a rising need for a means to assess, measure, compare, and explain democratic 
progress cross country, cross region, and over time. The issues in democratization studies 
no longer focus on democratic transition and its consolidation. Focus in contemporary 
democratization studies is on how to measure the qualities of these democratic regimes 
that have undergone the transitioning stage, as well as democracies that are already well 
established.
143
 According to analysts, three challenges face the new interests of 
measuring democracy: conceptualizing; measurement and aggregation.
144
  
All of these challenges are very poorly resolved by existing measures of 
democracy. Regarding democratic concept specification, existing measures are based on 
a conception of democracy that is too simple and lack a sound conceptual logic that can 
be standardized to be used in other cases. Aside from conceptual inadequacy, the method 
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of measuring (the measurement) used to create indices that do not demonstrate high 
validity or reliability and some cannot be imitated. Finally, researchers who have used the 
existing measures neither discuss nor justify their aggregation level and rules.
145
  
A number of composite indices were developed to measure democracy. Coupled 
with the advancement of statistical methods, democratic indices became powerful tools of 
social science research and an important factor of political decision-making. Well-
established democracy indices, such as Freedom House and Polity IV, are criticized for 
not being sensitive enough to measure the delicate differences among established 
democracies. For instance, well-established indices like Freedom House, Vanhanen, and 
Polity are more relevant to be used to distinguish a democratic country from non-
democratic country; thus, they are not designed to measure the quality of established 
democracy. The reason for this is their minimalist concept as a basis for democracy.
146
 
The reason for measuring democracy is to establish where democratic countries 
stand on a scale of democratic quality. O’Donnell criticized mainstream political science 
on democracy for regime bias. Political science can rely on predominantly narrative or 
statistical methods for observing and understanding democracy. Important recent works 
in narrative traditions—O’Donnell et al. on measuring democracy in Latin America, 
Diamond and Morlino et al. on measuring comparative democracy across the world—
focused on the complexity of democracy and the need to look beyond the regime type in 
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the assessment of quality, stating that observation should focus on the situation of the 
citizens.
147
 
A sample study in Norway on democracy assessment drew on large-scale surveys 
of attitudes and beliefs among political, business and cultural elite; as well as surveys of 
citizenship and political behavior, in addition to analyzing political processes and 
structures. O’Donnell et al. developed a theory of democratic quality that links 
democracy with human rights. Diamond and Morlino et al. identified a range of 
dimensions for assessing democracies, including their responsiveness.
148
 
Lijphart studied thirty-six countries, comparing two types of democracies— 
majoritarian and consensus democracies—to show how they differ in performance. 
Political scientists agree that consensus democracies should be better in 
representativeness, and majoritarian democracies should be better in terms of efficiency 
of rules. Lijphart found that consensus democracies tend to outperform majoritarian 
democracies in both representativeness and efficiency of governance, indicating that 
democracies do differ systematically in quality and performance.
149
 
The main issue in measuring quality of democracy is how to actually measure it. 
What framework should be used? Must the method be standardized so that it applies 
universally? Can different cases use different measurement method? Lastly, how should 
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democracy be graded? Is democracy a property that can be graded in terms of having 
more or less of it, or is it an either/or phenomenon?  
Measuring the quality of a democracy is the latest new field in democratization 
studies. Various types of measurements and assessments have been designed and applied 
to new and old democracies, displaying different degrees of consolidation. The goal of 
this new literature on democracy assessment and measurements is to learn what makes a 
democracy work better or worse and to provide policymakers and other agents of reforms 
insights on how democracy can be improved and strengthened in a country. 
The issues surrounding this new literature are on how to untangle the concept of  
democracy vs. its quality. When assessing the quality of democracy, one should bear in 
mind that levels of understanding about the structure and process of democracy are 
substantially different across geography and societies. Different socio-cultural, economic 
system, and institutional patterns explain democracy in variations of ways and standards. 
In developing countries of late, people have started to demand more government 
accountability, transparency, and social justice. Citizens are beginning to understand that 
elections alone are not sufficient to make a good democracy.  
In Malaysia for example, decades of semi-authoritarian rule, rising socio-
economic inequalities, rising corruption among government officials, and preferential 
treatments that benefit few have made Malaysians demand good governance from the 
ruling regime. 
  
 59 
International IDEA and Democracy 
This method maintains a more dynamic position that sees democracy as an 
ongoing process in all countries, which cannot be imported or exported but must be 
supported. To this end, the International IDEA Handbook on Democracy Assessment, and 
the revised edition Assessing the Quality of Democracy: A Practical Guide, both adopt a 
wide and substantive definition of democracy that is built on fundamental principles and 
mediating values; the fundamental principles being (1) popular control over decisions and 
decision-makers, and (2) equality of respect and voice between citizens in the exercise of 
that control.
150
  
The International IDEA framework of assessing democracy does not yield 
comparative quantitative measures; the move from higher-level theoretical concepts and 
democratic principles to analytical categories and search questions represents an adoption 
of virtually the same principles. The IDEA approach is broadly inclusive of the 
constitutive elements of democratic development; however, it lacks an explicit theory of 
how these elements are related to one another and how democratic development occurs 
and is sustained.
151
 
The surge of democracies since the end of the Cold War has been acknowledged 
and noticed. New interest in comparative politics literature has arisen in seeking to 
explain the conditions for the emergence, breakdown, or survival of different regimes; 
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and to address questions regarding the quality of these new democracies and issues 
surrounding the stages of democratic consolidation of transitional regimes/countries.  
The quality of democracy is a multifunctional phenomenon, and it does not make 
sense to measure the quality of democracy in non-democratic countries. The literature on 
the quality of democracy is in an early stage; there are no well-established hypotheses 
about the causes (or consequences) of a good democracy.
152
 The assessment of a 
democracy’s progress may not be sufficient to be explained holistically by concentrating 
on statistical measurements without an explanatory approach. By using a case study 
approach, research can go in-depth in analyzing and measuring how a democracy 
functions in a particular country. A statistical approach or quantitative approach should 
go well with large-N studies; however, for a single case study like Malaysia, a qualitative 
study is more relevant. 
Democracy assessment can be used for analyzing the problem of consolidation as 
well as different trajectories, processes, and outcomes under democratization.
153
 I believe 
that democratization should be explained holistically and, thus, use all four approaches in 
analyzing democracy in Malaysia. 
Conclusion 
I have displayed the approaches under democratization studies that I believe are 
important to understanding how democratization (third wave democracy) can plausibly 
bring about regime transition or regime stalling in the process. I argue that these 
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approaches are important for understanding why some regimes transform to democracy 
and why some do not and, instead, pause in the process. I also argue that each of these 
approaches may be relevant and can provide sufficient explanation if applied to particular 
cases, but may not fit to explain other cases. Hence, taking one approach in isolation will 
not provide a satisfactory explanation for the outcomes of regime transition. Different 
approaches under transition theory should be considered complementary to each other, 
instead of competing with each other or dominant against the other approaches, in 
explaining certain cases or many cases, given that each of them has their own strengths 
and limitations. 
In conclusion, I have determined that all approaches for understanding the 
democratization process—modernization/economic, historical structuralism, and 
transition approaches—are relevant and play a part in understanding the political system 
in Malaysia. By using all of these approaches, we can discern what variables cause 
democratic achievement and what hinder its realization. Democratization requires a 
collective action of classes and social movement, more than just an agency- and actors-
oriented approach.  
Teorell (2010), in his studies on regime change in the world, found that it is 
important to have an integrated theory of democratization for measuring democratic 
quality. Singling out one or two approaches is not enough to fully describe the 
complexities of democratization, especially in countries that are different than the 
original hypotheses used in successfully developed Western countries, Latin America, 
 62 
and Southern Europe.
154
 All of the approaches are important; each has its own strengths 
and limitations in explaining the issues and advantages of democratization in developing 
countries. For instance, economic growth theories alone cannot be used to analyze 
democracy in a country such as Malaysia or Singapore or the oil-rich Gulf states. This 
explains why these cases are as important and intriguing as the democratization 
paradigms studied.
155
 
What works will necessarily depend upon national circumstances; and what works 
in one country will not necessarily work in another. However, successful cases of 
democracy practices that benefit the people can be emulated by others, as long as they do 
not disturb the equilibrium of the socio-economic construct of the polity. The main 
advantage of having methods to measure the performance of a political system and its 
governance is always beneficial to know; from these assessments, policy and decision 
makers can improve the quality of their government performance. 
Bottom line, there is no single correct research strategy for researching political 
and social phenomenon. As Lakatos (1978) wrote, a theory is evaluated not only on the 
basis of parsimony but also on the grounds of the comprehensiveness of the explanation 
advanced and the extent to which it provides a promising foundation for future 
research.
156
 Each strategy has its own strengths and weight for explaining particular 
issues in particular cases. Some may not have the advantages of explaining and resolving 
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paradox due to limitations; however, this does not mean that some approaches are 
completely useless. In practice, both the researcher and the analyst must be ready to be 
more open to venturing different approaches than conventionally used.  
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Chapter Three: Malaysia’s Political Trajectory Since Independence in 1957 
Politics in Malaysia is influenced by two forms of governing: (1) partial 
democracy, and (2) controlled mechanism used by the state as its apparatus to manage the 
country. These sets of ruling have continued since the tragedy of ethnic violence that has 
marred Malaysia’s history as a plural society. Malaysia since then has used the incident 
to mark its politics as based on communalism. On this ground, politics in Malaysia 
presumably, cannot be managed under fully liberal democratic ideas alone and instead 
has to be supported by control apparatus to stabilize the whole political structure.  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the backdrop of the establishment of 
Malaysian regime’s157 experiences and to provide an understanding of the subsequent 
trajectory to trace any kind of political change experienced by Malaysia after colonialism 
ended in 1957. The backbone of this time line is the twelve general elections that have 
taken place since 1955.  
1955 
This is the only general election held under the then federation of Malaya on July 
27, two years before independence. Voter turnout was 82.8 percent and the Alliance Party 
won about 80 percent of the total vote. The election resulted in a decisive win for the 
Alliance; comprised of United Malay National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian 
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Chinese Association (MCA), and Malaysian Indian Council (MIC).
158
 The outstanding 
issue was the independence factor, which allowed the Alliance Party to secure 
outstanding victory against the opposition. The only opposition candidate was from the 
Malayan Islamic Party, later known as Pan Malaysian Islamic Party or Parti Islam se-
Malaysia (PAS) and was nicknamed Mr. Opposition.
159
  
1957 
In 1957, Malaya, the old name for Malaysia before its official formation in 1963, 
gained independence from the British. However, the independence of Malaysia is 
different from the independence of other countries. It was a peaceful independence, 
attained by holding talks with the British. One can claim that Malaysians, especially the 
Malays are non-confrontational people who are likely to accommodate and who practice 
a politics of give and take.  
The UMNO became the bastion of Malays’ political power and the protector of 
Malay communities; the MCA found potential support from the Chinese business 
community and joined the Alliance right before the independence, mainly to protect the 
interests of the elites. The Alliance party (now Barisan Nasional, BN) demonstrated the 
political stability and multi-ethnic harmony that were essential for the new nation-state’s 
survival. Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister, set the pattern of administration 
for future prime ministers. In his government, as one observer claimed, the essence of 
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Alliance bargaining was not equality but mutual dependency, combined with a 
willingness to cooperate and accommodate.
160
 
1959 
Malaysia’s first general election after independence was held in 1959. Tunku 
Abdul Rahman’s administration had managed to put aside the sensitive issues such as 
education, language, and the Malays’ special rights; and focused more on calling for 
communal harmony. During campaigning, they pointed to their good record over the past 
four years, promising further progress. The party stood for tolerance and amity among the 
ethnic groups of Malaya’s plural society. The Alliance won successfully in 1959, because 
they succeeded in convincing the people of their main role as the best safeguard of the 
nation’s domestic peace. 161 It is claimed that the period from 1957 until the 1969 
ethnicity riots is generally regarded as a harmonious period in Malaysian history. 
1963 
On 16 September 1963, the formation of Malaysia consisted of the formally 
propagated Federation of Malaya, Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Brunei declined to be 
under Malaysia. Singapore, then, was a state in Malaysia, until it seceded in 1965.  
1964 
Malaysia’s second general election after the independence was held April 25, 
1964. The Alliance party won 89 of the 104 seats. The People Action Party (PAP) headed 
by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore won only one seat. Every Alliance Minister was returned, 
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with an even bigger majority. The result, according to Lee, came as a shock. The 
resulting victory of the Alliance is believed to have been due to the Tunku’s leadership 
and his call for patriotism and public support in the face of Sukarno’s confrontation.162 
Even though the PAP leadership was keen to establish a partnership with UMNO in the 
Alliance, its intention was doubted by leaders in the Alliance. The mutual suspicion 
between PAP and UMNO resulted in an intense ethnic antipathy in Malaysian society. 
The manifestations of these were the two ethnic riots that took place in Singapore in July 
and September 1964.
163
 The speech by Lee Kuan Yew in 1965, calling for Malaysian 
Malaysia, further strained the relationship between the Malay elites in the Alliance and 
the PAP. This was considered the most serious threat ever to the framework of a Malay 
nation-state; hence, it contributed toward the “expulsion” of Singapore from Malaysia.  
1965 
Singapore seceded from Malaysia in 1965. In the beginning, the Alliance’s idea to 
include Singapore under Malaysia was a wise thing to do in order to contain its left-
leaning Singapore politics.
164
 However, shortly after the formation of Malaysia, the 
wisdom of the idea was challenged. As widely claimed, the incorporation of Singapore 
into Malaysia created an unstable balance of power between the state of Singapore and 
federal government in Malaysia in addition to conflicts of interest socially, economically, 
and politically.  
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The People Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore created an 
alliance of its own under the new Malaysia, proposing Malaysian Malaysia which was 
against the aspirations of Malaysia’s own Alliance Party.  
Since Malaysia is a heavily plural society, the then ruling elites, especially 
premier Tunku Abdul Rahman, were widely known for their peaceful nature and beliefs 
that communal solidarity is an extremely dominant force in Malaysian politics. The threat 
of communal violence was apparently the crucial factor that made the federal government 
make the crucial decision to oust Singapore from Malaysia.
165
 Some critics (mostly the 
ultra-Malay nationalists) argued that Tunku’s act of letting Singapore slip away was a 
mistake. Nevertheless, ethnic violence did not end in 1964; it happened again in 1969. 
1966 
As a result of the official formation of Malaysia in 1963, after almost four years 
of confrontation
166
 with Indonesia, the two nations agreed to a peace treaty in 1966; 
although Indonesian President Sukarno believed that the formation of Malaysia had been 
colonial clandestine to maintain British colonial rule behind the cloak of peaceful 
independence given to Malaysia in order to maintain their colonial possessions in 
Southeast Asia. It was also claimed that the formation of the Malaysia federation 
destroyed Sukarno’s ambitious plan to create Melayu Raya or Greater Indonesia.167 
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Nevertheless the confrontation (1962–1966) was an “undeclared war,” with most 
of the action in the border area between Indonesia and East Malaysia (Sabah and 
Sarawak). Malaysia was assisted by the Commonwealth armies, mostly from Australia 
and New Zealand. In October 1965, Sukarno was toppled in Indonesia and the “New 
Order” was begun under General Suharto. In late May of the following year, his foreign 
minister, Adam Malik, met Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia’s deputy prime minister, for 
peace talks in Bangkok, and the Peace Agreement was signed 11 August 1966.
168
 
1969 
Malaysia’s third general election on 13 May 1969 is renowned for the ethnic riots 
that followed, marring the peaceful history of Malaysia’s plural society. The consequence 
also included the collapse of Malaysia’s consociational practices, plus a return to power 
for the Alliance Party (comprised of UMNO, MCA, MIC), although with a reduced 
majority. The Alliance Party’s seats fell from 89 in 1964 to now 66, and its popular votes 
declined from 58.4 percent in 1964 to 48.5 percent.
169
 The opposition parties, such as 
Gerakan and Democratic Action Party (DAP), had campaigned on the highly sensitive 
issues against Malay privileges that were outlined by Article 153 of the Constitution, 
causing major gains in the election. On May 12, jubilant Gerakan and DAP supporters, 
mainly Chinese, took to the streets of Kuala Lumpur in a victory celebration, ridiculing 
the Malays and predicting future Chinese successes. A counter-rally by UMNO 
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supporters the following day led to unprecedented and uncontrolled ethnic violence. The 
official result showed the death of 196 people (could be more than reported), 406 injured, 
and unaccounted properties destroyed.
170
 
Ethnicity had been a strong factor in Malaysian political life long before 1969. 
However, the scale of violence on this day radically changed not only the political system 
but the wider social consciousness. Following this episode, the consociational model of 
the pre-independence era developed into a hegemonic party system,
171
 with UMNO 
establishing itself as a dominant party supported by growing Malay nationalism. The 
ascending groups of Malay nationalists had lost faith in the leaders of the Alliance and 
were pressing for a stronger Malay government.
172
 These groups blamed the election 
results, and the violence that followed, on the ongoing economic hardship of the Malays 
and called for policies to address this economic imbalance.
173
 
As a result of the ethnic violence, a state of emergency was declared. The 
Parliament was suspended and an emergency government—the National Operation 
Council (NOC) under the directorship of the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak—
took over. Tunku later resigned as premier and Tun Abdul Razak took over as Malaysia’s 
second prime minister.  
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It is claimed that the era of complete Malay political dominance took effect after 
1969. Tun Abdul Razak and the groups of Malay nationalists demanded a new 
affirmative policy to correct the perceived discrepancies in the socio-economic system in 
Malaysia, in an effort to manage the opposition and dissidents. This usually involved 
government actions that curtailed human rights, with repressive instruments such as the 
Draconian Law of ISA, which had been used to contain a Communist threat some fifty 
years previous and this time was used against the opponents.
174
 As such, the political 
system ceased to be one of consociationalism and became one of control exerted by a 
UMNO-led BN coalition. Nevertheless, observers claimed that, aside from the repressive 
measures to manage constraints in the country, the government combined them with 
responsiveness.
175
  
1971 
The most radical change in the wake of 1969 was the establishment of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP). May 13, 1969 had confirmed the fear of many in Malaysia’s 
fragile plural society, where ethnic tensions were high, that only a strong state could 
prevent the society from plunging into the abyss of societal collapse. The ethnic violence, 
hence, initiated a state-run social engineering program known as the NEP, whose 
objectives were two-pronged: first, to eradicate poverty; second, to restructure the society 
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through rapid expansion of the economy over time, in order to eliminate identifying one’s 
ethnicity with economic function.
176
  
Aside from these two objectives, critics claimed that the interventionist 
affirmative policies of the government at all levels of society had perhaps caused the 
greatest creation of wealth in the shortest span of time by peaceful means in the history of 
the world.
177
 Analysts also claimed that the NEP were providing the government the 
accumulation of resources in order to support their patron client relations within the 
society. Although the NEP discriminated against the non-Bumiputeras, NEP proponents 
claimed that NEP was a positive discrimination policy that helped to correct the 
inequality and socio-economic imbalance that had been entrenched in the society since 
independence. Nevertheless, the UMNO-led government was flexible to allow a free 
market economy to develop, and the government gave the non-Bumiputeras a free hand 
in the economy as long as quotas and shares were allocated to Malays.
178
 
1974 
In Malaysia’s fourth general election in 1974, the result was a victory for Barisan 
Nasional (BN), the coalition ruling party (formerly known as the Alliance Party) 
established in 1973. BN managed to capture 135 of the 154 seats in the Parliament. This 
meant the BN was much stronger now at the federal level than the Alliance had been in 
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1959. The main reason for the victory was the strong support the BN got from the main 
ethnic composition in Malaysia: the Malays, Chinese, and the Indians.
179
 
1978 
In Malaysia’s fifth general election in 1978, as expected, the BN comfortably 
maintained their majority in the Malaysian Parliament, with 131 of the 154 seats 
contested. The premier during that time was Tun Hussein Onn, the country’s third prime 
minister. Despite PAS’ withdrawal from BN, the UMNO still won by losing only four 
seats, and Kelantan lost to UMNO. MCA lost to DAP, winning only 17 of 28 
parliamentary seats. The issues used by DAP to attack BN were the 1961 Education Act, 
the Merdeka University, and the Industrial Coordination Act. Nevertheless, despite 
garnering 42.8 percent of the total votes, the opposition as a whole only won 23 seats. 
Critics and analysts claimed that those were the effects of electoral gerrymandering.
180
 
Analysts claimed that the decade after 1978 saw the consolidation of BN’s rule, in 
particular UMNO’s hegemony over the ruling coalition’s party.181 
1981 
In 1981, for health reasons, Hussein Onn relinquished power to Mahathir 
Mohamad, who then became Malaysia’s fourth prime minister. It is significant to include 
this moment in the time line of Malaysian politics, because for the next twenty-two years, 
                                                 
179
 Chandrasekaran Pillay, “The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia: The Post Mortem,” Occasional Paper 
25 (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974). 
 
180
 Malayan General Election 1978 Malaysia Factbook, available at 
http://malaysiafactbook.com/Malaysian_general_election,_1978. 
 
181
 In-Won Hwang, Personalized Politics: The Malaysian State under Mahathir (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 118. 
 74 
he would preside over a repressive-responsive
182
 state that tightly guarded the preferential 
status of Malays, curbed civil liberties, destroyed judicial independence, and delivered a 
steady economic growth with plenty of patronage to go around. In addition to Mahathir’s 
authoritarianism and the growth of illiberal democracy,
183
 post-1969 political 
developments were marked by an expanding middle class, competition within the Malay 
community between UMNO and the opposition PAS, Sino-Malay tensions, and the slow 
but steady growth from 1998 onward of a civil society movement that began to transcend 
communal barriers. One or more of these factors has been responsible for most of the 
major shake-ups in politics over the last four decades.
184
 
It was in Mahathir’s administration that the mechanism of control and executive 
dominance increased in an effort to manage constraints in the system. One of the 
methods, for instance, was controlling mainstream media. The existing control of the 
media became even stronger under Mahathir’s leadership. By the end of the 1980s, 
UMNO and its coalition partners were able to control all the mainstream media, in both 
publishing and broadcasting, through ownership. In addition to direct ownership of the 
media, Mahathir’s administration increased control by tightening regulations that affected 
freedom of the press. After Mahathir came to power, many opposition-oriented 
publications lost their printing permits and journalists were occasionally punished for 
their contributions that negatively portrayed government policies.
185
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1982 
Malaysia’s sixth general election in 1982 was held more than one year early, 
before the term of the Parliament elected in 1978 was due to expire. It was claimed 
necessary to provide a mandate for Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, who had taken office in mid-
1981.
186
 As expected, the ruling coalition Barisan Nasional (BN) won the overwhelming 
majority of seats, 132 of the 145 parliamentary seats (91.0%).
187
 
Factors for the big win were, aside from the natural advantages accrued by 
controlling the resources of government, BN’s claim of an impressive long-term record 
of achievement, economically and in terms of political stability and overall ethnic 
harmony. In addition, they were proud of the strong government, which the BN claimed 
was necessary to maintain the country as evidence of a major economic takeoff. The 
opposition parties, on the contrary, were disorganized, underfinanced, traumatized by 
infighting, lacked credible alternative programs and policies, and were unable to ignite 
issues or to get their various messages across convincingly.
188
 
1986  
Again, as expected, in Malaysia’s seventh general election in 1986, the UMNO-
led BN achieved an unprecedented victory, particularly in the rural areas which are 
predominantly Malay states. BN won 148 seats, DAP 24, PAS 1, and independents 4. Of 
all the BN component parties, UMNO performed the best, winning 83 of the 84 seats 
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contested. MIC also performed well, winning 12 of the 13 seats allocated. DAP’s 
performance was their best ever in Malaysia’s election history. This made DAP the only 
opposition party in the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat). The main reason for 
DAP’s achievement, particularly in urban areas, was that they successfully articulated 
their criticism of the government on ethnic issues, economic mismanagement, financial 
scandals, and corruption. MCA lost their appeal for its pro-government’s policies.189 The 
BN component party that performed badly was MCA and Gerakan; they suffered a 
humiliating defeat, winning only 17 of the 34 parliamentary seats allocated. 
1987  
Malaysia’s economic recession in 1987 resulted in a more controlled flow of 
patronage, and rewards to new elites. Thus, the economic downturn can be seen as the 
catalyst for a split waiting to happen. Mahathir was challenged for the presidency of 
UMNO, and effectively the prime ministership, by Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah.
190
 The 
post of president provided an effective accession to the prime ministership. Hamzah’s 
new party, Semangat 46, teamed up with Party Islam se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian 
Islamic Party), PAS, and the Democratic Action Party (DAP) to form an opposition 
alliance called Gagasan Rakyat Malaysia. The opposition bloc campaigned on an anti-
corruption platform within the context of UMNO and NEP patronage.
191
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Also this year, in October, the Internal Security Act (ISA) again took effect, in 
Operasi Lalang. Under this repressive law, 106 persons were detained for allegedly being 
involved in activities prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. These included Lim Kit 
Siang, leader of the opposition, and Dr Chandra Muzaffar, a prominent human-rights 
activist (both were detained for two years), as well as university lecturers, 
environmentalists, businessmen, and some members of UMNO. All had been critical of 
the government.
192
 From there on after 1987, tighter authoritarian rules were applied to 
strengthen Mahathir’s centralized political control.  
1988 
There were two important events in 1988. First, the split within UMNO, revealing 
not just a power struggle but a hegemonic crisis, which signified a fundamental shift in 
the political basis of the union. UMNO was split in two: UMNO Baru (new), known as 
Team A, led by Mahathir; and Semangat 46, known as Team B, led by Razaleigh 
Hamzah.
193
  
The second major event was the sacking of the Tun Salleh Abbas, the Lord 
President (highest judicial figure in the land) by Mahathir, for gross misbehavior and 
conduct. This action was taken because the judge had written a letter of protest to the 
Agong in disagreement with Mahathir’s decision to increase the power of Parliament to 
remove the general power of the High Court to conduct judicial reviews. A tribunal set up 
by Mahathir found Salleh guilty and recommended to the Agong that Salleh be 
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dismissed, along with five other judges who supported him, which the Agong did. This 
most blatant intrusion of the separation of power that had ever happened in Malaysia’s 
political history, according to Milne and Mauzy, destroyed the independence of 
Malaysia’s judiciary.194 
1990  
Following the split in 1988, in Malaysia’s eighth general election in 1990, the 
UMNO-led BN political hegemony was still intact. The dynamics of the split had created 
a more centralized political union. Although the unpopular feelings against Mahathir 
were high, they were balanced by the economic recovery. This was proven by the BN 
winning the election again, as expected, in which it won 127 of the 180 parliamentary 
seats (70.6%).
195
 Despite the high expectation that the Gagasan Rakyat would do well in 
the election, voters decisively rejected them. One of the main reasons was the dispute 
over goals between DAP and PAS and Semangat 46. For instance, PAS’s platform to turn 
Malaysia into an Islamic state was totally incompatible with DAP’s secular view of a 
multi-cultural and multi-religious society.
196
 In addition, the Semangat 46’s relation with 
the PAS was never smooth. In sum, all three parties were hopelessly divided to oppose 
the dominant UMNO-led BN coalition. 
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1995 
Malaysia’s ninth general election in 1995 had no surprises. The BN won 162 of 
the 192 parliamentary seats (84.4%) contested,
197
 easily surpassing the two-thirds 
required for amending the Constitution. Some claimed that this was the Reaffirmation of 
Barisan Nasional dominance.
198
 Despite predictions that Mahathir would face stiff 
opposition in three states, his coalition government—the BN—won the election in a 
landslide victory. The result was the best for the BN since Mahathir had come to power 
in 1981, and the political landscape had changed significantly since the 1990 general 
election. One change was the disappearance of the opposition alliance, the Gagasan 
Rakyat.
199
  
The most distinctive feature of the 1995 general election was the considerable 
shift in Chinese votes in favor of the BN. Observers found that, in this election, the BN 
was courting Chinese voters due to the fact the UMNO Baru (the new UMNO) could no 
longer take the Malay vote for granted because of the divisions within the Malay 
community, especially in the rural areas of Kelantan and Trengganu where the PAS held 
power. Thus, cultivating the Chinese vote was not simply a short-term solution to 
problems faced by UMNO Baru in the northern Malay states; it also reflected a concern 
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with the steady erosion of popular support for the BN since 1982. In this regard, the 1995 
election rightly portrays the dominant party regime as a strategic actor.
200
 
1997 
The 1997-1998 East Asian crisis, triggered by the collapse of the Thai baht in July 
1997, led to a currency crisis, a financial crisis, then an economic recession in most 
countries of the region. However, the Malaysian economy and population were not as 
adversely affected as their counterparts in Thailand, South Korea, and Indonesia. Thus, 
Malaysia was the only country involved in the East Asian crisis that did not involve the 
IMF.
201
 
The currency crisis in 1997 triggered the tension between Anwar Ibrahim’s 
faction and those who were opposed to his rapid rise in UMNO. Tensions also escalated 
due to Anwar’s opposition to the government’s desire to bail out a crony’s firm, 
particularly those who had ties with Mahathir and UMNO, including Mahathir’s own son 
Mirzan Mahathir.
202
 Anwar’s positions against Mahathir’s policies during the currency 
crisis are said to confirm rumors that he was plotting to oust Mahathir. However, 
worrying more about a palace coup than ideological differences, Mahathir sacked Anwar 
from UMNO and from the vice-president position. Anwar’s debacle led to creating an 
informal coalition, which became the main opposition to Mahathir’s government; it was 
based on the PAS, the DAP, the small Malaysian People’s Party led by Husin Ali, and 
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about a dozen NGOs. In addition to defending Anwar, the group was also championing 
reform, particularly opposition to nepotism, corruption, and cronyism. They lacked 
coverage by the mainstream media; however, they got to exercise some influence through 
the Internet and the new media.
203
 Then Anwar was arrested under ISA in September 
1998, after numerous political speeches that criticized Mahathir and the UMNO-led 
government on corrupt practices, nepotism, and cronyism. The charges brought against 
Anwar were very demeaning and shameful, and brought a revolt by the Malays under a 
movement called Reformasi.  
1998 
The Reformasi movement in 1998 is considered a unique moment in Malaysia’s 
political history where a sense of unity was felt by Malaysian society. Observers and 
analysts claim that Anwar’s imprisonment and demonizing accusations against him were 
politically motivated by Mahathir and his cronies. The Malay communities, sensing some 
sort of injustice done to their favorite political leader,  took to the street to protests. 
Whatever it meant to different groups, the Reformasi movement was more than just a call 
to justice for Anwar. It was a call for change in government policies, including concerns 
of Chinese and Indian activists; and it was a call for social justice, human rights, and 
Malaysians who felt excluded from the system.
204
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1999  
Discontent was obvious but insufficient to topple Mahathir during Malaysia’s 
tenth general election in 1999. BN still won and kept a two-thirds majority, but they lost 
14 seats and  won only about 56 percent of the votes cast. The UMNO was the biggest 
loser in this year’s election. Their share of the parliamentary seats decreased from 88 to 
72, losing mainly to PAS and Parti Keadilan Rakyat (People Justice Party).
205
  
The result of this election was the creation of the multi-ethnic Alternative Front 
(Barisan Alternatif) comprised of PAS, DAP, and Keadilan into a short-lived opposition 
coalition. Though they lost to BN, nonetheless, the oppositions in this election scored a 
symbolic victory, ensuring that calls for good governance (transparency, accountability, 
eliminating corruption) would continue in the future. 
2003 
In 2003, Mahathir stepped down as prime minister and Abdullah Badawi took 
over as Malaysia’s fifth premier. Mahathir continued to be the focus of criticism, until he 
stepped down in October 2003, turning power over to his deputy, Abdullah Badawi. 
Badawi’s mild-mannered and low-key style were a welcomed change from Mahathir’s 
harshness and arrogant attitude. Badawi’s adoption of some of the key planks of the 
Reformasi platform, especially a commitment to curb corruption and his promotion of 
Civilisational Islam (Islam Hadhari), suggested a non-threatening evolution to greater 
communal harmony and a little more justice, with the stability that ongoing Barisan 
Nasional patronage could buy. 
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2004 
In Malaysia’s eleventh general election in 2004, the BN coalition captured 198 of 
219 seats in Parliament, on the way to their most convincing electoral performance since 
1974. BN also managed to increase their share of popular support from 56.5 percent in 
1999 to 63.8 percent in 2004. Likewise, opposition votes declined markedly from 44 
percent in 1999 to 30 percent in 2004. Most notable was UMNO’s return to prominence; 
as the dominant party in the Barisan coalition, they managed to secure 109 of the 219 
parliamentary seats contested, only one seat shy of an absolute majority.
206
 
It is claimed that the BN coalition had won the 2004 general election before it 
even began. This is because the advantage of incumbency had always offered UMNO and 
the BN several avenues through which to create an electoral environment that would 
work in their favor. While much attention was focused on parties and personalities during 
the 2004 elections, the role of civil society slipped quietly to the sidelines of Malaysian 
politics, marginalized once again by the state as well as by other political forces and 
interests that intended to showcase the titanic struggle between UMNO and PAS as the 
centerpiece of the elections. Indeed, civil society movements, so proactive and politicized 
merely five years before with the growth of the Reformasi movement, were 
conspicuously absent in 2004.
207
 
Thus, Malaysia’s eleventh general election proved to be a monumental triumph 
for Abdullah Badawi, UMNO, and the Barisan Nasional. The extent of the victory was 
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largely attributable to the personality and policies of Abdullah.
208
 Most important, 
Abdullah’s creed to curb corruptions in his government had given hope to the Malaysians 
that, this time, their government would be more accountable and clean. In addition, this 
election witnessed major lapses in opposition strategy. However, a careful investigation 
into the issues that surfaced during and after the election indicates that much remains 
vague about the trajectory of Malaysian politics. 
2007 
In this year of the Bersih and HINDRAF movements, in November Kuala 
Lumpur witnessed tens of thousands of protestors take to the streets, calling for electoral 
reform. The police claimed that the protesters did not have the permit to gather in 
Merdeka Square and they dispersed the crowd with tear gas and water cannons. However, 
the crowd claimed that they had the right to express their views.  
This event had been organized by a group called Berish (Clean) and comprised of 
a mixture of NGOs, CSOs and opposition parties. The issue they demanded was electoral 
reform and prevention of fraud in the electoral system.
209
 It was in this context that civil 
society and opposition politicians organized the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections 
(Bersih), with the goal of getting the opposition a more even playing field for the twelfth 
general election coming up in 2008. Some 245 people were arrested.
210
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The second largest gathering that same year was the country’s ethnic Indian 
community, who protested against the government’s ethnic discrimination policies. They 
drew attention to the fact that ethnic Indians lived under poor socio-economic conditions. 
This second protest was regarded as the largest mass demonstration by ethnic Indians in 
decades. It mobilized 10,000 protestors under the banner of the Hindu Rights Action 
Forces (HINDRAF).
211
 
2008 
On March 8, 2008, Malaysia held its unprecedented twelfth general election, 
which resulted in what became known as the political tsunami
212
 in Malaysian politics. 
This is because for the first time since 1969,
213
 the coalition government lost to the 
opposition their two-thirds majority in the Parliament and their control of four state 
governments.
214
 No analyst had foreseen this event, given the strength of the BN 
machinery so far. This was a disaster on a major scale for BN and UMNO and was 
perceived as a sea change that eventually could spell the end of Barisan dominance.
215
 
The largest swing of votes away from the BN came from the non-Malays. By 
2008, the BN was being criticized for undermining the interests of the Indian community. 
The issue that hurt the Indians was the government’s demolition of several Hindu temples 
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in 2007 on the grounds of being illegally constructed. Also, increasing poverty and 
marginalization of the Indians aggravated multiple problems facing the community.
216
 
Abdullah’s reputation for weak leadership and flip-flopping on important decisions 
alienated the three main ethnic groups, with close to 70 percent of Indians voting against 
him. Rampant corruption and abuse of power further angered the voters. Abdullah 
promised to clean up the system under his National Integrity Plan and to set up an 
independent Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA). However, he was caught between staying 
in power and agreeing to his promises, and personal weakness and a lack of conviction 
led to corruption reforms going downhill.  
The March 2008 election signaled the idea that the BN could not remain in power 
forever simply by mobilizing ethnicity-based politics. The opposition parties won, not on 
ethnicity issues but across a range of issues that cut across ethnicity lines.
217
 In addition 
to credibility problems of BN leaders, the public were tired of rampant corruption, 
scandalized politics, and issues on the government lacking transparency and 
accountability.  
2009 
By 2009, the political landscape had changed again. Prime Minister Abdullah 
Badawi was forced to step down after the huge loss in the 2008 general election. He was 
replaced by his deputy, Najib Tun Razak, who was frequently referred to as an UMNO 
prince because of his privileged background and the fact that his father had been prime 
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minister in the 1970s. Compared to Badawi, as the sixth prime minister, Najib 
demonstrated stronger authoritarian tendencies, exemplified by the government’s 
response to the anti-Internal Security Act demonstrations in August 2009 and his move to 
take over the Perak state government earlier in the year. Najib understood that the only 
way to keep hold of a restive electorate was to move toward reform in many areas, such 
as his bold effort to abolish ISA and OSA in 2011; however, he was still not ready for 
electoral reform.
218
 
2011 
Dismantling—or being seen to dismantle—the state’s machinery of repression 
was a carefully considered strategic move by Prime Minster Najib Tun Razak . The most 
important part of that machinery was the Internal Security Act (ISA), a holdover from the 
colonial era, which allowed preventive detention of security suspects for two-year 
periods, indefinitely renewable. More than anything else, the ISA symbolized the 
illiberalism of Malaysian democracy, and its removal had been a key demand of the 
Reformasi movement and civil society. On 15 September 2011, Najib announced plans 
for the ISA’s repeal.219 
2012 
Prime Minster Najib Tun Razak introduced into Parliament: (1) in April, 
amendments to the 1971 Universities and University Colleges Act, to allow students to 
take part in political activities; (2)  in July, his planned repeal of the Sedition Act; (3) in 
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August, liberalization of the Printing Presses and Publishing Act, to allow greater 
freedom of expression; and (4) in November, a Peaceful Assembly Act. All of these 
actions were lauded in the government-controlled media as evidence of Najib’s 
credentials as a reformer. Criticism, however, came from all sides: from the UMNO right 
wing, including Mahathir, that the reforms were a sign of weakness; to the opposition, 
saying the reforms did not go far enough. Even a reformist member of UMNO 
acknowledged that, on close examination, the reforms were less than they seemed.
220
 
2013 
Malaysia’s thirteenth general election—in April 2013 221—was the most 
anticipated in Malaysian history. The Barisan Nasional (BN), led by Prime Minister 
Najib Tun Razak, and Pakatan Rakyat (PR), led by Anwar Ibrahim, were the main 
contestants. BN had been the longest-ruling coalition in the world and everyone was 
asking whether Najib could sustain his premiership and the UMNO-led BN dominance 
against the opposition coalition which was gaining momentum in terms of support from 
potential Malaysian voters.  
As predicted, the BN won again, for the thirteenth consecutive time since 
independence from the British. However, this latest election witnessed the most unified 
challenge ever from the coalition opposition parties. The ruling party may have won but 
it was by a more narrow margin than they had ever experienced. For the first time in 
BN’s history, the opposition coalition party won the popular vote, showing a 
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vulnerability in the incumbent’s position. Also very significant, the BN captured only 133 
of the 222 seats in Parliament; thus, denying them—for two elections in a row and only 
for the third time since independence—the needed two-thirds majority (first in 1969, then 
2008, now 2013).  
The Economist has described Prime Minister Najib Abdul Razak’s win in the 
2013 election as a cheap victory, that only brought to the fore a system that is skewed 
toward the BN. Analysts say that this was the dirtiest election in Malaysia’s history; that, 
tired of the unfairness, cronyism and corruption, the voters, especially the young and the 
growing urban middle class, abandoned the BN.
222
 
Conclusion 
This chapter staged the time line of the Barisan Nasional (BN) regime in Malaysia 
since its establishment in 1963, based on the years of the general elections since 1955. 
This discussion shows the regime’s persistence under six premiers. In twelve general 
elections, only twice did the BN lose their super majority in the Parliament, 1969 and 
2008. Chapters four, five, and six address the practices of democratic principles and the 
control mechanisms at work in Malaysian politics.  
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Chapter Four: State of Democracy Analysis 
Citizenship and Nationhood 
This chapter examines dilemmas regarding common citizenship and nationhood 
in Malaysia, and assesses the overarching question: Is there public agreement on a 
common citizenship without discrimination? Malaysia’s pattern of politics and 
governance, which combine democratic procedures with authoritarian practices of control 
and repressive rules, are categorized here in what is broadly understood as a hybrid 
system or political regime.
223
 Two main issues that allegedly contribute to these 
dilemmas are: (1) Malaysia’s social contract, and (2) the Affirmative Action Policies.  
The issue of citizenship has tainted the smooth rolling of Malaysian democratic 
politics since before and after independence. This main issue has caused debates, 
arguments, and fights among Malaysians, especially when a general election is 
approaching.  
Malaysia is well-known as a plural society that is deeply divided along ethnic 
lines: economically, politically, culturally, and socially. After more than fifty-four years 
of independence, Malaysia did not score well as a “melting pot” society that can be 
proud, as experienced in the United States, for example.
224
 However,  Malaysia scores a 
high grade for being relatively peaceful, stable, and prosperous, in comparison to other 
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plural societies that have a history of colonialism; for example, Indonesia, India, Rwanda, 
Sri Lanka, and many other post-colonial states with histories tainted by ethnic conflict 
and violence. This is not to say that Malaysia has not experienced ethnic grievances at all. 
The most major, and the last one, that is considered a tragedy in Malaysia’s political 
history was in 1969. This event is also considered a national tragedy, because it disrupted 
Malaysia’s consociational democracy.225 This ethnic tragedy of May 13, 1969 is claimed 
by many experts and pundits as the main event in Malaysia’s ethnic history that changed 
and shaped the Malaysian political system until now.  
The Roots of the Nationhood Paradox 
Before Malaya became a united Federated Malays state, there was the Malayan 
Union. According to analysts, the idea of the Malayan Union was propagated by the 
British in 1946, which galvanized Malay’s sentiment toward nationhood. It is said that 
without consultation with the Malay elites and masses, the British came up with the idea 
of the Malayan Union, which called for liberal citizenship terms for non-Malays, to end 
special rights of the Malays, and to eliminate the power and status of Malay sultans. 
Reactions from the Malays to this idea of a Malayan Union were swift, intense, and 
confrontational. Due to fierce protests, the British abandoned the plan. However, this 
episode highlighted the sensitivity of the issue of non-Malay citizenship.  
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According to Chandra Muzaffar, the Malay elites believed that a political system 
that offered a common citizenship and equal political rights for all would destroy the 
Malay race and would unjustly strip the Malays of their inherent rights as the historical 
community.
226
 Hence, the foundation of the Malayan Union’s ideas were somehow 
relevant to what have been demanded by non-Malays, especially on the right to equal 
citizenship status without preferential treatment given to any specific ethnic groups.
227
 
Another significant occurrence that resulted from the Malayan Union idea was the 
creation of a central Malay political organization (United Malay National Organization, 
UMNO), which became the primary political party to protect and promote Malay 
interests, and continues even today. The UMNO constituted the core and undisputed 
leadership of the Malay society as a whole. It was the most powerful party, and pushed 
through a plan for a federation with centralized powers and Malay special rights; the 
powers and special position of Malay rulers were restored and citizenship regulations 
were made complex and strict.
228
Now the question, who could belong to the Malaysian 
nation? Was it just the Malays? What about the non-Malays who had been born and bred 
in Malaysia for generations?  
It is claimed by analysts that the Malays have constantly been reminded by the 
Malay elites that, unlike the Chinese and Indians, they had no other homeland but the 
Malay land (the Federation of Malaya). Thus, they were the rightful sons of the soil. 
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Whereas, the non-Malays had been brought in by the British and were immigrants who 
maintained a loyalty to mainland China and the Indian subcontinents.
229
  
This may have held true in the early years of the formation of Malaysia; however, 
after five decades of independence, the descendants of the immigrant Chinese and 
Indians, who had lived in Malaya all their lives and intended to live the rest of their days 
in Malaysia, who had known no other country and who pledged allegiance to the Malay 
states as their one and only “homeland,” they too wanted to be regarded as rightful sons 
of the soil of Malaysia. The problem, could the Malay nationalists accept this? I believe 
that if a Malaysian nation is to be established, these points must be taken into serious 
consideration. 
Therefore, one must ask, what is the source of discrimination? It is the social 
contract argument, in which the non-Malays claim that they have been discriminated 
against on the basis of race, or being non-Malay. So, who are the Malays? According to 
the Constitution of Malaysia, the Malays are those who are from the Malay race, speak 
the Malay language, practice the Malay culture, and hold Islam as their faith.
230
 
A key feature of Malay nationalism has been a sense of otherness; the Malays 
have regarded non-Malays as the “other” who poses a threat to the essential survivability 
of the Malay nation. Therefore, boundaries were created to being a Malaysian nation, in 
which “the other” must be differentiated from the Malays, with a highly developed sense 
of us versus them. In other words, the Malays must protect, by whatever means, 
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everything considered Malay. However, the non-Malays were on the defensive; and, 
upon gradually realizing that Malaya is in fact their homeland as well, the “others” in 
their view were the Malays, who were given a special position and who conferred upon 
the non-Malays (usually referred to as the Chinese and Indians) the status of being 
second-class citizens.
231
 
After the failure of creating one Malayan nation through the Malayan Union in 
1946, the British realized they could not cultivate a civic nationalism in Malaya as the 
country progressed toward independence. The vast majority of Malays did not agree on 
the idea of granting political equality and common citizenship to the non-Malays; 
however, the British insisted that in order for independence to be granted to Malaya, the 
Malayans must prove to the British that they could co-exist peacefully with the non-
Malays.  
By this time, the communities were already mobilized on the basis of ethnic 
political parties: the Malays with UMNO and Party Islam Setanah Melayu (PAS), the 
Chinese with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and Indians with the Malayan 
Indian Congress (MIC). The British supported a multi-ethnic political party and 
considered transferring power to the Malayans only if they would form an Alliance. The 
first president of UMNO, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, was influenced by this idea and, in 1950, 
proposed openness toward the non-Malays to becoming members of UMNO.
232
 
However, this idea by a prominent Malay leader was strongly rejected by the Malays, 
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causing Dato’ Onn to be expelled by UMNO. This consequence proved how the idea of 
opening UMNO to the others was feared by the Malays.  
Dato’ Onn went on to establish an Independence of Malaya Party (IMP), with 
membership open to all Malayan communities. However, the party was decisively 
crushed during the next municipal election and was dismantled shortly thereafter. This 
occurrence also proved the Malays’ position regarding accepting the “others” under the 
banner of Malayan nationhood.
233
 
UMNO was set up to serve as the protector of Malay interests and their special 
position. Tunku Abdul Rahman, elected as the UMNO president in 1951, was one of the 
founding fathers who had worked to achieve independence for Malaya. The Alliance 
Party, founded in 1953 in an effort to get independence from the British, was comprised 
of the elites in the three ethnicities—Malays, Chinese, Indians—and were from the 
various parties, UMNO, MCA and MIC, respectively.  
These ethnic “bargains”234 shaped the form and fate of Malaysia. In the 
negotiations, the leaders of the three dominant ethnic communities (Malay, Chinese, 
Indian) reached an understanding: that the Malays would be dominant in the government, 
and the non-Malays were granted citizenship and assured that their position in the 
economy would not be disturbed.
235
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Specifically, the “bargain” offered liberal citizenship status to the non-Malays on 
the basis of jus soli
236
 as the major concession by the Malays, in return for acceptance by 
the non-Malays of the Malays’ special position as the rulers, of Islam as the state religion, 
and of Malay as the sole official language. This bargain
237
 established an informal 
understanding among the elites that UMNO and the Malays would be the “first among 
equals” in politics; in return, the Chinese could pursue economic dominance free of 
restrictions and persecution. Although much was purposefully left vague in the 
constitutional bargain, these terms satisfied the major claims of each of the communities 
and led to ethnic solidarity, favoring independence in 1957.
238
 This concession was 
enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution under Article 153, which entitles Malays to their 
special rights and, to the non-Malays, citizenship.  
This act of bargaining among the three main ethnic groups was widely claimed as 
Malaysia’s “social contract.”239 However, critics argue that the “social contract 
provision” is nowhere to be found in the Constitution and that it only surfaced in the 
1980s when the phrase was widely used by UMNO politicians. Also, this social contract 
is said to be detested by non-Malays (e.g., Chinese and Indians), who charge that it is an 
“apartheid system,” because the contract or bargain’s foundation is based on ethnic 
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discrimination against those who are non-Malay; and who charge that the government  
divides the people into Bumiputeras
240
 and non-Bumiputeras, who are to be treated 
differently, all in the name of the social contract. It is claimed that the classification does 
not augur well with the objective of creating one Malaysian nationhood, because it is 
bound to create prejudice among the people, which will keep them apart. Hefner (2001) 
has argued that the foundation of the social contract is what triggered the debate and 
criticism of the citizenship issue in Malaysia, that what is conferred to the non-Malays is 
not equal citizenship but a form of differentiated citizenship.
241
 So what is the social 
contract that some Malaysians say is the main problem that is blocking the creation of 
one Malaysian nation?  
The Social Contract aka The Bargain 
The Malays were recognized as having a fundamental stake in the political 
system; while the non-Malays were assumed to be concerned primarily with a dominant 
position in the country’s economy. In effect, the communal compromises involved some 
trading of economic power for political power, with the objective of equalizing the 
proportionate distribution of power and wealth. The demands of non-Malays for 
increasing political participation were met by acceptance of the principle of jus soli, 
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whereby everyone born in Malaya after independence would be counted as a citizen.
242
 In 
return, the Malaysian Chinese and Indians accepted the Malays’ special rights.  
The Malays’ special rights were a peculiar part of the communal compromises, 
because they were designed to both improve the economic position of the Malays and to 
ensure the latter’s dominant role in the political system. The non-Malays were told that 
special rights were necessary only because of the Malays’ inferior economic condition; 
also, it was implied that, once the Malays achieved economic parity with the non-Malays, 
the special rights would be reconsidered and, presumably, would be eliminated and no 
longer necessary. Thus, throughout the years, these two contradictory sets of expectations 
have been generated among the Malays and the non-Malays as to whether the Malays’ 
special rights are temporary and transitional, or permanent and inalienable.
243
 
When the Constitution for Malayan independence was being drawn up, the issue 
was again reexamined by Lord Reid who was charged with the responsibility of drafting 
the new Malaya Constitution. However, the Reid Commission found it impossible to 
reconcile the two principles of the bargain: (1) providing a common nationality, and (2) 
safeguarding the special position of the Malays. The first principle presumed the equality 
of all citizens, while the second involved the creation of separate rights for two classes of 
citizens. The Commission expressed its preference for the principle of equality, but it 
acknowledged that the Malays would suffer if special privileges were suddenly 
withdrawn. To resolve this contradiction, the Commission did not give the Malay special 
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rights constitutional status; rather, they allowed the system to continue by law, thus 
permitting termination or diminution by legislative enactment.
244
 
The Reid Commission’s most controversial proposal provided that the Malays’ 
special rights would be continued for a substantial period, but that, in due course, the 
present preferences should be reduced and should ultimately cease.
245
 Accordingly, the 
Commission recommended that the existing Malay privileges should be reviewed fifteen 
years after independence, with the objective of preparing for their eventual abolition.
246
 
These suggestions by the Reid Commission were vehemently rejected by the 
Alliance government, which mounted a successful campaign to include a constitutional 
guarantee of Malay rights and to delete all provisions regarding their future reevaluation 
or eventual reduction. Thus, in the final Constitution of Malaysia that came into operation 
in 1957, the Malay special rights received specific constitutional sanction and protection. 
So that, Article 153 authorizes a system to safeguard the special position of the Malays 
through a system of quotas applied to the public service, to scholarships, to training 
privileges, and to licenses for any trade or business. Article 89 sanctions the system of 
Malay Reservations, and permits the state legislatures to add to a land area that has been 
declared a Malay Reservation. The only limitation is that at least an equal area should be 
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made available for general alienation and that the new area added to a Malay Reservation 
should include no land already owned by non-Malays.
247
 
To ensure that the operation of the democratic process would not erode or 
terminate Malay special rights, the latter were given a unique constitutional status. Article 
153 begins: “It shall be the responsibility of the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong [Paramount 
Ruler]
248
 to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of 
other communities.…”249 Similarly, approval of the Conference of Rulers is required for 
any change of policy relating to the special position of the Malays and Malay Rights as 
defined in Article 153; and any amendments to Article 153 require agreement from the 
Conference of Rulers. As a result, these provisions make the Malay special rights more 
difficult to amend than the Constitution itself.
250
 
For these reasons, it is no surprise that Article 153 is one of the most controversial 
articles in the Malaysian Constitution. Critics consider it to create an unnecessary 
distinction between Malaysians of different ethnic backgrounds. In response to Article 
153, proponents argue that the protective provisions were written into the Constitution 
not with the intention of pulling back the advancement of the non-indigenous peoples but 
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with the intention of securing the advancement of the indigenous peoples who, through 
no fault of their own, were educationally, socially, and economically less advanced.
251
 
Following the establishment of the Malaysian Federal Constitution in 1957, in 
1963 Malaysia was created and the Chinese, under Singapore’s People Action Party 
(PAP) led by Lee Kuan Yew, challenged the foundation of Malay nationalism and Malay 
claims to dominance. The Chinese-dominated party called for a Malaysian Malaysia 
based on ethnic equality rather than a Malay Malaysia that gives special rights and 
privileges to the Malays. 
This PAP challenge angered the Malays and the settled issues were stirred again. 
The language issue became a focal point when the Chinese demanded a wider official use 
of the Chinese language and to elevate it to co-official status. This effort was countered 
by a Malay determination to secure the full implementation of “the bargain” over 
language. UMNO youth said if language was to be reconsidered, so should be 
citizenship.
252
 
Nasty riots followed in Singapore in the summer of 1964, which led to Singapore 
being dispelled from Malaysia. The official separation was announced in 1965. Fortunate 
for the Singaporeans, the Malay leader during that time was Tunku Abdul Rahman, who 
was well-known for his soft spot toward the Chinese.
253
 When the UMNO ultras 
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demanded him to send an army to get the island back from Lee Kuan Yew, Tunku 
rejected this idea. 
Singapore’s expulsion did not resolve ethnic problems in Malaysia, however.254 In 
1969, a few days after the election results were announced, the opposition, mainly the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), made significant gain. During the victory rally, the 
opposition who were mainly Chinese were jubilant; and, during the celebration, they 
provoked the Malays through demonstrations on the streets of Kuala Lumpur, mocking 
the Malays to go back to the jungle. As retaliation, the Malays made counter-
demonstrations, telling the Chinese to return to mainland China. These insults and 
provocations led to the worst race riots Malaysia had experienced so far; hundreds were 
reportedly killed, and thousands of Ringgit in property were lost. 
These riots caused the government to declare a state of emergency
255
 and they 
suspended the press and the Parliament. A National Operations Council (NOC) was 
established, which functioned as a de facto government for about two years. With 
parliament suspended, the NOC became the supreme decision-making body (1969- 
1971). The NOC implemented security measures to restore law and order in the country, 
and peace was gradually achieved. In February 1971, parliamentary rule was re-
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established and, to restructure the wounded society, affirmative action policies were 
established.
256
  
The Affirmative Action Policies (AAP) 
Since the riots in 1969, ethnic issues have gripped Malaysia’s political culture. 
The government had struggled to find acceptable reasons for what had caused the ethnic 
riots and, finally, confirmed that the deteriorating socio-economic and political situation 
in the 1960s had caused it.
257
 This led to establishing the Affirmative Action Policies. In 
Malaysia, these policies were government-mandated preferences for government-
designated groups.
258
 The Malays were designated as the disadvantaged group at varying 
levels of economic and social development; thus, making it imperative for the 
government to intervene to help some of them to overcome their economic 
disadvantages.
259
 In addition to the AAP were government remedies to the socio-
economic imbalances, which existed due to the British colonialists’ policy of divide and 
rule among the three major ethnic groups. 
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Proponents of these policies still argue that many constitutions empower 
schemes
260
 of preferential treatment in order to elevate the status of those who are 
economically, socially, and culturally disadvantaged; such as women and children, 
aborigines, “untouchables,” and other marginalized groups and communities in society. 
The AAP was awarded to the Malays for being the bumiputera (sons of the soil), stating 
that they had suffered from socio-economic inequality inherited during the colonial 
period and consolidated in the post-independence years. Obligations were placed on the 
State to take charge of the AAP actions, to restructure the deprived Malays; thus, State 
paternalism was needed to promote the economic and social welfare of the Malays as the 
disadvantaged community.
261
 
The AAP became a compensating, as well as remedial measure, to undo the 
effects of past discrimination. Today, it still operates broadly, mandating special 
privileges for the politically dominant but economically depressed Malay majority, 
protecting minorities like the Orang Asli (Malaysia’s indigenous peoples) and the native 
communities of Sabah and Sarawak, and conferring special privileges to underdeveloped 
regions in Sabah and Sarawak.
262
  
Although these services are part of the “social contract” in which the non-Malays 
have rights of citizenship and cultural and linguistic protection and the Malays are 
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guaranteed a continuation of their special position, critics say that these policies cause 
ethnic division and segregation which will hinder the plan for Malaysian nationhood. The 
goal of the AAP policies was to put the Malays (the natives) on a more equal footing with 
the immigrant populations (mostly ethnic Chinese), for fear of reverting to the social 
imbalances that had been set during the centuries under colonial rule; which had started 
with rule by the Portuguese, then the Dutch, then the  Japanese, and ended with the 
British.
263
  
With regard to inter-ethnic income inequality, although there were claims that the 
AAP had diminished such inequality in Malaysia, some indicators contradict these claims 
and show, in actuality, a worsening situation of inequality between various income 
groups within the nation as a whole and within each ethnic communities.
264
 Although the 
AAP often has been portrayed as providing measures that increase social cohesion, 
according to some critics, such policies actually have reinforced ethnic division, 
antagonized the less favorite ethnic groups (especially the Chinese), and exacerbated 
ethnic tensions. For instance, since the enforcement of the National Cultural and 
Educational Policies in 1971, which favors the Malay language and culture, especially in 
terms of getting government support, there have been growing tensions between the 
Malays and the Chinese communities.
265
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In addition, claims of abuse and corrupt practices have rendered the AAP to be 
poorly distributed and to be concentrated in the hands of a few in the societies. Instead of 
benefitting the poor Malays, the AAP has morphed into cronyism and has widened the 
gaps between the haves and haves not; a lack transparency in the implementation has 
caused unchecked corruptions by those in power. 
Critics strongly argue that these privileges are entrenched in the Constitution and 
they are against repeal in many ways. First, they state that any Bill to abolish or curtail 
these privileges may be caught by the law of sedition.
266
 Second, under Article 159(5), 
any amendment to Article 153 will require a special two-thirds majority of the total 
membership of each House of Parliament plus consent of the Conference of Rulers. 
Third, any change in policy affecting administrative action under Article 153 requires the 
government to consult with the Conference of Rulers.
267
 Fourth, Article 10(4) of the 
Constitution permits Parliament to prohibit questioning of any matter, right, status, 
position, or privilege protected by Article 153.
268
 
Ethnic affirmative action policies implemented and enforced in Malaysia have 
associated the interests of entire ethnic groups with their respective elites; thus, 
generalizing resentments associated with inter-ethnic and intra-class competition. Thus, it 
is unlikely that the ethnic affirmative action policies will achieve the end of improved 
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inter-ethnic relations. An alternative approach needs to be found in order to create more 
lasting conditions for improved inter-ethnic relations.
269
 
Jomo (2004) claimed that a comprehensive alternative solution must be taken in 
order to engage ethnic issues, stating that partial solutions cannot work in tackling a 
complex ethnic integration paradox in Malaysia. For instance, one cannot wish away 
ethnic discrimination without tackling the existing problem of inter-ethnic inequalities 
and prejudice to which discriminatory policies and actions respond.
270
  
Maznah (2005) argued that appropriate “ethnic management” is important in 
tackling ethnic issues in Malaysia. According to Maznah, Malaysia’s development policy 
was clearly predicated on a group-based framework, as opposed to a group-blind policy 
that places individual well-being as the core concern. While group-based policy has 
predominated, the motives for such a policy may have been driven by multiple concerns 
rather than just group benefit. The notion of “horizontal inequality”271 has become a 
persistent tool for justifying unequal allocation of resources, rights, and privileges among 
contending forces.
272
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Proponents of the AAP argue that, despite widespread non-Malay resentment of 
many existing policies, Malaysia has not experienced the trauma of the race riots in 1969. 
In response to this, some analysts have claimed that direct interventionist policy by the 
State, such as the AAP, is the basis for Malaysia’s stability. For whatever it is worth, and 
no matter if the policy is successful at bridging disparity gaps, it has had the effect of 
quelling mass inter-ethnic dissatisfaction. Therefore, the AAP, such as the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), must by necessity take on the form of an hegemonic discourse, 
accompanied by an array of state-coercive mechanisms that will mute dissent. The 
politically powerful group is the preferred group and is pacified by the policies. For the 
un-preferred group, the fear factor is usually explained as the reason behind the absence 
of dissent against the plan or a lack of opposition toward the ruling party that implements 
it.
273
  
What explains stability in Malaysia since the race riots of 1969? To understand 
Malaysia’s sense of ethnic peace, one relates it to the social condition of 
multiculturalism, or ethnic co-existence. Each group has actually existed separately but 
within parallel systems in a cultural and economic sense. Thus, as long as each group 
feels that their interests are not being threatened, and deprivation gaps are prevented from 
being unduly widened, there is stability, even if ethnic tension prevails. The pillars of this 
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framework include the logic of security, the ethnic “bargain,” the social contract, and 
planned development that enables Malaysia to exist in a state of stable tension.
274
 
Critics argue that, although there has been no recurrence of the ethnic violence of 
1969, the resentment among the non-Malay population (i.e., Chinese and Indians) having 
to endure the AAP remains widespread and profound. With the sedition acts and 
government censorship on sensitive issues, “race relations” is still a politically sensitive 
subject, which shows that Malaysian society is far from harmonious.
275
  
Crouch (2001) seems to have certain positive impressions about the preferential 
policies, despite the injustices and resentments created among non-Malays; stating that 
these policies have contributed to conflict-management and social cohesion in Malaysia, 
which have become evident in the relative absence of ethnic tension. However, he 
suggests that the main factors behind this stability in Malaysia are the country’s 
uninterrupted economic growth as well as the repressive measures against ethnic 
violence, such as the Sedition Act.
276
 
Recent development in Malaysian politics have seen some openings in revision of 
the AAP; for example, when the incumbent Barisan Nasional (BN) lost significantly 
against the opposition coalition Party Keadilan Rakyat (PKR) during the 2008 general 
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election. Also, Malaysia’s sixth premier, Najib Tun Razak,277 is the first Malaysian leader 
to argue that Malaysia’s structural problems have been caused largely by the failures in 
implementating the AAP. Najib has claimed that the policies that served the purposes of 
the previous era are now becoming impediments to success.
278
 
Despite the proponents and critics who support or challenge the AAP, there are 
various constraining factors that prohibit a complete policy reversal. In addition to the 
historical legacy of ethnic division, segregation, and special rights introduced under the 
British colonial rule, which continue to affect all domains of state policies in Malaysia, 
many prevailing issues prevent the state from taking any drastic measure to de-racialize 
the whole policy regime.  
The problems are that many beneficiaries of the AAP include the high income of 
Malay families, who benefit from Malay special rights, and the non-Malay business 
elites, who profit from close relations with Malay officials; also, the UMNO-led BN 
coalition has relied on the “political and social contract” between UMNO and the Malay 
elites to remain in power since the implementation of the APP in 1971. These Malay 
political, bureaucratic, business and social elites, along with some sections of Chinese 
businessmen close to the UMNO patronage and clients, have been the ones who will lose 
the most from any genuine revision of long-standing affirmative action policies.
279
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Disbanding Ethnic Politics 
After more than four decades since its establishment, the mission of building one 
multicultural Malaysian nation remains unrealized in Malaysia. Today, the country seems 
to be even more divided along ethnic lines. Thus, many liberal Malaysians have started to 
realize that the strict AAP is cancerous to a plural society and economic growth, and they 
recommend revision of the AAP. 
On the issue of making one Malaysian nation, the important questions are: Should 
ethnic politics be disbanded? Are the Malays and non-Malays willing to accept a one 
Malaysian nation, regardless of race, culture, and religion? I believe that the goal in 
making one Malaysian nation will continue to be jeopardized because of the ethnic 
polarization and because the Malaysian people are still not ready to accept a multi-ethnic 
dimension to this country. 
As long as we continue to harbor our identity based on our ethnicity, Malaysia 
will not grow into a nation but will remain a squabbling society of dissatisfied peoples. 
Sure, we can never remove our ethnic origin, but we can stop behaving as if by becoming 
a Malaysian we cease to become a Malay, whether we are Chinese or Indian. We just 
need to celebrate our diversity through equal treatment; and stop politicizing race and 
religion, because these issues are really divisive and cannot contribute to building a one 
Malaysian nation, which is way overdue. 
Rule of Law and Access to Justice 
Now we discuss the symptoms of the weakening of the rule of law in Malaysia. I 
argue that despite the proliferation of the 1957 Constitution, which established the main 
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legal and institutional framework
280
 in Malaysia, there have been significant problems in 
implementing the rule of law and persistent problems with reasonable and reliable access 
to justice, as practiced in Malaysia so far in contrary to the ideals and conventional 
meaning of the rule of law as manifest in Western countries. 
Although the Malaysian government sometimes obeys, even promotes, the 
elements of the rule of law, they do so only when it is in their interests. When the costs of 
obeying the laws outweigh the benefits, the laws are discounted, which gradually is 
leading to the deterioration of the rule of law itself. With this claim, I here try to answer 
the main question set by the International IDEA regarding the rule of law and access to 
justice: Are the state and society consistently subject to the law? 
Countries differ in their cultures, political systems, economic systems, and how 
they implement rules of law. In the Western liberal system, rule of law is widely 
considered necessary for sustained economic development, the implementation of 
democracy and the protection of human rights. However, these fundamental values 
adhered to by Western countries make some people question if they are likely to take root 
fully in a different cultural, in the economic and political context of a non-Western nation 
as in Asia.
281
  
The rules of law generally subscribed in Malaysia do not prevail to the same 
extent as in Western democracies. In a country “whose significant democratic and 
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authoritarian characteristics are inextricable mixed,”282 the ideals are just on paper. The 
reality in Malaysia is that authoritarianism has been manhandling the rule of law. For a 
government that places greater emphasis on maintaining stability and ethnic harmony, 
this could not be avoided. 
In Malaysia, the 1957 Constitution provides the main legal and institutional 
framework of the rule of law and access to justice. For instance, Article 8(1) states that all 
persons are equal before the law and entitled to its equal protection. However, despite 
these provisions, questions arise on the issues of its supremacy, as against the supremacy 
of Parliament, which in Malaysia is controlled by the executive body. Ideally, there 
should be a fundamental difference between the Parliament and the laws of the 
Constitution, as practiced in Britain. Hence, in Malaysia, the fundamental difference is 
irrelevant because the powers of Parliament, in theory, are supposed to be limited by the 
Constitution; yet, in practice, are unlimited. This paradox questions the credibility of the 
Constitution, which is supposed to be the most powerful law of the land.  
The idea of the rule of law in Malaysia was adopted from the Westminster form 
of government and the legacy of British colonial rule,
283
 which are clearly embodied and 
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expressed in many of the Constitution’s provisions; for instance, Articles 5 and 8284 
outline the principles of the rule of law prescribed by Dicey (1970).
285
 
In Malaysia, since independence in 1957, the idea of the rule of law was not 
subjected to extensive public debate or rigorous analysis until the 1980s. According to H. 
P. Lee (1986), a significant factor can be attributed to the backgrounds and personalities 
of the prime ministers in power during those times. Almost all of the predecessors of 
Mahathir were British-educated, with exposure to Britain’s political system and laws, 
which were most likely indoctrinated with a greater sense of their importance.
286
 
Tun Mohamed Suffian,
 
the Lord President of Malaysia from 1974 to 1982, 
commented in a public lecture that, so far, the independence of the judiciary had never 
been in jeopardy, thanks mainly to the fact that Malaysia’s first three prime ministers 
were lawyers who understood the importance of having a judiciary that enjoys public 
confidence.
287
 The rule of law in Malaysia was deeply tainted, however, during 
Mahathir’s era, who was educated in Singapore. This may explain why he disregarded 
the importance of separation of powers between the judiciary, executive, and legislative 
bodies, as well as the limits of government regarding the implementation of the rule of 
law and access to justice. 
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Two main issues regarding the rule of law are (1) emergency laws; and (2) the 
separation of power, or judicial independence.  
Emergency Laws 
Emergency laws display a set of provisions that empower the government to 
summon extraordinary powers to cope with a crisis. In the Malaysia Constitution, such 
power is under the provision of Article 150.
288
 For example, it is provided that if the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agung (YDPA): 
is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic 
life, or public order in the Federation or any other part thereof is threatened, he 
may issue a Proclamation of Emergency, making therein a declaration to that 
effect.  
 
A Proclamation of Emergency may be issued even before the actual occurrence of the 
event that will threaten the security or economic life or public order, if the YDPA is 
satisfied that there is imminent danger of the event occurring. When a proclamation of 
emergency is issued, it has full force and effect as if an act of Parliament.
289
 The 
proclamation of the emergency laws may enlarge the scope of the law-making power of 
the Parliament. Regardless of provisions in the Constitution, “the Parliament may make 
laws with respect to any matter if it deems crucial by reason of the emergency”290 and 
such laws cannot be invalidated on the grounds of inconsistency with any provision of the 
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Constitution. Hence, the broadening of the Parliament’s power cannot be applied to 
issues of Islamic Law, Malay customs, or with respect to any matter of the customs of the 
natives in the states of Sabah and Sarawak. Also, emergency laws that are contradictory 
to the constitutional provisions relating to religion, citizenship or language will not be 
valid.
291
 Apart from these specified exceptions, all of the fundamental rights granted in 
the Constitution can be derogated in times of an emergency. In this matter, the power of 
the judiciary to monitor the exercise of emergency rules is prohibited by the provisions of 
Article 150(8).
292
 
The emergency powers have been invoked four times since independence. They 
were used in 1966 and 1977 to overcome political crisis in the states of Sarawak and 
Kelantan, respectively. The 1964 state of emergency was proclaimed during the 
confrontation with Indonesia during the Sukarno era. The most important emergency 
declared, however, was during the 1969 race riots in Kuala Lumpur. In order to control 
ethnic disturbances during this period, an Emergency Ordinance was promulgated, which 
widened police powers to detain and arrest ordinary persons for sixty days, two years for 
a minister. 
These emergency ordinances became the most controversial debate, were fiercely 
debated by pundits and analysts, and have become the target of people’s unease with the 
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government’s intention and policies. Some of the ordinances enacted were with no real 
security problem obviously affecting the stability or ethnic harmony in the country; they 
were just instruments used by the federal authorities to serve their own interests and 
political advantage to secure control of the State.
293
 The fact that these ordinances have 
been made the norm in government actions can have atrocious consequences upon the 
administration of justice, not only in Malaysia but other countries that maintain 
emergency laws. Therefore, these laws need to be repealed.
294
 
Another observation about the 1969 assertion of the emergency laws is that even 
though the laws were proclaimed over forty years ago, they still have not been revoked or 
annulled. They are still operative, even though no serious ethnic disturbances have ever 
taken place since their origin. It appears as though the emergency laws have become a 
permanent fixture in legal settings, which casts doubt on the continuing relevance of the 
rule of law in Malaysia.
295
 
Ong Hock Thye, once a federal court judge, said in the Ningkan court case that 
Article 150 of the Constitution does not serve as an award for the Cabinet to cause an 
emergency to be declared with untrammeled discretion just to fit their whim and fancy, 
saying that it appears the Cabinet has carte blanche to do as they please.
296
 Enactment of 
Article 150 weakened the judiciary, whose power has been crushed because it is not able 
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to remove any court’s decision in relation to the validity of a proclamation of emergency 
law or ordinance; whereas, the Cabinet has unrestricted power to act unchecked. 
Constitutional Amendments 
The Constitution in Malaysia is regarded as the highest law of the land and even 
this was not spared from the frequency of amendments that have diminished its 
reputation as the most revered document. While some amendments were justified as a 
basis for changing circumstances, like the exclusion of Singapore from the Federation of 
Malaysia, many other amendments have been motivated by political consideration. For 
instance, during in 1983, Article 150 was amended to provide for the issuance of a 
Proclamation of Emergency by the YDPA “if the prime minister is satisfied” that a grave 
emergency exists whereby the security, or the economic life, or public order in the 
Federation, or any part of thereof is threatened. This amendment replaced the satisfaction 
of the YDPA to, instead, the satisfaction of the prime minister. This amendment was, 
however, subsequently annulled, by amendment, in the Constitution Act 1984 as part of 
the agreement reached between the Mahathir government and the hereditary rulers, to 
bring an end to the constitutional crisis of 1983-1984.
297
  
The Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence 
The Malaysian Westminster-type constitution does not explicitly mention the 
independence of the judiciary; there is also no clear line separating the bodies of the 
executive and legislative branches against the affairs of the judiciary. In the Constitution, 
the articles merely refer to the administration of justice and do not have specific Acts 
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about upholding the “Separation of Power” (SoP). However, the SoP is essential in a 
democratic government in order to maintain the existence of the rule of law.
298
  
Regarding the position of the executive body, the Malaysian Constitution follows the 
British tradition in which the executive is part of the legislative body.  
Specific provisions about the extent of each power are not provided by the 
Constitution but are found in the subsidiary and other legislation.
299
 Furthermore, the 
executive who is head of the federal government, in this case the prime minister, has 
succeeded in retaining its power that it acquired during the enactment of the emergency 
laws in 1969. 
One of the main principles of democratic government is the accountability of the 
executive ministers to the Parliament. However, in Malaysia, the ministerial 
responsibility is frequently traded off in favor of party unity and party discipline. The 
ministers are not accountable to the Parliament; but, instead, to their component party 
within the leading ruling party, that is the Barisan National (the National Front).
300
 
The Judiciary Trampled by the Executive 
The year 1988 is written down as an unfortunate judicial event in the history of 
judicial independence in Malaysia. It marked government’s reneging from its 
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commitment to uphold “the rule of law.” What happened was a complete standoff 
between the government (Mahathir’s administration) and the Lord President (top judge in 
the country). It all started over the dispute about the 1987 presidential election results.  
After a recount, Mahathir’s team narrowly had won over the opposing team. The losing 
team, the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), filed a suit questioning the 
legitimacy of the elective process. The High Court ruled that the ramifications arising 
from discrepancies found in the registration of its branches under the Societies Act 
rendered UMNO an “unlawful society.”301 
UMNO then brought the case on appeal to the Supreme Court. Hanging on to a 
thread for political survival, Mahathir hoped the judiciary would dismiss the case in favor 
of his team. Instead, the country’s highest judge, Lord President Tun Salleh Abbas, 
motioned for the appeal to be heard by a bench of nine judges on the Supreme Court.
302
 
This angered Mahathir and his team and there were bitter exchanges of criticism between 
the prime minister and members of the bench. Mahathir made contemptuous attacks 
toward the judiciary, declaring them to be too sternly independent, to a point of 
jeopardizing the security of the nation. The judicial branch was uneasy about this 
accusation from the executive branch, judges wanting to be above criticism. 
At the end of the dispute, Mahathir was successful in manipulating the 
mechanism for removing the Lord President and two other judges from office. This 
episode in the history of Malaysian politics has been described as unconstitutional 
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interference with judicial independence, stating that it undermined confidence in the 
independence of the judiciary. This incident also contributed significantly to the notion 
that the present Constitution was no longer viable and that the actions of the government 
no longer carried the legitimacy enjoyed before 1988.
303
  
Since this event, the judiciary body has gradually weakened, and the Mahathir 
administration has made an effort to scrutinize appointments of every officer to the 
higher courts. In fact, it is reported that less reputable figures were given high judicial 
positions. In July 1996, a High Court Judge, Syed Hamid Idid, resigned from office after 
accusing colleagues on the country’s highest benches of 39 incidents of corruption, 27 
cases of abuses of power, and 52 acts of misconduct. An example of such misconduct 
was the controversial libel lawsuit, in which crony capitalist Vincent Tan who had a close 
relationship with Mahathir’s administration and was awarded RM 10 million (US$2.6 
million) in damages against journalist M.G.G. Pillai. It was later found that Tan’s 
counsel, V.K. Lingam, had sponsored holiday trips to Italy and New Zealand for Eusoffe 
Chin, the presiding judge who later became Lord President.
304
 
Another prevalent example of executive power defeating judicial power is the 
Anwar Ibrahim
305
 case. Anwar’s trial was an attempt on the executive’s part to legitimize 
the humiliation of a political dissident by interweaving legal principles with moral 
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standards that had been generally accepted by the society. The government sought to 
articulate that Anwar had committed a crime that was demeaning. The case was brought 
to a hearing of the court, so as to give Anwar the so-called fair hearing. On the other 
hand, Anwar believed that the court had been turned into a political tool to destroy his 
political career. The most lethal of Anwar’s political conspiracy assertions were his 
insinuation that the court was not neutral and that the country’s highest ranking judge306 
was incorporated in the plot to tarnish his reputation, thus shattering the whole basis of 
the court as a legitimate arena in which to try a case fairly. Anwar asserted that the trial 
was a “political persecution hiding behind the cloak of law.”307 
Anwar’s trial is said to have awakened the spirit of resistance among Malays 
against their leaders, which had been limited since the Malay Union proposal by the 
British in 1946. Many Malays began to question the actions and accountability of the 
Malay leaders and became more comfortable discussing Western politico-legal jargons, 
such as the rule of law, access to justice, and the separation of powers. 
Access to Justice 
Access to justice is a fundamental human right, rooted in civilized values, 
religion, the common law, and a constitution. The attainment of justice has been the 
cherished goal of all civilized societies.
308
 In lieu of the dark event that befell the 
judiciary in 1988, when the judicial body was trampled by the unchecked power of the 
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Parliament and the executive, the active use of the Internal Security Act to silence 
dissent, and other repressive laws and authoritarian practices against the populations, 
analysts are baffled by the “official vision” proposed by Premier Mahathir Mohamad 
that, by year 2020, Malaysia should be categorized as a developed nation. 
The issue of rights to access justice, whether provided in the Constitution or not, 
have come under a storm of explicit judicial debates. Although the judicial discourse has 
downplayed the rights of access to justice and deprived the “right” of any constitutional 
significance, the marked difference in views between the Malaysian Court of Appeal and 
the Federal Court have generated interest in constitutional law; because access to justice 
involves being able to access the courts and judicial remedies as well as legal 
representation, and also involves the right of ordinary citizens to challenge administrative 
decisions that affect their legal rights.
309
 
A proactive judiciary, in implementing access to justice programs in a particular 
jurisdiction, may be associated with relatively weak constitutional provisions on the right 
of access to justice. It is argued that the practice and implementation effort to develop and 
improve access to justice should be informed and undergirded by a well-considered 
notion of rights and constitutionalism. Hence, if the rights of access to justice are absent 
or not recognized and protected by the legal system, it is possible that beneficial access to 
justice programs may one day cease to exist or be challenged by aggrieved parties.
310
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Issue: The Parliament’s Increased Power over the Constitution 
In the case of Malaysia, which has a written Constitution, the Parliament is not 
empowered to abolish the right of access to justice. Judicial review is a basic and 
essential feature of the Constitution, which no Parliament can take away. However, the 
Malaysian Federal Court,
311
 in the case of Pihak Berkuasa Negeri Sabah v. Sugumar 
Balakrishnan, subsequently reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal.
312
 The Federal 
Court held that the constitutional rights are not absolute. In this respect, it should be 
noted that Malaysian federal courts have rejected the basic doctrines in the Constitution, 
wanting to remove the power of judicial review from it. The Court held that the effect of 
the ouster clause was clearly intended by the Parliament to remove judicial review. Thus, 
the right of access to justice cannot be sustained in the face of an express statutory ouster 
of judicial review.
313
 
In the case of Kekatong Sdn Bhd v. Danaharta Urus Sdn Bhd, the High Court’s 
decision was reversed by the Court of Appeal, who ruled that Section 72 was 
unconstitutional as it violated article 8(1) of the federal Constitution. What is important in 
this ruling is the Court of Appeal’s detailed examination of the right of access to justice 
in the Constitution. In this case, the judge ruled that the definition of law in the 
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Constitution is not exhaustive but open-ended by reference and entrenched in Article 
160(2). The learned judge, among others, said that the government is according to the 
rule of law; thus, there must be fairness in State action of any sort, legislative, executive 
or judicial and, in simple terms, that no one is above the law.
314
 
In overruling the Court of Appeal’s decision, on the same case the Malaysian 
Federal Court contended that the common-law right of access to justice cannot amount to 
guaranteed fundamental rights.
315
 According to the Federal Court, the common law could 
be modified by written law; thus, the right of access to justice is one provision that can be 
modified by written law (in this case, the Danaharta Act). 
The Federal Court also emphasized Article 121(1) of the Constitution that the 
High Court shall have such jurisdiction that every citizen should have a constitutional 
right of access to the courts of justice in order to obtain remedies. However, the Federal 
Court referred the access to justice in the Constitution under Article 8(1) as a general 
right,
316
 in contrast to the Court of Appeal’s treatment of access to justice as a 
fundamental liberty under the Constitution. While the Federal Court stated that Articles 
8(1) and 121(1) complement each other, the powers of the Court are clearly the dominant 
element that determines the boundaries of access to justice. Thus, access to justice shall 
be available only to the extent that the Courts are empowered to administer justice.
317
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The Federal Court proceeded to add that the right is determined by the 
justifiability of the matter. If the matter is not justifiable, there is no right to access to 
justice in respect of that matter. Thus, Parliament can enact a federal law pursuant to the 
authority conferred by Article 121(1) to remove or restrict the jurisdiction and power of 
the Court. This unrestrained power of parliamentary law-making in derogation of judicial 
power has been applied in subsequent Malaysian cases.
318
 
The Federal Court has been subjected to fairly strident criticism. One critic has 
claimed that the Court has failed to appreciate the difference between laws enacted by 
Parliament in pursuit of powers given under the Constitution and the constitutional 
provisions themselves.
319
 Abdul Kader (2005) argued that the right to justice embodied in 
Article 8(1), although of common-law origin is not dependent on it, stating that the right 
flows from the Constitution itself, which is sui generis.
320
 
In a nutshell, the search for constitutionalism and rights in the context of access to 
justice in Malaysia has not been an entirely fruitful one. Judicial discourse in Malaysia 
garnered from the case law and extra-bench pronouncements suggests that access to 
justice, while broadly construed, has not been accorded constitutional status, thus is 
subject to interpretation of Parliament’s acts and other Acts outside the Constitution. 
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Conclusion 
The strength of the rule of law in the context of administration of justice in 
Malaysia varies, depending on the degree of government interest in the cases before the 
courts. In the vast majority of cases that come before the court daily, there has been no 
display of public concern over the manner in which these cases are handled, the integrity 
of the presiding judges and magistrates, or the eventual outcomes. Regardless of whether 
the cases involve commercial or family-law litigation or criminal prosecution, the Justice 
in Jeopardy (2000) report stated that there were well-founded grounds for concern as to 
the proper administration of justice in Malaysia, in cases of particular interest, for 
whatever reason, to the government:
321
   
Plainly, this is only a small proportion of the total number of cases which arise, 
but they are of vital importance to the well-being of the entire system of justice in 
Malaysia. The central problem appears to be in the actions of the various branches 
of an extremely powerful executive, which has not acted with due regards for the 
other essential elements of a free and democratic society based on the just rule of 
law
322
 (p. 77) 
 
Politics are played in Malaysia by using the ethnicity of politicians in the 
incumbent ruling party. It’s the same “old politics,” say analysts, with the purpose of 
preserving the status quo; all in the name of stability, ethnic harmony, and economic 
growth. All actions and policies undertaken by the government are for the good of the 
people; to impose on this policy, the State must be strong with its apparatus, backed by 
coercive policies.  
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The talk of national stability and ethnic harmony by the incumbent government is 
actually propaganda for the people to continually support and give mandate to the 
existing ruling coalition party, the Barisan Nasional (BN), stating that keeping the BN in 
power is essential for maintaining economic and social achievements. Hence, goes the 
argument that the price to be paid for stability is some dwindling in the strength of the 
rule of law, that fundamental liberties may have to be constrained, and that the executive 
power must be strong and powerful for the benefit of the people and the country.  
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Chapter Five: Civil, Political, Economic, and Social Rights 
Are Civil and Political Rights Equally Guaranteed for All? 
This chapter analyzes several different issues that brought dilemmas in 
implementing civil and political rights in a full sense in Malaysia. Since independence in 
1957, and with the enactment of the nation’s Constitution in the same year, Part II of the 
nation’s Constitution, titled “Fundamental Liberties,” included the right to life and liberty 
of the person; equality under the law and freedom from discrimination; freedom of 
movement; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; and freedom of religion.
323
  
Malaysia’s Constitution epitomizes the fundamental human rights, civil and 
political liberties that are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UNDHR). However, Malaysia is a semi-democratic country, with apparent authoritarian 
practices. The government has maintained that it is realistic to have these rights restrained 
in order to maintain stability and harmony in the system and country. The irony is that 
those restrictions are also entrenched in the Constitution through amendments made by 
Parliament to limit the provisions of human rights in the Constitution.  
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This phenomenon places human rights in Malaysia under the mercy of state 
power
324
 and is the dilemma facing the full implementation of civil and political rights in 
Malaysia. For the last fifty-four years, many Malaysians and critics have expressed 
concern that there has been an incremental development of an array of preventive 
detention laws and other restrictive laws that were inherited from the colonial 
government, which have allowed authorities to deny or place unjustified restrictions upon 
the enjoyment of fundamental human rights.
325
 These laws have given more unrestricted 
power to the state, especially the executive body, to carry on with the repressive laws to 
stifle opposition parties and dissidents who are against the state’s agenda. These have 
affected many Malaysians and have created intimidating effects on the development of 
civil and political life in Malaysia.  
Due to the inflammatory nature of ethnic and religious issues in Malaysia, 
discussing and criticizing hypersensitive issues (e.g., the Malay privileges, the citizenship 
status of non-Malays, and language issues) for the purpose of inciting hatred and 
confrontation in the society is sanctioned as a criminal act. The Ministry of Home Affairs 
has the power to order detention without trial under the Sedition Act,
326
 and the 
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government has progressively tightened its grip on all critical institutions,
327
 to the point 
of rendering them useless. Mahathir wrote in his 1970 book that the manner, frequency, 
and trivial reasons for altering the Constitution was reducing the supreme law of the 
nation to a useless scrap of paper.
328
  
To explain the dilemma of the peoples in Malaysia in practicing civil and political 
rights, it is important to evaluate Part II of the Constitution, titled “Fundamental 
Liberties.” The nine Articles (i.e., the right to life and the right to liberty of the person, 
including habeas corpus
329
; equality under the law and freedom from discrimination; 
freedom of movement; freedom of speech, assembly, and association; and freedom of 
religion) are not absolute rights. Although the Articles pertaining to freedom from 
discrimination (Article 8) and freedom of speech, assembly and association (Article 10), 
in particular, contain a number of clauses that give more power to the Parliament to 
legislate any restriction on freedom of expression, association, and assembly that it 
“deems necessary or expedient in the interest of the security of the Federation ... public 
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order or morality,”330 these clauses have allowed the fundamental principles of the 
Malaysian Constitution to be comprehensively undermined. Through legislation, 
Parliament has given more power to the executive body.
331
 
A legislative and administrative structure has emerged, posing a grave threat to 
the rights and liberties safeguarded in the Malaysian Constitution as well as under 
international human-rights law. For instance, Article 149 in the original 1957 
Constitution allowed for Parliament, in the event of serious subversion or organized 
violence, to pass laws that are repugnant to the fundamental rights safeguarded elsewhere 
in the Constitution. Then, in 1960, authorities amended Article 149 to expand the 
definition of subversion, and removed the one-year time limit on such Emergency 
Ordinances by providing that they could continue indefinitely, unless both Houses of 
Parliament passed laws revoking them.
332
 
In addition, Article 150 of the Constitution empowered the executive body to 
exercise extraordinary powers if a State of Emergency was proclaimed, but only for 
periods of two months at a time. Article 150 was also amended in 1960 to allow 
Proclamations of Emergency, and any Ordinances issued under them, to continue 
indefinitely unless both Houses of Parliament annulled them. In 1981, in further 
amendments to Article 150, the Cabinet was authorized to declare an Emergency when it 
perceived a potential threat, and not, as previously, when such a disruption was actually 
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taking place. No judicial challenge to the legitimacy of the Proclamation, or the validity 
of the subsequent Emergency Ordinances, was permitted.
333
 
Why Civil and Political Rights Cannot Be Practiced in Full 
Analysts and critics contend that certain unavoidable factors influence the 
development of the culture of human rights in the country. These factors involve 
historical realities, the political system, economic importance, and the social and cultural 
attitudes of the people who generally lack an understanding of how important these rights 
are.
334
 Five factors regarding this must be highlighted: 
First, the incumbent government, in power since independence in 1957, continued 
to be given the mandate to continue ruling,
335
 giving the incumbent the authority to 
maintain its hegemonic rule and to sustain the repressive colonial-era laws. Such 
repressive laws from the colonial era that are still being implemented today are the 
Sedition Acts of 1948, the Emergency Laws of 1948, and the Internal Security Act of 
1960. These laws were used during the colonial period to stifle dissidents, especially 
Communist insurgents. They are still in use today to suppress legitimate political 
dissidents and to generate a culture of fear to freeze critical speech and debate on 
sensitive issues.
336
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Second, Malaysia is a plural society threatened by an ethnic-religious fissure, and 
maintaining public order is of paramount importance. The Malaysian government 
considers maintenance of social harmony and stability vital for securing economic 
growth and foreign direct investment, which are excuses for curtailing the civil and 
political rights of the people. The state believes that exercising too much freedom in a 
plural society like Malaysia, if unchecked, causes destruction to public order. This goes 
back to the paradigm of “Asian values”337 for understanding the democratic and human 
rights practiced in countries in Asia and the East, where stability and harmony are more 
valued than individual basic rights and freedoms.
338
 Thus, a strong state that is armed 
with coercive tools and the political will to accomplish national growth and development 
is considered essential for tackling poverty and managing the politics of envy that is 
fueled by growing wealth and income disparity.
339
 In Malaysia, the New Economic 
Policy is one of the Affirmative Action Policies practiced through the state authoritative 
policies. 
Third, the separation of powers among the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
bodies is not fully realized in Malaysia. Critics claim that Malaysia’s judicial system 
allows a wide scope for executive intrusion, and the extent of judicial independence has 
been placed in serious doubt since the dismissal of the Chief Justice and five other 
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Supreme Court judges in 1987-1988.
340
 The judiciary can reasonably claim that it 
operates in strict accordance with the law; however, Malaysian law has been increasingly 
framed to restrict the Court’s freedom to determine their own procedures, interpret laws, 
and exercise review of legislation.
341
 Several times, Malaysia’s fourth premier342 has 
criticized the notion of judicial review as giving judges open-ended powers to oppose 
government policies and to throw out laws they dislike.
343
 Until 2008, the incumbents in 
Malaysia enjoyed the Parliament’s power of the two-thirds super majority to amend or 
restrict the power of the courts. Lately, since the opposition coalition won big in the 2008 
general election, the power of the Malaysian Parliament has been checked. Good news 
for democracy. 
Fourth, Parliament and state legislatures share the power to make laws over 
matters under the “Concurrent List” stated in the Constitution344; however, Article 75 
provides that, in the event of conflict, federal law will prevail over state law. In Malaysia, 
the division of powers among federal, state, and local governments reveals a central bias. 
While each state is recognized as an independent tier of government exercising legislative 
and executive powers within constitutional limits, federal laws take precedence over 
those of the states if for any reason there happens to be a conflict or inconsistency. It has 
been observed that, in practice, the states have little real autonomy. Although some 
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federal functions have been decentralized, most decision-making remains at the national 
level. State and local governments in Malaysia operate within a framework of being 
politically, financially, and economically subordinate to the federal government.
345
 This 
situation has created a subservient relationship on the part of the states in relation to the 
central government, which presents an unhealthy atmosphere for practicing political and 
civil liberties. Such a state of affairs, in the context of federalism, has contributed to an 
environment that can stifle free speech.
346
 
Fifth, various draconian laws specifically enacted to limit the practice of civil and 
political rights are the legacy of the May 13, 1969 ethnic riots that took place more than 
four decades ago. In the 1969 general election, the opposition parties won big, denying 
the two-thirds Parliament majority to the incumbent, resulting in riots on the streets and 
many casualties and losses. The Malaysian government has always used this incident to 
use restrictions to stifle civil and political rights as a justification for stability. The 
incumbent faced another setback after almost four decades, in the 2008 general election 
when they lost the super majority. However, no ethnic riots occurred. The point here is 
that the Malaysian government can stop using the rhetoric that stability will be 
jeopardized if the rights of the people are practiced in full. The societies in Malaysia are 
mature societies, even though pluralistic in nature, and do not want to stick to the 
ethnicity card when defining politics in Malaysia. 
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Despite the provisions in Article 10 of the Constitution, freedoms of assembly and 
association, laws such as the Trade Union Act 1959, the Societies Act 1966 and the 
Universities and University Colleges Act 1971, impose a straightjacket on the exercise of 
freedom of association and further undermine freedom of expression. In addition, below 
are several other significant legislative laws that, if un-repealed, pose even greater threats 
to peoples’ rights in Malaysia. 
Internal Security Act (1960)  
The Internal Security Act (ISA) enacted in 1960 is one of two outdated 
controversial draconian laws that most undermine the fundamental rights and liberties of 
the people in Malaysia. The other is the Emergency Ordinance of 1969 discussed below.  
The state has many stringent laws
347
 at its disposal to stifle basic civil and 
political rights of the people. Many of the draconian laws overlap; that is, for the same 
act, a person may be charged under different Acts. Among the most notorious ones is 
ISA. This preventive detention law was enacted as a substitute for the 1948 emergency 
regulations used to fight the Communist insurrection. ISA was intended to be a temporary 
detention law, merely to finish off the Communist insurgency; however, it has never been 
repealed and has become a permanent law.
348
 
Under ISA, government officials may order persons to be detained without even 
the most basic due process of rights. Most importantly, the government may detain 
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individuals whom it deems a threat to national security, for as long as it sees fit and with 
no meaningful judicial review.
349
 Under Malaysian criminal law as it normally operates, 
police officers and others are allowed to detain individuals only if they have a reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause. ISA requires that an officer have reason to believe that an 
individual is acting, or about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia. In 
order to engage in long-term detention under Section 8, the minister must be satisfied that 
such detention is necessary for Malaysia’s continued security and stability. No attempt is 
made in the Act to further define specifically what constitutes a true security threat under 
ISA; and, without the possibility of narrowing the language of ISA through judicial 
interpretation, the government is left with a free hand to pull almost any behavior into the 
scope of ISA.
350
 
In the 1960s and 1970s, ISA was used as a tool against left-wing political parties 
such as the Labor Party of Malaysia and the Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia. In October 
1987, police arrested 107 people in Operation Lalang (weed), including prominent 
leaders and parliamentarians of the opposition Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS), the 
Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition. ISA was later 
used against human-rights defenders, students, teachers, journalists, religious clerics, 
union officials, and political opponents. Indeed, ISA gained further international 
notoriety in the late 1990s when political differences led to the arrest of then-Deputy 
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Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim under ISA, before he faced trumped-up charges of 
sodomy and corruption.
351
 
After September 11, 2001, former premier Mahathir Mohamad publicly prided 
himself for Malaysia’s conscience in using ISA. He described the U.S. Patriot Act352 as a 
sign of U.S. endorsement
353
 of Malaysia’s ISA. The event that happened in New York 
City on September 11 gave some governments the opportunity to reinforce their anti-
terrorist legislation and measures. Often, such legislations have served domestic-politics 
purposes, especially for silencing voices of the opposition, rather than effectively aiming 
at eliminating terrorist groups. In Malaysia, ISA is skillfully used, especially against 
Malaysia’s prominent Islamic party (PAS), which the incumbent government has 
considered a political threat. 
Individuals detained under ISA have been regularly denied access to lawyers and 
their families. Some have been told that their families would be harmed if they did not 
cooperate. There are reports that ISA detainees had been physically and mentally 
assaulted and subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
354
 According to 
Amnesty International, ISA remains the core of the permanent arbitrary powers to detain 
one without trial. Beyond the violation of basic rights experienced by particular 
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individuals, ISA has a wider intimidating impact on civil society and a marked influence 
on the nature of political participation and accountability in Malaysia.
355
 
Human-rights groups locally and internationally have worked tirelessly to push 
Malaysia’s latest premier356 to reform the laws under ISA. According to human rights 
watch, reform in Malaysia requires more than repealing ISA. The minister in charge of 
legal affairs has said that detention without trial would continue under two new 
counterterrorism laws even after a repeal of ISA and other laws, but that the detention 
periods would be shorter.
357
 
The Emergency Ordinance (1969) 
The Emergency Ordinance (EO) was enacted in 1969 as a temporary measure to 
respond to the race riots on May 13
th
 that year. For the past forty-two years, however, the 
EO has been used to detain persons without the government having to prove any charges 
against them. As with ISA, the EO is a preventive detention law that allows the 
government to detain individuals whom it (and not a court of law) believes to threaten 
public order. Due to amendments to the law in 1989, the courts have been stripped of the 
right to review the virtues of EO detentions. Detainees may challenge their detention on 
procedural grounds, but that has limited use. Even when detainees file a habeas corpus, 
petitions are ordered released by the court and the government often re-arrests the 
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detainees on the same charges, thus rendering futile any procedural challenges to the EO 
orders. In October 2005, the government ordered the arrest of eight individuals under the 
EO for the same offense that they had been acquitted of only minutes earlier, violating 
their rights under the principle of double jeopardy.
358
 
The EO has not been limited to actions necessary to restore public order. 
According to Amnesty International, “it has become an extraordinary law to deal with 
categories of suspected criminals who are regarded as difficult to bring to justice by the 
ordinary process of law.”359 The EO also has been used by the police to justify the 
detention of persons under the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC). Having failed to solve a 
case, the police will use an EO order to continue detention of a suspected criminal. This 
is done without the detainee being brought to court or proven guilty. EO detainees are 
held incommunicado and denied access to counsel during the initial sixty days of 
detention. They usually suffer serious beatings and ill treatment from the authorities.  
However, in May 2005, the government appointed the Royal Commission to 
Enhance the Operation and Management of the Royal Malaysia Police. The Commission 
concluded that the EO violates international human-rights laws, and recommended repeal 
of the EO, stating that it facilitates the abuse of fundamental liberties. To date, however, 
the Malaysian government has shown no sign that it intends to repeal this draconian 
law.
360
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The Sedition Act (1948) 
The Sedition Act places wide limitations on freedom of expression, especially 
concerning the sensitive issues involving the Malays’ privileges, the non-Malays’ 
citizenship, language issues and culture. The original Act, adopted by the colonial 
government, was intended to address offenses such as sedition against the government, 
inciting contempt for the administration of justice, and provoking conflict in the societies. 
Thus, the Act has been used extensively against opposition parties and government 
dissidents. 
The Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984) 
This is one of the Acts introduced during the colonial era during the period of 
emergency against Communist insurgents. It required all newspapers and printing presses 
to obtain a license that must be renewed annually. The Ordinance was revised as the 
Printing Press Act of 1971 to provide more power to the government to revoke the 
licenses of newspapers that aggravated national sensitivities or were detrimental to 
national development goals. This Act had wider impact on the freedom of expression, the 
media, and the development of civil society in Malaysia. Authorities continue to use this 
Act to intimidate writers and publishing companies toward self-censorship. Publication of 
“malicious” or “false” news renders publishers, printers, editors, and writers, who fail to 
take reasonable measures to justify an item’s truth, liable to prosecution.361 
  
                                                 
361
 Amnesty International 1999, “Malaysia Human Rights Undermined: Restrictive Laws in a 
Parliamentary Democracy” (London: ASA, September 1999): 39-40. 
 143 
The Official Secrets Acts (OSA) 1972 
This Act, based on the British OSA of 1911, also imposed wide, largely 
unjustified, restrictions on the right to freedom of expression, especially for opposition 
parties when discussing public issues and concerns. This Act gave power to the 
government to conceal virtually all government documents, which are subject to the 
discretion of ministers, meaning this Act weakens the public’s ability to hold the 
government accountable and transparent. 
The Societies Act 1966 
This Act provided the executive body with the means to block or impede the 
formation of any organization that it considers undesirable. This Act strongly impacted 
the development of an independent civil society. Amnesty International remains 
concerned that the Societies Act can be used to deny the rights of individuals and groups 
to associate freely and to express their opinions about government activities.  
The Universities and University Colleges Act (UUCA) 1971 
This Act was enacted in 1971 to help establish new universities. However, in 
1975, the government introduced a range of amendments imposing restrictions on 
students’ rights to freedom of association and freedom of expression. This Act also 
applies to university staffs and lecturers, in the government’s effort to clamp down on 
political activism on campuses. Students are not allowed to hold posts in political parties 
or trade unions and are barred from expressing support, sympathy, or opposition to any of 
these groups. An observer wrote:  
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The raison dieter of universities is to promote learning; intellectual freedom 
should be encouraged, nurtured and cultivated. If ones do not allow university 
students the freedom to think, reflect and express themselves, what hope is there 
for thinking and reflecting intelligentsia?
362
  
 
In 1979, the government added Discipline of Staff Rules under the powers of the UUCA, 
which limits the possibility for university staff to engage in political activity.
363
 
The Police Act 1967 
This is another Act that constrains the freedom of assembly of the people in 
Malaysia. This Act was tightened through amendments in 1987. It limits the citizens’ 
constitutional right to assemble peacefully. Under this Act, all public assemblies of three 
or more persons require a police permit, and a police officer may refuse the permit if he 
believes the three persons are representing an organization. Police officers are also 
empowered to arrest without warrant and to use force if participants ignore an order to 
disperse. In July 2001, the government issued a blanket ban on all political gatherings, 
once again on the grounds of national security. Critics from SUARAM (the voices of 
Malaysians) strongly denounce this ban, because it not only severely affects the normal 
process of democracy in Malaysia but seriously restricts the activities of human-rights 
defenders.
364
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Conclusion 
It is clear that all the restrictions to the civil and political rights in Malaysia 
through the legislative acts and executive powers affect the implementation of these 
rights to Malaysians, which impacts the development of democracy in the country.  
Economic and Social Rights  
This section highlights the source of social and economic grievances among 
ethnic groups in Malaysia, with examples of ethnic grievances. Analysts and experts on 
Malaysian politics say that the policies of the Affirmative Action Policies (AAP) and the 
New Economic Policies (NEP) are the cause of these grievances and the discrimination 
toward not only non-Bumiputeras (sons of the soil) but also Bumiputeras.  
The central question is, are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all 
in Malaysia? Because Malaysia is a plural society, with a history of ethnic segregation 
during the colonial era on the basis of occupation, and with corrective policies that are 
affirmative and discriminatory in nature implemented by a post-colonial state with strong 
state apparatus, the issue of fairness regarding distribution of the country’s wealth is 
unavoidable. Analysts and critics claim that the source of the unfairness is enshrined in 
the NEP. 
The ethnic disturbances in 1969, and vocal demands from the ethnic Malay for a 
greater share of the country’s wealth, forced the new post-colonial state to rethink the 
country’s economic policies. In the First Malaysia Plan in 1966-1970, a special provision 
was made to promote the Malays economic development; however, none of the measures 
adequately addressed the issue of Malay poverty. In 1970, the incomes of 49.3 percent of 
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all households in Peninsular Malaysia were below the poverty line, estimated then at 
M$33 per capita monthly; of these, 75 percent were Malays. These data show that the 
goal of eliminating economic disparity between the major ethnic groups simply was not 
being achieved.
365
 
In 1971, under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, father of the present Msia 
premier, took a drastic measure in an effort to make right what presumably had been 
made wrong by the colonial master; that is, implementing affirmative action policies 
(AAP) in the form of NEP, to ensure that more resources and more opportunities would 
become available to the Malays. More than any other measure, the NEP has been 
responsible for the immense changes that have occurred in Malaysia for the past forty 
years. Implemented through four five-year plans, from 1971 to 1990, the NEP had two 
principal objectives: (1) to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity, and (2) to 
accelerate the restructuring of society to reduce and eventually eliminate identifying 
one’s ethnicity with an economic function. This second principal caused the stir among 
the non-Malays, because it gave more advantage to the Malays.  
Because the Malays (Bumiputeras, sons of the soil 
366
) were overwhelmingly 
underrepresented in higher education and as professionals and equity owners, the NEP 
was designed to empower them as the disadvantaged group through the upper echelons of 
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society. The Malaysian government believes that the disparity between the economic and 
social positions of the poor and disadvantaged Malays populations, against the rich and 
advantaged Chinese, was the cause of the ethnic tensions and would be the major threat 
to political stability in the future. By reducing and finally eliminating the disparity, it was 
believed that the plural society in Malaysia would be in harmony and that future ethnic 
conflict would be avoided.  
Critics have an opposite view of NEP and do not see it as a method to correct 
imbalances in society. They state that even though the discriminating affirmative action 
policies may have a positive outcome, the policies further alienate a plural society, 
because the government focuses on special ethnicities to determine and allocate 
government subsidies, scholarships, funds for business, and contractor licenses, etc. So 
that, the critics see the NEC policies as simply discrimination against ethnic groups who 
are not Malays. Thus, instead of integrating the plural society, the government is further 
alienating one ethnic group against another. 
For example, Malay equity ownership has risen dramatically, from 1.5 percent in 
1969 to 20.3 percent by 1990; while Chinese equity ownership rose from 27.2 percent in 
1970 to 44.9 percent in 1990. All groups shared in the prosperity; however, the rise in 
Malay and Chinese ownership came at the expense of foreign holdings.
367
 Then in the 
1970s to the 1990s, a new generation of middle-class Malays emerged, burgeoning from 
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18 percent to 28 percent of the population; in addition, the Malay agricultural population 
decreased from 65.2 percent to 33.5 percent.
368
 
In order for the NEP to take full effect, the government set a target that, within 
twenty years (1971-1990), the Malays and other Bumiputeras groups would manage and 
own at least 30 percent of the total commercial and industrial activities in all categories 
and scales of operation.
369
 This 30 percent target was a serious political issue with critics, 
especially from non-Malays. The government maintains that the Malays still have not 
reached the 30 percent target and, therefore, says that the NEP must be continued. 
Whereas, some analysts, mostly non-Malays, say that the Bumis has reached its target 
and, thus, the NEP should not be continued.
370
 
NEP May Cause Strain in the Plural Society 
Positive outcomes of the NEP are widely reported.
371
 However, analysts have 
identified two main strains on society, regardless of the NEP’s success or failure: (1) the 
strain from different ethnic groups (i.e., Malays and non-Malays), and (2) a strain among 
the Malays themselves. According to Milne (1976), the non-Malays might be 
antagonized by the fact that the NEP is doing more for the Malays than for them, 
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particularly in areas where there may be inter-ethnic competition for scarce resources 
such as small manufacturing businesses and entry into university.
372
  
Fundamentally, the NEP identifies Malaysians in two main groups: Bumiputeras 
and non-Bumiputeras. The Bumiputeras are given special privileges in many aspects; 
including economic rights, higher quota to entering universities, and public sector 
employment. These conditions make the non-Bumiputras feel like second-class citizens. 
The NEP’s first prong, to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity, drew 
attention to the poor Chinese. The Gerakan parties especially referred to the plight of the 
New Villages set up during the twelve years of the national emergency period. There had 
been little development and improvements in these settlements. The economic plights of 
the settlers were being neglected by the government. Also, some Chinese leaders from 
the DAP claimed that the government was overemphasizing the rural poor and tended to 
neglect the urban poor which comprised a large number who resided in towns where 
conditions were worse than in rural areas.
373
 The Chinese-based parties and organizations 
expressed unhappiness over the Bumiputeras/non-Bumiputeras distinction in the NEP 
and in all government policies. Lim Kit Siang, a Dap veteran leader, questioned whether 
the NEP policy with such an ethnic approach would bring national unity to the plural 
society and stated that the policy might backfire. 
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Intra-ethnic Strains 
Despite the apparent success of the NEP in restructuring society, especially the 
Bumiputeras, many Malays have remained unhappy about the policy because of the 
widely held perception that the policy has helped only some Malays and not all, which 
has resulted in creating two distinct classes of Malays: those who have benefitted from 
the NEP and those who have not. Thus, some Malays have become rich and affluent, 
while the rest have remained entrenched in poverty. Dissatisfaction with the NEP also 
originated from the widespread corruption and cronyism that took place during 
implementation of the policy.
374
 
A study conducted on Malaysian Universities in 1986 by Ozay Mehmet and Yip 
Hat Hoong showed that only 12 percent of the Bumiputeras students who had received 
government scholarships had come from poor families. The study found that poor Malay 
families had far less opportunity of having a child at university than Chinese and Indian 
poor families.
375
 Also, social interactions between inter-ethnic Malays and non-Malays 
on campuses has been deteriorating under the NEP. This is blamed on a lack of trust and 
legitimacy in the system. Thus, the NEP has not been a successful instrument for 
overcoming ethnic inequality and integration issues. 
The UMNO-led BN has used issues of Malay poverty as the backdrop to their 
political whims, and they have politicized the NEP to create money politics. Also, 
members of UMNO are trying to buy votes for position in the party and/or promoting 
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respective crony capitalists. In a wider context, Gomez (2007) described Malaysian 
money politics as including favoritism, conflicts of interest, and nepotism in the award of 
rent seeking by disbursing material benefits in order to secure votes during state and party 
elections.
376
 For power to be sustained, NEP is also a source of UMNO money politics. 
As protector of the Malays, UMNO vocally criticized PAS about the poverty of 
the Kelantanese Malays under its rule. However, critics fired back with empirical and 
statistical data that shows clearly that after eighteen years of PAS rule, the Kelantan were 
no longer the second poorest Malay state in Malaysia; whereas, the state of Terengganu, 
which is under UMNO and BN rule, was suffering much higher levels of absolute 
poverty, with more people living below the poverty line.
377
  
According to Gomez, practice of UMNO political business has been facilitated 
through the extensions of authoritarianism, characterized by the centralization of power 
of the executive body with no checks and balances from the judiciary,
378
 which has led to 
the belief that the Malays poverty is not because they are being denied their rights to 
economic success by non-Malays; they are poor because their share of the economic 
prosperity is being snatched by the UMNO-putra.
379
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It is through the NEP that the UMNO has been able to rebuild its credentials and 
legitimacy among Malay constituents. Through the dispensation of political patronage 
and access to material resources, the NEP created another opportunity structure for 
UMNO to build its power bases. The growth of money politics built around the largesse 
of the NEP has made the UMNO 
380
powerful and the UMNO has become the trustee and 
gatekeeper of the distribution process. Thus, the NEP has been a crucial instrument for 
distributing political patronage, which is used as a reward to gain loyalty from the 
Malays.
381
 
Inter-ethnic Strains 
The NEP is largely about inter-ethnic redistribution. Since the main redistribution 
objective is to reduce inter-ethnic economic disparities, it was assumed they would also 
improve inter-ethnic relations and, thus, contribute to national unity. However, this 
assumption might have been simplistic and naïve; thus, the effectiveness of the main NEP 
prong—to restructure society—is questioned.  
Poverty eradication measures mainly seem to involve Malay peasants; in 
particular, the target groups such as rubber tappers, rice farmers, and fishermen. Non-
Malays, like the Orang Asli and the aborigines in Sabah and Sarawak who are also under 
the Bumiputeras categories, complain that they have been neglected by the NEP policies. 
Similarly, most of the urban poor from both the Malays and non-Malays feel that poverty 
eradication measures are not directed at them.  
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The discourses on ethnic inequality in Malaysia always concentrate on the 
Bumis
382
 and non-Bumis; and this dichotomy, by default, refers to ethnic Malay (Bumis) 
and Chinese (non-Bumis) issues. Because both Malay and Chinese polities have evolved 
over time, their issues are homogeneously acknowledged, as compared to other non- 
Malay ethnics (e.g., the Indians) and the other Bumiputeras (e.g., the Orang Asli). 
Recently in Malaysian politics, the country was stunned by the 2008 general election 
results when the opposition coalition party, the People Justice Party (PKR), succeeded in 
denying the incumbent BN the two-thirds majority of parliamentary seats. This was a 
huge blow to the government, because it meant they could not amend the Constitution at 
will.
383
  
One of the factors contributing to the incumbent BN getting a “black eye” for the 
first time in forty-two years of general elections was because a large section of the 
society were angry with the government’s policies and the leaders misbehaving. 
Throughout 2007 and early 2008, large-scale protests over unequal government 
distribution policies were held in the Kuala Lumpur city center, mostly led by officials 
from the opposition coalition parties—Parti Islam (PAS) , Democratic Action Party 
(DAP), and National Justice Party (PKR). Among the protestors were the ethnic Indians, 
organized through the Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF). 
It is claimed that, unlike with the Chinese, who are already successful in 
Malaysia’s economy, and with the Malays, who are protected by the government, the 
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Indians have been left to fend for themselves in an unfair social and economic 
environment. According to reports, over 300,000 poor Indians were displaced during the 
last two decades, when the plantations that traditionally had provided them modest 
livelihoods were acquired for property and township development. It is reported that 
FELDA, the country’s most successful poverty alleviation program, failed to take in large 
numbers of rural Indians who were displaced from plantations.
384
 Consequently, the 
Indians lost their basic livelihoods. Research indicates that the highest rates of suicide in 
Malaysia are in the Indian community, and Indian youths have resorted to gangsterism 
and crime. The combination of socio-economic exclusion and deprivation forced the 
Indians to shift their votes to the opposition in the 2008 general election. 
Also, according to the 2011 World Bank report on Malaysia’s “brain drain,” 
better career prospects, compensations, and social justice
385
 outside of Malaysia are 
draining the country of its best minds. For example, 88 percent of Malaysian diasporas in 
Singapore are of ethnic Chinese origin, and 54 percent of all Malaysians are moving to 
Singapore; as well as 15 percent to Australia, 10 percent to the U.S., and 5 percent to the 
UK.  
Two other issues have marked the sincerity of the state on eradicating poverty 
irrespective of ethnic origin. First, among non-Malays, the non-Muslim indigenous 
groups on Malaysia’s east coast in Sabah and Sarawak have long claimed they are being 
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treated as third-class Bumiputeras and that they have limited access to NEP economic 
benefits. More significantly, even some Malays are being disenfranchised; in particular,  
Malaysia’s aborigines, the Orang Asli.386 Within the ethnic mosaic that comprises 
Malaysia, the aborigines of the Malay peninsula are today both the most deprived and 
under-represented community in the country. The controversial issues of Malay special 
rights and Bumiputra (indigenous) rights become even more complex and contentious 
when applied to the aboriginal peoples whose claim to indigenous status antedates
387
 all 
other communities.  
It is also important to highlight the East
388
 and West
389
 Malaysia divide. On 
peninsular Malaysia (West Malaysia), the issue of Bumiputeras and non-Bumiputeras is 
given more attention by the federal government than to the East Malaysian Bumiputeras 
and intra-Bumiputeras of Sabah and Sarawak. Tensions between Malaysia East and West 
are becoming more acute with increasing inequality in federal allocations and widening 
socio-economic disparity gaps.
390
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Conclusion 
The active role of the state in its effort to socially engineer Malaysia’s plural 
society through the NEP has provoked many social and political contradictions. The 
inter-ethnic sensitivities and intra-ethnic deprivations have caused strain as NEP quotas 
and targets are imposed in many areas of social and economic life. Proponents of the 
NEP argue that its benefits cannot be seen only with economic successes but also with 
social integration.  
Since the ethnic riots in the late 1960s, almost all policy issues in Malaysia are 
bound with ethnic issues. The role of the state has expanded in managing, engineering, 
and enforcing ethnic identities in Malaysia. Because of the ethnic-laden nature of the 
Malaysian state, implementing the Affirmative Action Policies is seen as the only way to 
correct the imbalances in the society that caused ethnic disturbances in the 1960s. 
Proponents of the NEP say that one cannot wish away ethnic discrimination without 
tackling the existing problem of inter-ethnic inequality and prejudice, to which 
discriminatory policies and actions respond.
391
 NEP is considered a state tool for society 
engineering. Thus, comes the question, is the NEP the right tool to socially engineer a 
complex society like Malaysia? 
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Chapter Six: Assessing Representative and Accountable Government 
Electoral System 
This chapter focuses on Malaysia’s electoral system, which is incompatible with 
the idea of a fully liberal democracy, and assesses the question: Do Malaysia’s elections 
give the people control over their government and its policies? 
Critics of the electoral system in Malaysia claim that it contains elements of 
unfairness, that although elections are free, they are not entirely fair. Crouch (1996) wrote 
that:  
Malaysian elections have not been characterized by widespread fraudulent 
practices such as ballot-box stuffing or blatant physical pressure on voters. 
However, the electoral system was significantly biased in favor of Malay parties 
and the government coalition.
392
  
 
The electoral system in Malaysia greatly favors the incumbent coalition 
government party, the Barisan Nasional (BN) (National Front), at the expense of the 
opposition parties. In twelve general elections since Malaysia achieved independence in 
1957, the BN has not lost even one election, and only twice has lost two-thirds of the 
seats in Parliament, in 1969 and 2008; which has brought some optimism to democracy 
proponents in the country. 
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In 1995, Malaysia’s fourth premier, Dr. Mahathir, said a democracy is a “means 
to choose the government
393
 … if the people prefer another government, they are 
welcome to it”394 and if they choose to retain the government “eight times consecutive” it 
is their “democratic right to do so.”395 Observers claim that factors that have kept the BN 
in power twelve consecutive times may be due to the maneuvering of the electoral 
process, which makes it impossible for opposition parties to win.Malaysia uses the simple 
majority process in which the candidate with the most votes gets elected. This method, 
inherited from the British, favors a stronger government rather than proportional 
representation. Analysts of the simple majority system claim that the inherent effect of a 
plurality election is its big-party bias, which awards considerably more seats to the 
biggest party relative to its share of votes won. Proponents of this plurality system claim 
that it is a valuable contribution to a strong and stable government; the ruling party has 
always argued that a strong government is needed to maintain stability in the country’s 
plural society and to promote economic development.
396
 By contrast, analysts like Reilly 
(2002) state that a society divided by ethnic diversities will fare better with proportional 
representation.
397
  
SUARAM and many other observers point out that unfair constituency 
delineations and gerrymandering also have made a mockery of the one-person one-vote 
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democracy, which is fundamental in any electoral system that claims to be democratic:  
“For the one-person one-vote system to function, the disparity in numbers of voters 
between constituencies (whether at state or parliamentary level) must be controlled.”398 
Constituency Boundaries  
Elections in Malaysia are competitive and a number of parties compete in the 
process. However, the way the electoral system is maneuvered, it has always sided with 
the ruling government’s party, the Barisan Nasional (BN). The UMNO-led BN has never 
lost an election because the electoral boundaries favor this governing coalition. In 
addition, the UMNO is the largest party in the BN, because it represents the Bumiputeras 
and the most votes are from the rural Malays. Critics claim that over-representation of the 
Malays in the electoral constituents is the key factor behind the BN’s consistent victories 
in the federal general elections.
399
 
The 1957 Constitution allocated a provision that there should be some weight in 
favor of the rural areas because of the size and difficulties of communication compared to 
urban constituencies. The political significance of the disparity between rural and urban 
constituencies lay in the fact that the rural areas were predominantly Malay and the urban 
areas were predominantly non-Malay.  
Since 1963, the bias of the electoral system against non-Bumiputeras in the 
peninsular (West Malaysia) was reinforced by inclusion of the two East Malaysian states 
and, as expected, the Bumiputeras majorities in both states (Sabah and Sarawak) 
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generally, although not always, aligned themselves politically with the peninsular 
Malays. Thus, the electoral system contained a built-in advantage for the Malay 
community.  
Also, dissatisfaction is likely to be more widespread among the Chinese than 
other ethnic groups, and there has been no realistic possibility of a non-Bumis party or 
coalition “going it alone” and winning the election. The only way for Chinese and Indian 
politicians to participate in the government has been by allying themselves with the 
Malays.
400
 
Evidence of Occasional Manipulation During Elections 
The UMNO-led BN has a majority stake in most press and media in Malaysia. 
Given their ownership of the mainstream media, it is not surprising that opposition party 
members have complained repeatedly that they are not able to get their manifestos 
publicized during campaign periods. Very often, their messages have been falsely 
reported and their statements taken out of the context. Whereas, the press has heavily 
favored BN campaigns and manifestos, giving them wide coverage and positive 
advertisements
401
 The major influencing factors, commonly termed the “3Ms,” are 
money, media, and machinery. There have been many complaints about the BN’s 
excessive use of funds, abuse of its control of Malaysia’s leading newspapers, television 
and radio networks, and misuse of the government’s machineries.402 
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The UMNO, the dominant party in the BN, has been able to use its control of the 
government to win votes in many ways. In the 1978 general election, Razaleigh Hamzah 
(when he was in the UMNO before the split in 1988), revealed how the BN had won the 
majority against the PAS: “In cases where PAS had a majority of 80 votes in the last 
election, I brought in 100 new UMNO supporting families. That’s how they (PAS) lost 
their majority.”403 
Other factors that have benefitted the party in power (the coalition BN) include 
the shortness of the electoral campaigns, a ban on open rallies, and the application of 
state funds. The Election Commission decides the length of the campaign period and 
ensures that it is kept very short, normally just over a week, presumably to maintain 
public harmony. Since 1978, open rallies have been banned, especially toward opposition 
parties. Nonetheless, BN leaders have extensively campaigned at huge rallies and used 
government functions for campaign purposes.  
Compared to the opposition parties, the BN’s campaign machinery, especially that 
of the UMNO, has been efficiently and effectively run during elections and is partly 
attributable to its easy access to funds. Through their control of federal funds, BN leaders 
have often promised new development projects and distribution of state largesse to party 
supporters.
404
 The most common allegation made during elections is that funds are used 
to buy constituency support.
405
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Electoral Outcomes 
All twelve general elections in Malaysia since 1955 have been won by the 
incumbent government, the BN. Table 3 below shows how the BN has been able to win 
consistently more than two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, except in 1969 and 2008, yet 
still have had the majority of votes to lead the country.  
 
Table 3. Malaysia’s General Election Wins, 1969-2008 
 
 
Incumbent BN Opposition 
Year % vote % seats % vote % seats 
1969 49.3 65.97 50.7 34.03 
1974 60.7 87.66 39.3 12.34 
1978 57.2 84.42 42.8 15.58 
1982 60.5 85.71 39.5 14.29 
1986 55.8 83.62 41.5 16.38 
1990 53.4 70.55 46.6 29.45 
1995 65.2 84.38 34.8 15.62 
1999 56.5 76.68 43.5 23.32 
2004 63.9 90.41 36.1 9.59 
2008 50.14 63.1 46.4 36.93 
Sources: Abdul Rashid Moten
406
 
 
Figure 3 below reveals the “hiccups” in general elections 1969, 1990, 1999, and 
2008. The hiccup in 1969 was caused by the ethnic grievances and riots over distribution 
of wealth; in 1990, the split of UMNO into Teams A and B; and in 1999, Malay votes 
decreased because of the Anwar debacle. Despite some loses in these four elections, the 
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UMNO-led BN continued to rule the country; although, now, its dominance is 
deteriorating.
407
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Parliamentary Seats Won in General Elections, 1959-2008 
Sources: Data for 1959-1974 compiled by researcher; data for 1978-2004 can be assessed from 
Election Commission of Malaysia (http://www.spr.gov.my/); data for 2008 was assessed from 
New Straits Time, March 10, 2008. 
 
 
It is also important to discuss the general electoral outcomes in 1999, 2004, and 
2008, which reveal the development of the people’s control over the government’s 
policies. Interestingly, during those three general elections, the number of parliamentary 
seats held by the incumbent government plunged slightly in 1999, then boosted up in 
2004, then again plunged even deeper in 2008. Analysts and observers claim that this 
trend shows that the people of Malaysia were angry with the government’s discriminating 
policies and with how they were manipulating the electoral system, and that the 
Malaysian people communicated their anger through the ballot box. 
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Analysts say that the 1999 general election result was essentially a repeat of the 
past, that nothing much had changed between the incumbents in power (BN) and the 
opposition; that is, the BN continued to rule and the opposition continued to oppose.
408
 
The most significant aspect of the 1999 general election, however, was the “Anwar 
factor”; observers claim that a significant number of Malay votes shifted from UMNO to 
the Pan Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) as a sign of the Malays’ anger over how Mahathir 
and UMNO had treated Anwar Ibrahim.  
However, one of the main reasons the opposition parties had previously lost 
elections to the BN was because the opposition had been unable to bridge the ideological 
gaps among the DAP’s “Malaysian Malaysia” (seen as implying equal political rights for 
all citizens), alienated Malay support, and the PAS who advocated creating an Islamic 
state, which distanced ethnic non-Muslims.  
In 2004, the number of seats won by the BN rose and UMNO-led BN won big, 
indicating that the people had put their trust in the new premier Abdullah Badawi on his 
promise to clean up the UMNO-led BN party of corrupt practices and leaders. However, 
Badawi was not up to the expectations of the people in fulfilling his promises. 
Consequently, in the 2008 election, dubbed a political “tsunami,”409 the ruling BN party 
lost big to the opposition and it was the BN’s worst performance ever in Malaysia’s fifty 
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years of independence. Crucially, for the first time since 1969, the BN lost the two-thirds 
majority in Parliament, which is needed for amending the Constitution.
410
 
Malaysia’s twelfth general election in 2008 witnessed the rise of people power 
against perceived suppression and dissatisfactions over communal politics, government- 
manipulated elections, deteriorating socio-economic conditions (dubbed the “3Cs”411 
factor), and continued marginalization of the ethnic Indian community. Large-scale 
protests throughout 2007 and early 2008 before the election were mostly led by officials 
from PAS, DAP, and PKR (National Justice Party). The protests, inspired by grievances 
over distributive fairness, were most potent by ethnic Indians, who organized through the 
Hindu Right Action Force (HINDRAF) as the Indians felt barred from Malaysia’s rapid 
industrialization and neglected by the government. Protests also came from deprived 
Malay and Chinese communities, who increasingly have raised doubts about distributions 
from developmental performance and have decried that patronage from the government 
mainly benefits a lucky few.  
As Malaysian citizens collectively began scrutinizing common procedures, an 
umbrella movement called Bersih
412
 (an acronym for a protest movement for “Clean and 
Fair Elections”) took shape. Although the Bersih movement413 articulated diverse 
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grievances, the center of attention was on the government’s electoral manipulation. The 
movement leaders, led by Anwar Ibrahim and top PAS officials, organized the 
demonstration, demanding electoral reforms.
414
 
Conclusion 
In general, Malaysia’s electoral system cannot be considered free and fair, 
because it does not fulfill the functions of what an electoral democracy requires. The 
Malaysian case serves as an example of a skewed, maneuvered electoral institution.  
So, what is the answer to the overarching question, do elections give the people 
control over their government and its policies? The answer is somewhat yes and no. 
Some may argue that elections in Malaysia serve more to legitimatize the government 
rather offer a change to the government. Others may see a glimpse of hope for 
democracy; as seen in the 2008 election results, which showed a strong sign that 
democratic choice was exercised and that there is a possibility of an “alternative 
government” in sight.  
One thing for sure, the government cannot ignore, anymore, the plight of the 
peoples. Yet, according to Lim (2002), the opposition members and other malcontents 
have focused attention on correcting the weakness of the present system rather than to 
push for proportional representation.
415
 An interesting point from William Case (2010) in 
describing the disappointment of the Malaysian people during elections: They do not so 
much bring the opposition to power as show the government that they are angry with how 
the government is manipulating the electoral system.  
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Ultimately, until the unfairness of the electoral system is fixed, the incumbent is 
risking being thrown out of office; as continues to be evidenced, such as in the results of 
the 2013 election (see page 86).  
Political Party System in Malaysia 
Does the party system assist the working of democracy? This section discusses 
the issues and political parties’ function in enhancing democracy in Malaysia.  
Politics in Malaysia has mainly been articulated in communal terms; thus, the 
main political parties have organized along ethnic lines: UMNO for Malay, MCA for the 
Chinese, and MIC for the Indians. Commonly, each party has sought to maximize its 
political power and economic benefits for a particular ethnic group and to promote group 
interests in areas such as language, education, and culture. For instance, UMNO 
presumably serves as the protector of the Malay communities.  
The hybrid criteria of Malaysian politics have directed political activity and 
accountability to political parties, without clear boundaries between the parties and the 
state. In addition, this system undercuts the space available for democratic political 
discourse and engagement, which has fostered a party-centric order with an autocratic 
background. 
Institutionalization of Malaysia’s Party System and Political Parties 
Malaysia’s key political parties416 are well-institutionalized. Enduring and stable, 
they are accepted and, across time, have gained stable roots in society. Moreover, with 
the legitimate electoral institution, the main political parties in Malaysia have been given 
                                                 
416
 The UMNO, MCA, MIC (coalition parties in BN) and the DAP, PAS, PKR (opposition coalition 
parties). 
 
 168 
the mandate to rule the country and to carry on with the system. Malaysia’s hybrid 
system consists of political parties that are least volatile in the region. More than fifty 
years since independence, only once has the Parliament been suspended and democracy 
collapsed and that was during the 1969 riots. Then, when in 2008 the opposition coalition 
(PKR, PAS and DAP) succeeded in denying the incumbent two-thirds of the super 
majority in Parliament, unlike in 1969 no ethnic tensions occurred. Also, even though the 
elections system was designed to benefit the incumbent coalition (BN), the 2008 election 
was proof that democracy is relatively alive in Malaysia, because the opposition was able 
to win control of state governments.
417
  
Parties in Malaysia have their general pattern of support in society, faith in 
organized interests, and a remarkably stable foundation in the system. In terms of 
longevity, the main party Barisan Nasional coalition members—UMNO, MCA, and 
MIC—who emerged before independence, have remained persistent until today. The 
opposition, comprised of two main parties—PAS418 and DAP—also have remained 
persistent since independence. In 2003, another party emerged to rival the UMNO and 
BN:  the PKR.
419
  
Parties in Malaysia at the earlier stage of independence defined themselves as 
communal ideologies. Different parties appealed to particular ethnic groups. UMNO was 
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for the Malays, the MCA for the Chinese, and the MIC for the Indians. On the 
oppositions’ part, the PAS and DAP (Democratic Action Party) claimed that their 
ideology was, contrary to BN, not communal issues but to represent all ethnicities in 
Malaysia. Even so, voters always have related the PAS with representing Muslim 
fundamentals and the DAP with representing Chinese communities.
420
  
Parties in Malaysia remain a primary mode of political engagement among the 
people, who show less interest in other forms of participation. However, since the 
Reformasi 
421
 movement in 1998, Malaysians have gone into the streets in protest, 
demonstrating their discontent, mostly toward the government and state policies. In 2007, 
two major demonstrations took place in Kuala Lumpur, organized by HINDRAF and 
Bersih.
422
 
On the other hand, the government discourages such acts as demonstrating in the 
streets; as seen in the many laws
423
 enacted that limit citizen participation in protest 
activities, especially those regarding government policies. Jomo (1996) wrote that the BN 
encouraged the idea of democratic participation through voting in elections rather than 
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through extra-electoral engagements
424
 like organized public meetings, street protests and 
demonstrations.  
In a smaller earlier survey, Welsh (1996) wrote that Malaysians understand 
democracy in terms of procedures and the performance of institutions and leaders, and 
that most were satisfied with the regime, however illiberal.
425
 This tolerance of the 
illiberal political system is because Malaysians have a narrow concept of democracy, 
which is defined through involvement in registered political parties and participation in 
multi-party elections that are conducted regularly; and, unlike elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia (Singapore excluded), elections and party politics are the stuff of contemporary 
Malaysia politics.
426
 
Party organizations and disciplines are relatively solid and high in Malaysia. The 
networks created between parties and supporters keep party leaders informed of 
sentiments and priorities at the grassroots levels, which prepares a strong ground for 
parties to create strategies to gain the absolute confidence and votes of supporters. One 
main characteristic of parties in Malaysia is that they identify themselves through a 
particularistic ground; for example, UMNO based its main agenda as the protector of the 
Malay race and the Malays’ special positions, and the PAS are a Malay Muslim-based 
party that appeals to the Islamic state as well as justice for all. 
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The paradox of the party system in Malaysia is that it functions against the 
principles of democracy. According to Weiss (2009), the case of Malaysia shows a 
strongly institutionalized party system that is incompatible with democracy.
427
 Elements 
of domination are obviously criteria in the system; one single party dominates the power 
in the government, and the power structure is concentrated on a single party dominating 
rather than power being shared with other less dominant parties.  
Thus, not surprisingly, the party system in Malaysia contributes to the literature in 
politics and government in terms of how party systems flourish in a semi-democratic 
political regime like Malaysia. The interesting phenomenon in the studies of Malaysia’s 
government is that coercive systems tend to reinforce stable party systems. The regime 
often uses coercion, such as threat of detention or confinement, as a deterrent to causing 
further trouble to the regime. This action might also have an exemplary function, in that it 
warns other prospective opponents of the consequences of their actions. On a grander 
scale, wholesale coercion in the form of a state of emergency might be employed in order 
to displace or out-maneuver successful members of opposition parties.  
To justify the control of its domestic legitimate opposition and dissidents who are 
seen as a threat to the government’s agenda and interests, this application of coercion 
thus works as a form of political strategy. For example, coercion might simultaneously 
punish an opponent for his actions and prevent him from continuing them, while 
providing a deterrent to others who might contemplate a similar action.  
Several broad categories of coercion are readily identifiable. A regime might 
employ coercive measures to prevent unwanted actions such as demonstrations and 
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strikes, or the speeches, writings, and mobilizing activities of a particular leader. A 
persistently troublesome opponent might find himself subjected to punitive coercion and 
suffer a period of detention. 
Coercion is the most appealing strategic option for a hybrid regime like Malaysia, 
which seeks to balance constraints from the divided societies and regime’s political goals. 
Thus, these acts of restraining divided societies through the mechanism of control are 
claimed to be justified in order to maintain social harmony and economic development. 
Political Engineering of the Party System in Malaysia 
Political parties in Malaysia mobilize support along ethnic lines. As mentioned, 
the BN and UMNO lay their ideology on the foundation of communal politics. Thus, 
their political leaders usually conduct their campaigns by playing the “ethnic card.” This 
often leads to increasing ethnic tensions and, in some instances, ethnic conflict. The 
common argument that says democracy fares better in mono-ethnic societies than in 
multi-ethnic ones is due to the particular ways that parties form, develop, and campaign 
in ethnically divided societies. Not surprisingly, ethnic conflict is often a direct result of 
ethnic politics imbued in the party system.
428
 
In such a system, the easiest way to mobilize voter support at election time is to 
appeal to the root insecurities of the population. For instance, during campaigns, the 
UMNO always remind supporters that, if they do not vote and secure the power of 
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UMNO, the tragedy of May 13, 1969 will repeat itself. The ideas of the May 13 riots 
often create uneasy feelings among voters who are of different ethnic backgrounds.
429
 
Sequencing the institutionalization of parties before state structures, specifically 
before meaningful democratization, helps to explain both the patterns of party 
development and the party-system institutionalization in Malaysia. Thus, a well-
institutionalized system is unfavorable, rather than essential to democratic stability.  
Complementing these effects has been a legacy of skewed rules of the game that 
deny representation of particular interests and that shift citizens’ decisions on whether to 
engage. The series of changes in these factors has yielded a polity in which elections are 
more honored than honorable, and a well-institutionalized system that is harmful rather 
than essential to democratic stability.
430
 
Malaysia’s dominant party-institutionalized system limits prospects for real 
democratization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995) see this as an asset, saying that 
institutionalization means parties play a key role in structuring the political system, which 
renders politics more predictable.
431
 
Conclusion 
Over time, most likely Malaysia’s institutionalized and strong party system will 
remain institutionalized. However, the party system will become increasingly unclear as 
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increased transparency and broader participation in extra-electoral channels are more 
contingent on the lack of inspiring leadership in UMNO.  
In sum, Malaysia’s institutionalized party system will not help move 
democratization along. Only when the system wavers, will liberalization be possible. 
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Chapter Seven: The Government’s Effectiveness and Accountability 
It is very important for the development of a democracy if a government is 
accountable in all of its activities. Basically, accountability relates to responsibility, 
blameworthiness, answerability, and trust; and, thus, involves the obligation to explain 
one’s actions and to justify what one does. In a democratic system, accountability is a 
crucial factor in determining good governance and, hence, the legitimacy of power. 
Regardless of the form of the ruling system used to govern a country, accountability is 
the pillar of integrity and is the actual portrayal of the ruling government’s uprightness. 
Figure 4 below shows the indicator of the voice and accountability that reflects 
perceptions on the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media. The performance of the ASEAN six countries was not encouraging, including 
Malaysia, which has performed low since 2006 and dropped in 2010, below Singapore 
and only a little above Thailand, which has performed the worst. Indonesia shows an 
impressive improvement, becoming the best in the ASEAN six in 2010. 
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Figure 4. Malaysia’s Voice and Accountability Indicator 
 
 
Issues with Malaysia’s Voice and Accountability Indicator 
According to the Global Integrity Report,
432
 Malaysia scores poorly in many areas 
of accountability, especially regarding the significant implementation gap between laws 
on the books and their actual enforcement. Repressive laws in Malaysia hamper freedom 
of expression and deny citizens’ access to government information; there is no right-to-
information law. Likewise, the separation of government powers in Malaysia is unclear, 
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and the executive body appears to enjoy relatively unchecked power. A supreme audit 
institution exists, but the public cannot access its reports.
433
  
Freedom of Information Act 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is not guaranteed in Malaysia either 
constitutionally or through any specific legislation. The Malaysian government has 
repeatedly rejected requests for FOIA legislation from opposition parliamentarians, civil 
society representatives, and journalists. The government’s chief argument is that access 
to information could affect race relations within the multi-ethnic population.
434
  
Such laws as these, however, are very important in any functioning government, 
because they can protect the people from corruption and help to promote transparency 
and good governance. With such laws, the government must share information so that the 
public is not in a state of ignorance regarding the government’s activities. When a 
government is transparent, this increases public confidence and deepens the citizens’ trust 
in their government.  
The Centre of Independent Journalism (CIJ) in Malaysia has added to the calls for 
the Malaysian government to introduce a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). With 
Malaysia performing badly in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), for three 
consecutive years (2009, 2010, 2011), it would be best for the country to have the FOIA 
passed because it would be one of the best tools to keep corruption at bay.  
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One big achievement in Malaysia regarding the FOIA is that in April 2011, the 
Malaysian state Selangor
435
 passed an FOI Bill, the first in Malaysia. Following suite was 
Penang in November 2011.
436
 Critics allege that those bills still have many discrepancies 
and risk being overruled by the federal government’s Official Secrets Act (OSA), but are 
the beginning of good signs to come regarding transparency in governance and 
government accountability.  
The FOI laws will face difficulties in implementation since they do not yet apply 
to information controlled by the federal government and they do not have the power to 
override OSA restrictions, which provides the government with broad discretion in 
classifying any government-controlled information; and with draconian laws such as the 
Internal Security Act (ISA), which sanctions imprisonment without trial of any 
individuals deemed to be acting in any manner prejudicial to the interests of the security 
of Malaysia. Moreover, the FOI laws require applicants to state the reason for and 
purpose of their information requests, and provides for the arrest and detention of 
individuals deemed to have used information contrary to the stated reason and purpose.  
Official Secrets Act 
Freedom of information is severely restricted in Malaysia, both by legislation, 
including the Official Secrets Act (OSA), and a pervasive culture of secrecy. Information 
on matters ranging from public health to government spending is classified. There also is 
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no allowance for appeal to public interest when requesting documents, nor is there a 
culture of protecting whistleblowers.
437
 
According to Suaram,
438
 it can be fairly said that the amount of information 
subject to classification as a state secret is potentially unlimited. The list of documents 
and information provided in the schedule is extremely broad, placing even formally 
adopted Cabinet documents in the realm of secrecy. This is contrary to fundamental 
democratic principles of an open government.  
In addition, any designated public official may, at any time and apparently for any 
reason, classify anything at all as an official secret.
439
 The absence of any check or 
balance on the powers of the minister or public officials to classify information is a 
serious flaw. There also is no penalty for misclassifying information, and section 16A 
attempts to place the decisions of even the most junior public official to classify a 
particular document beyond judicial scrutiny. This results in one-sided legislation that 
accords unlimited power to the state and its officials to deny the public information, and 
enables the use of the Act to conceal corruption, abuse of public power, and 
mismanagement of public resources, contrary to generally established principles of 
administrative justice.
440
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The OSA has created a culture of secrecy, which makes it difficult to access 
documents even when there is a legal obligation for the government to make these public, 
such as environmental impact assessments, budgets and local development plans. The 
Act has also made it illegal for journalists to have access to almost all official documents.  
As a result of these restrictions, the OSA is often invoked to silence dissidents. 
Many leaders and members of opposition parties have been found guilty of receiving and 
revealing information about the government’s excessive expenditures and misuse of 
public funds. Persecution relies on revealing the so-called government secrets.  
Another problem is that ministers and government officials are not obliged to 
reveal the facts, even when the issue concerns the public interest. This is obvious during 
the debate and question-and-answer sessions in Parliament, where the minister to whom a 
question is directed can decide not to answer. This provision is available under 
Parliamentary Standing Orders, which defeats the purpose of a parliamentary question 
time. Even on minor non-sensitive issues, civil servants are often reluctant to speak 
out.
441
 Due to the prevailing culture of secrecy in Malaysia, there is a long list of 
information that is of public interest but which the public is unable to access; or, if it can 
be accessed, red tape and bureaucracy prevent the public from obtaining the information. 
Government Effectiveness 
A government’s effectiveness is reflected in its citizens’ perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from 
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political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
The most comprehensive and reliable source of information on government 
performance is the Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) first released in 1999 by 
Kaufman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton.
442
 This indicator measures the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to 
such policies. If a government is effective, it should be able to deliver goods that 
individuals need in order to improve their social welfare. At a minimum, an effective 
government provides an environment where all citizens enjoy reliable access to sufficient 
amounts of food. Malaysia since 1996 has been relatively consistent in the government 
effectiveness indicator.  
In Figure 5 below, the ranking indicator between the ASEAN five (Indonesia, 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand), as of 2010 the Malaysian government’s 
effectiveness improved from 2009
443
 and ranks second after Singapore, which has been 
consistent in the indicator.  
 
                                                 
442
 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton, “Governance Matters,” The World Bank (1999). 
 
443
 The global financial crisis of 2008-2009, with its epicenter in the United States, may have impacted 
Malaysia’s economy. The overall GDP growth rate of Malaysia slowed in the last quarter of 2008 and fell 
further in the first quarter of 2009, resulting in Malaysia’s government cutting public spending.  
  
 182 
Figure 5. Government Effectiveness 
Source: Country Data Report for MALAYSIA, 1996-2010. The Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI),
444
 The World Bank Group 2011.  
 
 
Human Development Index 2011 
Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) found a strong positive association 
between government effectiveness and human development. For example, countries with 
higher accountability have had a more stable political environment, and more effective 
governments have had lower infant mortality rates and higher literacy rates.  
Also, improvements in government performance have a very large payoff in terms 
of human development. The more effective the government, the higher the level of 
human development. This is especially true in middle-income countries, where each year, 
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higher governance-effective rankings have resulted in a higher Human Development 
Index (HDI). 
 
Figure 6. Human Development Index: Trends 1980-present 
Source: The World Bank and researcher calculation 
 
The Human Development Index (HDI) is based primarily on international data 
from the UN Population Division, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS), and the 
World Bank. The HDI is an average measure of basic human development achievements 
in a country, represents a push for a broader definition of well-being, and provides a 
composite measure of three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, 
and income. Between 1980 and 2011, Malaysia showed progress in each of these HDI 
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indicators, placing Malaysia above the regional average.
445
 In the broader picture, 
government effectiveness in Malaysia is reflected in its high HDI.  
Many studies have noted positive correlations between an effective government 
and higher human development. Democracy promoters assume that democracy will 
improve human development. Ironically, Malaysia performed well in human 
development relative to it being a semi-democracy. Perhaps government effectiveness 
and efficient government institutions somehow influence human development regardless 
of the system of governance. 
Like all averages, the HDI masks inequality in the distribution of human 
development across the population at the country level. The HDI can be viewed as an 
index of “potential” human development and inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI) as an index 
of actual human development. Due to a lack of relevant data, the IHDI on Malaysia has 
not been calculated.
446
 
Civilian Control of the Military and Police 
Civilian control is implicitly defined as a lack of military coups and military rule; 
or a low risk for such events.
447
 An uncontrolled military is a hinder toward full 
democratization. Fortunate for democratization in Malaysia, there are no serious issues 
with the military-civilian relationship. The military in Malaysia are fully controlled by 
civilian-elected officials. The same applies to the police forces. In fact, Malaysia is one of 
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the few countries in Southeast Asia where the military has not intervened in politics and 
where the civilian authorities have continued in power since independence. Since there 
are no real tensions between the armed forces and the political leadership in Malaysia, I 
foresee no possibility of a military take-over in Malaysia in the near future.  
Factors That Shape a Positive Relationship Between Military/Police and Civilian 
Authority 
Institutional Building of the Malaysia Armed Forces 
Malaysia is a good example of a country where the civil-military relation is 
constitutionally instituted.
448
 The Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF)
449
 is a corporate entity 
that is completely loyal to the government and is subordinate to that civil power because 
of the rule of law (the nation’s Constitution), tradition, and its own sense of military 
professionalism. In this regard, the MAF adheres to the principle of civilian supremacy; 
that, in a stable democracy, patterns of civil-military relations are established by public 
law or constitutional tradition, assured control of the military by the civilian government, 
and are observed by the government and accepted by the armed forces as part of the 
military ethic.
450
 
According to Zakaria Hj. Ahmad (1985), the institution building of the Malaysian 
military itself is a factor that explains why there is no intervention by the MAF in 
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domestic politics. Its role has been clearly defined in terms of internal and external 
defense missions, and the military are clearly subservient toward the civilian authorities. 
In this sense, the non-intervention of the military in the political process might be 
attributed to the lack of opportunity and to their preoccupation with well-delineated 
military tasks.
451
 
Analysts report that the MAF had steadfastly stuck to its role in support of the 
civilian authorities, such as in instances like the critical period of the May 13
th
 ethnic 
riots in Kuala Lumpur. When the army was called to restore order, it could easily have 
seized the political power but did not do so; this occurrence demonstrated the non-
interventionist stance of the MAF. Most importantly, the point remains that no matter 
what changes that might happen in later Malaya and in present Malaysia, the MAF has 
not transformed nor deviated from its role.
452
 Another example is that during the twelve-
year Emergency Period (1948-1960), when the MAF had all the opportunity to take over 
the country on the grounds of protecting the nation state against Communists insurgents, 
there was no occurrence of the military taking over power from the civilian government. 
In the Malaysian context, the military is mainly responsible for the country’s 
internal and external defenses. They are focused on implementing rather than formulating 
national defense and security policies. The concept of loyalty to country and king has 
resulted in a deep-seated belief in subordination of the armed forces to the civilian 
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administration; accordingly, the military’s code of honor emphasizes political neutrality. 
The former army chief General Zain Hashim once remarked that the MAF’s primary 
concern was to carry out the missions issued by the civilian administration. As far as he 
was concerned, it is not even the duty of the armed forces to identify who the external foe 
is. This statement reflects the military’s commitment to non-interference in the political 
sphere.
453
 
As a national institution confined by the control authority and Constitution, the 
MAF has not changed much during the political transition of the country from colonial to 
post-independence times. This is an important factor in explaining the military’s high 
degree of organizational cohesion and institutional stability. 
Dominant Political Party 
Experts advise that if we want to explain the role of the military in politics, it is 
not enough to focus on the military institution alone; we need to see the political system 
as a whole. For example, in Malaysia, the features of political systems are that political 
parties have deep roots in society. UMNO and its alliance partners have real organized 
roots in society and there is no doubt that many Malays in Malaysia believe that UMNO 
serves as a safeguard to their interests. The military elites and civilian elites are closely 
linked, and disobedience toward the civilian government is very unlikely because both 
parties share similar interests in the state.
454
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Hence, civilian control in Malaysia refers to specific civilians (that is the Malays) 
and if in case there is transition in the regime, there will be still military compliance for 
as long as the new regime is still Malay dominated. So far, there have been no coups in 
Malaysia because the military has only served under the same regime (UMNO-led BN) 
since independence and only one ethnic community political control, the Malay and 
UMNO.
455
 Understandably, civilian control of the military in a semi-democracy or 
partially authoritarian political system like Malaysia is safeguarded by an informal 
networking between military officers and the dominant government party (i.e., UMNO-
led Barisan Nasional).
456
  
As stated in the Constitution, the MAF is part of the Malaysian Government 
Department of civil service and is responsible for implementing government defense 
policies. Therefore, the MAF does not intervene in political activities and is always 
supportive of the ruling government; although this close relationship between the military 
and the ruling parties invites claims that the MAF and the police forces are used as the 
government’s apparatus to sustain the regime’s survivability.  
Ethnicity and the Civilian-Military Stable Relationship 
The question of ethnic relations remains an unresolved problem in MAF 
institution building; thus, it may also be a key factor of the military’s non-intervention in 
politics. According to Cynthia Enloe (1976), when discussing civilian control on the 
military, the question should be which civilians control the military, with what resources, 
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and for what ends?
457
 Ethnic considerations are vital in the social composition of the 
military and its subordination to civilian authority. In Malaysia, the military has always 
been identified with the Malay community; especially after the 1969 riots, when the 
Malay community and political leadership came to view the military and the police force 
as crucial to maintaining Malay dominance.  
Harold Crouch (1997) argued that since Malaysia is sharply divided along ethnic 
lines, the ethnic factor has actually contributed to stable civil-military relations. The 
Malays are completely dominant in the armed forces and, since the government is also 
dominated by the Malays, there is little conflict between the military and the government. 
In fact, Malay military officers, Malay bureaucrats, and UMNO politicians are all part of 
the same elite and are often related to each other by either blood or marriage.
458
 In 
addition, the MAF are predominantly Malays and are controlled by the Malay high-
ranking officers; thus, logically, they will not seize power because, basically, they enjoy 
the same privileges and rewards and share similar values. Basically, the military in 
Malaysia reinforces the Malay domination of the government.
459
  
Others argue that the MAF will not seize power because they are controlled by the 
Malays, and the key posts in the force are mostly held by Malays, with the composition 
of members in the military also being predominantly Malays, implying that the forces 
                                                 
457
 Cynthia H. Enloe, “Civilian Control of the Military: Implications in the Plural Societies of Guyana and 
Malaysia,” in Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from Developing Countries, ed. Claude E. 
Welch, Jr. (New York: State University of New York Press, 1976), 65-98. 
 
458
 For instance, during the premiership of Tunku Abdul Rahman (Malaysia’s first prime minister), the 
armed forces staff general at that time was the nephew of the prime minister himself and, being related, the 
general would not have toppled his uncle in a coup de tat. 
 
459
 Harold Crouch, “Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia,” in Consolidating the Third 
Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Larry Diamond et al. (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins. 1997).  
 190 
will not change a system that supports Malay privileges. Even if there is an intra-Malays 
power struggle,
460
 it would be unlikely to change the present structure and pattern of 
civil-military relations in Malaysia. Nathan and Govindasamy (2001) theorized that the 
MAF would politically take over power only if the Malays’ dominance and privileges 
were threatened. Practically, as long as there is no direct threat to Malay power and its 
privileges, the military will remain apolitical and independent.
461
 
Strong and Stable Government Contributes to Stable Civilian-Military Relationship 
It is common sense that an ineffective civilian government and its weak political 
institutions can trigger interference from a strong military institution. We have seen 
military interference in Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and others in the region, 
throughout the history of Southeast Asia. When civilian leaders fail to legitimize their 
governmental authority in a sustainable manner, military interference is unavoidable. 
Malaysia’s political legitimacy, which is based on Malay dominance, has had a high 
degree of legitimacy and has been effective in delivering public goods and raising the 
living standards of the people.
462
 
Malaysia, since independence, has experienced decades of impressive economic 
and social progress, enabling it to provide for the health and education of its people, to 
eradicate poverty in large measure, to build an excellent infrastructure, and to become a 
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major global exporter of goods and services.
463
 Political stability and economic growth 
have sustained the political system in Malaysia, which can be seen in the people’s 
endorsement of the ruling government through regularly held general elections.  
The military in Malaysia are happy that their interests are well-looked after by the 
government and that the Malays supremacy and Malay interests have remained 
uninterrupted; which prompts the military not to interfere with the civilian authority. 
Furthermore, the Malaysian government’s legitimacy is amplified by the constitutional 
provisions of draconian laws,
464
 which are exercised by the legal body and the police 
force.  
The military, however, has been excluded from the exercise of the internal 
political coercion. While important and evident, coercion is not the fortress of the 
Malaysian government. Those laws are used on the grounds of enforcing authority and 
maintaining social harmony. Critics, however, say otherwise and criticize that the 
government uses coercion to buttress opposition and dissidents. 
Police Force in Malaysia 
The problem with police and security forces has been that they are always seen as 
a police of the government, most of the time defending the political order along with the 
government of the day. In addition, they are also against the opposition.  
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Lately, it has been reported by Amnesty International and human-rights groups 
that acts of police brutality in Malaysia are rising against civilians and opposition 
members
465
 as well as many deaths in police custody, with very few inquests conducted 
and the vast majority uninvestigated.  
A 2007 survey commissioned by Transparency International Malaysia and 
conducted by the Merdeka Centre for Opinion Research found that the police are among 
the least transparent government agencies; 56 percent of Malaysians have named the 
police as the enforcement agency with the lowest level of integrity and transparency. 
Between 1999 and 2003, 5,726 cases of corruption involving the police were reported, 
more than any other government agency. Some officers had taken sizable bribes from 
brothels and other criminal operations, and amassed millions of ringgit in their bank 
accounts. The Royal Commission found a pattern of consistent neglect and abuse of 
rights, apparently ingrained in police practices despite strong safeguards and compliance 
with human rights in national laws.
466
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Malaysia Military Spending 
Malaysia’s defense budget is modest compared to many countries. Defense 
allocation therefore depends on the question of affordability on the part of the 
government. Malaysia spent money on defense whenever her budget allowed for it.  
Figure 7 below shows that, on the government’s spending pattern on the military 
from 1990 to 1995, the trend is upward; after 1995, the military spending decreased until 
1998, after which military expenditures trended upward trend but in small increases year 
to year. In general, Malaysia’s military expenditure as a percentage of the GDP has been 
about 2.4 to 2.6 for the past fifteen years.
467
 
 
Figure 7. Military Expenditure As Percentage of Malaysia’s GDP 
Source: The World Bank World Development Indicators and researcher calculations 
 
 
Internationally, Malaysia remained on the sidelines of the dangerous escalation of 
tensions between China on one side and the Philippines and Vietnam on the other over 
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control of the South China Sea, despite Malaysia being one of the numerous claimants to 
the disputed Spratly Islands. In fact, Malaysia has taken a notably pro-China stance on 
the issue, assuring its fellow ASEAN members that Chinese involvement in the region is 
to be encouraged rather than feared. Nonetheless, Malaysia has remained largely aloof 
from defense co-operation with China, and held back from conducting any major joint 
exercises with the Chinese, as other regional militaries now do. Tensions with traditional 
rivals Indonesia and Singapore have remained at an historic low, with the Malaysian 
government pushing for the formation of a joint parliamentary committee with Indonesia 
to resolve the question of the two countries’ disputed land and maritime borders.468 
Speculation over the emergence of a regional arms race has not translated into 
defense spending increases on Malaysia’s part, perhaps impacted by the economic 
downturn. In October 2011, the government said it would be spending marginally less on 
defense in the coming year; according to the government’s figures, the budget was set to 
dip from MYR13.8bn (US$4.44bn) to MYR13.7bn (US$4.41 bn).
469
 
Conclusion 
Malaysia’s mixed political system, often called “semi-democratic,” 
understandably needs the backing of both the police and the military in managing public 
order and security. In appreciating this imperative for peace and stability, the MAF and 
the government complement each other under the rubric of national security and nation-
building. Having said this, the system will remain the same because “entrenched 
institutions and interests have largely blocked fundamental change.” The country’s 
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history and politics and geo-location helped create deeply entrenched identities, 
institutions and relations. Thus, any form of reform will be met with strong rejection for 
those benefits from the system.
470
  
Malaysia has scored well for its civilian-controlled relationship with the military. 
Although it may not be to the complete satisfaction of all groups, the norms are already 
entrenched in the system, through years since colonialism. The positive step forward is to 
concentrate toward greater transparency and accountability in both institutions, both the 
police force and the MAF. 
Assessing Corruption in Malaysia  
Although corruption
471
 in Malaysia has not attained epidemic proportions, it has 
been on the increase in recent years.
472
 Professor Syed Hussein Alatas (1986) wrote that, 
apart from Singapore, of all the developing countries of Asia, corruption is least 
pandemic in Malaysia. The fear is that it is growing. Since 1957, the year of 
independence, corruption has definitely been growing in Malaysia. We see numerous 
political figures and others amassing wealth through being in office. It is public 
knowledge that there is a great deal of corruption going on in customs, the highway 
police, immigration, the courts, the land office, the supply acquisition units of the various 
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ministries, the religious departments in the states of the federation, and the road transport 
offices. [But] corruption in Malaysia has not reached the Indonesian and Indian 
proportions to the degree of systemic malignancy.
473
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Malaysia’s CPI Score: 2001-2010 
Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010) 
 
 
The score in Figure 8 depicts Malaysia at its lowest rating ever by the graft 
watchdog Transparency International. Malaysia is seen plunging down into serious 
corruption, with an index score of 4.4. The index has a range of 0 to 10, 0 being highly 
corrupt, 10 being very clean. An index score of 4.4 is deemed to be a serious corruption 
score and is ranked at 56 out of 178 countries being rated (see Figure 9). The CPI scores 
released in October 26, 2010 show that, since 2001, Malaysia has distressingly dropped 
in the international rankings and corruption in Malaysia has reached a critical level; 
Transparency International warned the government to act for fear of losing its 
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Malaysia’s CPI Score 2001 to 2010 
 
Year Ranking CPI Score 
No. of countries 
surveyed 
2001 36 5.0 91 
102 
133 
146 
159 
163 
179 
180 
180 
178 
2002 33 4.9 
2003 37 5.2 
2004 39 5.1 
2005 39 5.0 
2006 44 5.1 
2007 43 5.1 
2008 47 5.1 
2009 56 4.5 
2010 56 4.4 
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competitiveness.474 Dato Paul Low, president of the local branch of Transparency 
International – Malaysia, noted that the plunge was serious not only compared to the 
country’s perceived past performances but, more importantly, in relation to other 
countries worldwide, especially those within the ASEAN region. Drawing attention to 
neighboring Indonesia, Low marked that though Malaysia ranks 111 and scored 2.8 on 
the CPI, the country’s corruption level is seen to be improving steadily under the 
administration of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
475
 
 
 
Figure 9. CPI Scores: Selected ASEAN Countries and South Korea 
Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010) 
 
 
In 2010, while Malaysia was slipping in its rank, Indonesia was rising, moving up 
fast and showing good improvement, mostly because of the political will of the country 
to improve itself and eradicate corruption. Indonesia’s powerful Corruption Eradication 
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Commission (KPK) so far has been successful in bringing the country’s ranking up under 
CPI in the region. This brings one to suggest that the Malaysia Anti-Corruption 
Commission (MACC) be given more prosecution power in order to be more effective like 
what is practiced in Indonesia. Malaysia needs to be more proactive in addressing 
corruption, especially those involving the “big fish,” if the government is serious about 
improving their rank in the CPI. Although there have been many media reports about 
high-profile corruption cases involving ruling party politicians and powerful individuals, 
the public’s perception in Malaysia is that few are investigated or end up in court. In 
addition, the MACC has been ineffective in catching any “big fish,” fueling a widespread 
belief that the Commission is not completely independent.
476
 
Recently, aside from a lack of political will and MACC’s lack of persecution 
powers, Malaysia’s fight against corruption has lost ground due to selective investigation 
and prosecution of graft cases. This lies solely with the attorney general who has made 
odd decisions not to take further action in certain cases. One example of how graft cases 
either go unnoticed or are not investigated is the Alcatel-Lucent bribery controversy in 
December 2010 when the French telecom giant was accused by U.S. officials of bribing 
officials in Latin America and Asia, including Malaysia; however, this case has gone 
unnoticed in Malaysia. It is unfortunate that we needed a charge from a foreign 
legislation (the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) to highlight incidences of possible 
corruption in Malaysia.
477
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Although there are good initiatives and the public’s confidence in the 
government’s actions to fight corruption has jumped, as shown in Figure 10 below, 
unfortunately there are indications of insufficient political will to eradicate corruption. 
For example, no “big fish” being brought to book, poor progress in identifying and 
prosecuting culpable persons in the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) fiasco,
478
 no further 
action by the Attorney General against those implicated in judicial appointment-
tampering (Lingam tapes saga)
479
 despite the Royal Commission’s findings and 
recommendations, and the continuing and snowballing practice of awarding mega 
projects and contracts without open tenders or competitive bidding, and IPs yet to be 
implemented.
480
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Figure 10. Assessment of Malaysian Government’s Actions in the Fight Against 
Corruption 2006-2010 
Source: Transparency International – Malaysia (Jul - Dec 2010) 
 
When Abdullah Badawi
481
 assumed office as Prime Minister on 31 October 2003, 
he pledged to implement reforms that are embedded in the National Integrity Plan (NIP), 
he tried to eradicate corruption and promote good governance and ethical values,
482
 and 
pledged war against corruption in Malaysia. This explains how the Barisan Nasional was 
able to capture 90 percent of parliamentary seats and won spectacularly in the 2004 
general election. Under Badawi, the people finally had hope that the country was heading 
in the right direction, as opposed to the uncompromising style of Mahathir. However, 
Badawi’s glory did not last long, as critics said he had failed to keep up with his initial 
plans. The lack of real change in terms of openness became more and more evident 
throughout his tenure. Often, he stood by mutely as investigations into the corruption of 
high-level officials collapsed and whistleblowers were penalized. For example, Eric Chia, 
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a tycoon once close to Mahathir, was charged for making payments of RM76 million 
($23 million) to a nonexistent company; he was acquitted for any wrong doing, and the 
opposition leader Lim Kit Siang characterized the acquittal as a major setback for anti-
corruption.
483
 
Also, to eliminate Malaysia’s endemic culture of patronage, Badawi ought to have 
explained in full how his son Kamaluddin had secured the position of a leading 
shareholder of Scomi Group, whose share price shot up by nearly 600 percent just a few 
months before Badawi was scheduled to take over from Mahathir as prime minister, 
making his son into a multi-millionaire overnight. The same thing happened with 
Badawi’s son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, whose meteoric rise to become the nation’s 
most powerful young man took place during Badawi’s tenure when, in 2006, he made a 
fortune in the merger between ECM Libra Capital Bhd. and the government-linked 
Avenue Capital Resources Bhd.
484
 
Transparency International – Malaysia (TI-M) urges the government to show 
strong political will to fight corruption without fear or favor. Given Malaysia’s aspiration 
to be a high income and developed country by the year 2020, the commitment to fight 
corruption must be clear and firm. CPI results, as in the graph “Relationship Between CPI 
Scores and GDP” have consistently shown a direct correlation between the level of 
corruption and the economic development of a nation. Nations with good CPI scores (less 
corrupt) are developed nations with a high Gross Development Products (GDP), such as 
                                                 
483
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Denmark, New Zealand, and Singapore (joint top three in the 2010 CPI ranking). 
Conversely, countries with low scores (more corrupt) are low-income nations. This 
indicates that Malaysia’s quest for a high-income economy will fail if corruption persists. 
A high-income economy can only be achieved where there are efficient delivery systems, 
and the organs of government and institutions govern and manage the country and its 
resources professionally, responsibly, and with integrity, transparency, and good 
governance in the interest of the nation and its citizens.
485
 
Najib Tun Razak,
486
 as Malaysia’s new premier in 2009, tried to prove that he was 
against corruption. Under his watch, ongoing high-profile court cases prosecuted by the 
MACC included former transport minister and MCA president Tun Dr Ling Liong Sik 
and former Selangor menteri besar Datuk Seri Dr Mohd Khir Toyo. Dr Ling was charged 
for cheating the government over his alleged role in the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) 
scandal; Dr Mohd Khir was arrested and charged for alleged corruption linked to a land 
deal. Another former transport minister, Tan Sri Chan Kong Choy, was also charged in 
relation to the PKFZ case.
487
 
Critics claim that such improvements and upgrades might do the trick of silencing 
skeptics. However, what is more important is that the MACC should continue to curb 
corruption in Malaysia, without fear or favor. Elements that facilitate “grand corruption” 
are still prevalent; including the continued and snowballing practice of awarding mega 
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projects and contracts without open tenders or competitive bidding, limited access to 
information that contributes to a culture of secrecy and a lack of transparency, allegations 
of inflated pricing in military purchases, and the continued close nexus between business 
and politics in Malaysia.
488
 
Corruption is a negative phenomenon often displayed in a hybrid political system. 
This is because the political system provides an able environment that accommodates 
corrupt practices. 
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Chapter Eight: Civil Society, Popular Participation Media, and Democracy 
This chapter answers the question: Do the media in Malaysia operate in a way 
that sustains democratic values? In a healthy democracy, the power of the media is to 
highlight issues that best serve the needs of the public. In order to perform effectively, it 
is imperative for the mass media to operate in a free environment. Access to information 
is a key; democracy depends on a knowledgeable citizenry whose access to a broad range 
of information enables them to fully participate in public life, help determine priorities 
for public spending, receive equal access to justice, and hold public officials 
accountable.
489
  
For a country pursuing a developed-nation status,
490
 there is a vital need for a 
plurality of independent media in order to achieve a good democracy. A variety of free 
and independent information sources, including the conventional media of printing and 
broadcasting (i.e., television, radio) and increased access to the new media that is the 
Internet (i.e., blogging, tweeting, social online networking), are essential in the 
contemporary democratic environment.  
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Media Freedom in Malaysia 
Figure 11 below shows that the press media in Malaysia consistently have not 
been free. The index provided by Freedom House shows that these results have been 
consistent for about a decade: “Not Free”491 (2002-2011). Information gathered from 
varieties of Human Rights Watch groups, Amnesty International, Reporters Without 
Borders, and World Press Freedom Index reveals government crackdowns on journalists 
and newspapers publications, especially news about criticizing and revealing government 
inefficiency and corrupt dealings.  
The index at its highest peak of “unfree” media in 2002 and 2003 covered the last 
two years that Premier Mahathir was in office. These indicate a government ineffective in 
Malaysia, which increasingly resorted to the crudest and most repressive legislations in 
the Constitution; namely the ISA, OSA, and Sedition Act, to try to curb political 
mobilization and scrutiny over the exercise of power and related media activities. The 
year 2006 had the lowest indicator since 2002, and was the period when the new premier 
Abdullah Badawi had promised to stop corruption and give more media freedom, which 
had inspired positive expectations in Malaysia’s public and civil society. The other years 
show signs of consistently slow progress in media freedom. However, the new media, the 
Internet, has shown some good signs that it is not in the same “shoes” as the mainstream 
media.  
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Figure 11. Malaysia: Freedom of Press and Freedom of the Net Index 2002-2011  
Main Issues on Media Freedom 
In Malaysia, the concerns of a free and independent media involve two main 
troubling issues: (1) the issue of ownership, and (2) regulatory issues.
492
 Regarding 
ownership, much of the mainstream media in Malaysia is owned directly or indirectly by 
entities linked to the ruling political party. Many local newspapers, especially the daily 
published press, are either controlled or owned by either the government coalition parties 
under BN or companies that have strong relations with the ruling party.
493
  
For instance, UMNO controls the Fleet Company which owns major daily 
newspapers in Malaysia, such as the New Straits Times, Berita Harian, Business Times, 
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the Malay Mail and Shin Min Daily News. In addition, the major Malay daily newspapers 
(i.e., Utusan Melayu, Utusan Malaysia) are owned by companies with a direct link to 
UMNO. Berjaya Group, the company that publishes The Star, The Sun, and Watan 
newspapers, is owned by Vincent Tan, a close friend to Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad. The same goes with major Chinese newspapers, such as Nanyang Siangpao 
and China Press bought by the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA).
494
 Likewise, 
Tamil newspapers, such as Tamil Nesan, Tamil Osai and Thinamani, have a close link 
with leaders in the Malaysian Indian Congress party (MIC).
495
 These cases clearly show 
the web of press ownership that directly links to the ruling Barisan Nasional, the longest 
serving party in the regime. 
Powerful politically connected business figures have increasingly looked to the 
courts to silence and punish critical reporting through “mega-suits.” Two defamation 
cases were brought by Mahathir’s son pertaining to an article about Malaysia Inc. in the 
January 1999 edition of Asia Wall Street Journal (AWSJ); in another case, a RM200 
million defamation suit was taken by Vincent Tan, Berjaya Group chairman and chief 
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executive, in response to “Malaysia Props Up Crony Capitalists” penned by Malaysian 
academic K. S. Jomo in the December 1998 edition of the AWSJ.
496
 
As a result of dominance in ownership, a monopoly is clearly unavoidable. Since 
almost all of the major media and daily newspapers in Malaysia, are under the BN 
government’s possession, the Radio and TV Malaysia (RTM) is used by the ruling party 
to spread its agenda and propaganda to the masses. All the media have been manipulated 
to direct people’s attention and support in favor of the ruling political parties. On the 
other hand, the opposition political parties are given bad reviews and negative media 
coverage; they are not given a fair share of the public access media to inform the masses 
of their political agenda and aspirations.
497
 
Strict Regulations Confining Media Freedom in Malaysia 
In addition to the issues of ownership in Malaysia, the media are confined via the 
array of the government’s strict regulations and laws. The Malaysian Constitution 
guarantees freedom of expression under Article 10, which provides each citizen the right 
to freedom of speech and expression; but, at the same time, allows hordes of limitations 
to this right. Well-known laws (i.e., Sedition Act, Internal Security Act, Official Secret 
Act) and other harsh criminal-defamation laws are used regularly to impose restrictions 
on the press and other critics of the government of its policies and unfavorable behavior. 
The 1984 Printing Presses and Publications Act (PPPA) requires all publishers and 
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printing firms to obtain an annual operations permit, and gives the prime minister the 
authority to revoke licenses at any time without judicial review.
498
 
One of the many cases was the imprisonment of Lim Guan Eng,
499
 a Malaysian 
opposition politician who spoke out against the rape of a schoolgirl by a government 
minister. For speaking out, he was sentenced to three years imprisonment, the schoolgirl 
to three years “protective custody,” and the minister so far has not been charged.500 Eng 
had raised the irregularities of the case after one of his constituents, who was also the 
girl’s grandmother, brought the case to him and sought his help. On 28 February 1995, 
Eng was charged under the Sedition Act for prompting “disaffection with the 
administration of justice in Malaysia.” On 17 March 1995, an additional charge was 
brought under the Printing Presses and Publications Act for “maliciously printing” a 
pamphlet containing “false information,” specifically that he had used the term 
“imprisoned victim” to describe the rape victim.501  
At his first trial in 1997, Lim Guan Eng was convicted on both counts and fined 
RM 15,000 (US$6,000). The state appealed to the Court of Appeal against the “leniency” 
of the sentence and, at a subsequent hearing before the Court of Appeal (1 April 1998), 
the sentence was increased to three years imprisonment. A consequence of that sentence 
is that Eng was automatically barred as a member of Parliament and is likely to be 
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declared bankrupt. The persecution of Lim Guan Eng is seen not as just an attempt by the 
government to silence a prominent critic, but as a warning to others. His constituents 
have been denied representation in Parliament.
502
 
Not only local journalists and activists are sued and jailed, but also international 
journalists have faced the wrath of Malaysia’s controlled media freedom. The jailing of 
FEER correspondent Murray Hiebert further highlights the seriousness of the situation. 
For those who do take the risk, there is always the cautionary example of Murray Hiebert, 
when Malaysia became the only Commonwealth country in half a century to jail a 
reporter (and a foreigner at that) for contempt of court. Hiebert, at the time Kuala Lumpur 
bureau chief for the Far Eastern Economic Review, was sent to prison for four weeks as a 
result of a story he wrote that was critical of the Malaysian judiciary.  
The ordeal of the two-year trial and appeals process, during which Hiebert was 
barred from leaving the country, made him Malaysia’s press freedom poster child. “Why 
are they doing this?” he was asked rhetorically one afternoon in his office before he lost 
his appeal. “I think they want to send a message to reporters not to go too far in this 
country,” he answered. 503 In an interview with the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 
Hiebert said, “They used antiquated British contempt of court law that allowed them to 
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put me in jail for writing an article that in most settings would have been viewed as very 
innocuous.”504 
With such a complex web of ownership, conflict of interest is unavoidable, and it 
is hard to imagine that the mass media can be truly independent and free from the 
influence of political parties and strict state regulations that restrict freedom of media and 
expression. Media control through state legislation and shared ownership have brought a 
great impact on the level of media freedom in Malaysia. When media are controlled by 
shared ownership and legislation, media reports tend to be more biased toward 
individuals and groups that are linked to media companies and the government. Only 
selected news that is favorable to the government and its political parties is allowed to be 
disseminated by the media, and news that is critical and negative toward the government 
and its allies is intentionally avoided. In sum, the media serves the interests of the ruling 
government instead of the welfare of the people. The mainstream media is used by the 
government to suppress and demonize the opposition parties and dissidents.
505
 
The “Unconventional” Media: The Internet 
Due to the mainstream media control by the government, an increasing number of 
Malaysians are turning to the Internet as their main source of news. In 1994, Malaysia 
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became the first country in Southeast Asia to offer Internet access to the public.
506
 The 
2011 Freedom House reported that the Internet had penetrated 56 percent of Malaysians, 
or 28.9 million population.
507
  
The online media have not only broken Malaysia’s information blockade, 
democratizing access to critical perspectives, less-than-rosy news, details on opposition 
parties, and a heap of mindless chatter, to boot; but also have arguably pressed 
mainstream media to open up and incumbent politicians at least to gesture toward 
interaction and, hence, accountability.
508
 
Malaysians depend on the Internet as an alternative to the mainstream media for 
obtaining and disseminating information. The unprecedented victory of the opposition 
parties in Malaysia’s 2008 general election is proof of the successful role of the Internet. 
The incumbent government reluctantly admitted that they had underestimated the power 
of Internet.  
Since 2009, the government has stepped up use of the Communications and 
Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA) to silence critics online. The authorities have carried out 
investigations against news portals and bloggers for making allegedly offensive 
comments. On August 2010, The Malaysian Insider reported that Najib’s administration 
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had started to evaluate the feasibility of using Internet filters to block undesirable 
websites, but backed off from the plan after public outcry.
509
 
Internet Freedom 
The significant development of the Internet in Malaysia’s political backdrop was 
the launch of the online Malaysiakini (Malaysia Now).
510
 This independent and critical 
newspaper soon had over 110,000 readers daily and won international journalistic 
acclaim. It exploited two loopholes: (1) existing laws did not require online media 
publications to be licensed; and (2) the previous commitment by the government not to 
censor the Internet.
511
 As an internationally respected, independent, non-party-political 
source, the Malaysiakini has gained the trust of people who are concerned about the 
government. 
As shown in Figure 11, Malaysia Internet freedom is only party-free. The extent 
of government surveillance of the Internet is unclear. In recent years, the authorities have 
repeatedly hinted that they may take steps to register bloggers. Meanwhile, they have put 
aside the plan of following protests by the blogging community and media outlets. The 
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government so far has kept to its promise not to impose restrictions on the Internet as 
mentioned in the Act in 1996. 
The Freedom House study, however, found mounting threats to Internet freedom. 
In 2001, the Prime Minister’s Department announced that a legislative review was under 
way to curb use of the Internet to incite public disorder and violence against the 
government; this included consideration of extending the embrace of the Printing Presses 
and Publication Act (PPPA) to the Internet.
512
 According to Freedom on the Net 2011, A 
Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media, cyber-attacks, politically motivated 
censorship, and government control over Internet infrastructure are among the diverse 
and growing threats to Internet freedom.
513
 
These violations on Internet freedom come at a time of explosive growth in the 
number of Internet users worldwide, which has doubled over the past five years. 
Governments are responding to the increased influence of the new medium, by seeking to 
control online activity, restrict the free flow of information, and otherwise infringe on the 
rights of users. These detailed findings clearly show that Internet freedom cannot be 
taken for granted, said David J. Kramer, executive director of Freedom House. 
Nondemocratic regimes are devoting more attention and resources to censorship and 
other forms of interference with online expression.
514
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The New Media, Web 2.0 
This new media is the latest achievement of the power of mass media technology 
to offer the promise of true freedom of information and away from the control of big 
corporations, political parties, and the government. Web 2.0 is a generic term used to 
describe the group of media technology that enables user-generated content. Video-
sharing websites such as YouTube.com, social-networking websites such as Friendster 
and Facebook, and blogs, are examples of Web 2.0. The main difference between Web 
2.0 and conventional media is the user’s ability to publish their own content and for the 
readers to respond without the interference of “gatekeeping” from editors. Web 2.0 also 
allows users to circumvent existing laws and regulations that govern conventional media 
such as print and broadcasting.
515
 
Web bloggers are imperative in the respect of keeping check on the mainstream 
media. Political bloggers, especially, perform on a regular basis, fact-checking the news 
and challenging the predominant point of view in the mainstream media. These bloggers 
highlight attention to issues that are, most of the time, neglected by the mainstream 
media. In Malaysia, blogging is becoming a form of political participation. Recently, 
there has been an apparent prominence of political blogs, in comparison to other Asian 
countries.  
However, lately, bloggers
516
 and “netizens” in Malaysia are under pressure from 
the government. In 2007, legal action taken by government-prominent English 
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 Lim Ming Kuok, “Mass Media and Democracy,” http://www.projectmalaysia.org/articles.html. 
 
516
 Famous political blogger Raja Petra Kamaruddin (RPK) hated by the regime, charged and detained by 
the authority for his repeated allegations of corruption and abuse of authority. He is still facing sedition and 
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newspapers against two prominent social-political bloggers sparked the formation of the 
National Alliance of Bloggers (All-Blogs).
517
 A cyber sedition
518
 bill is said to be under 
review. Introduced by the Council of Ministers in December 2010, it poses yet another 
danger to online freedom of expression in Malaysia. Aside from the Sedition Act, some 
thirty other laws may also be used to control the media and the Internet, including the 
ISA, the 1984 Press and Publication Law, and the 1998 Communications and Multimedia 
Act.
519
 
Conclusion 
Why are the media controlled in Malaysia? In theory, Malaysia claimed to be a 
democratic state following its colonial master’s parliamentary system. In reality, the 
democratic system is “flawed” and “fettered.” The argument made by the state is that 
Malaysia being a developing country cannot practice a fully democratic system in support 
of a developmental paradigm chosen over economic growth and stability; thus, some 
form of authoritarian rule is necessary to ensure economic and political stability and good 
governance, including stringent control of the media and other institutions in the country. 
The relationship between the media and Malaysian’s semi-democracy emphasizes 
the relevance of a “developmentalist” discourse that posits a payoff between stability and 
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economic progress on the one hand, and democratic and human rights on the other. This 
explains why the legislative restrictions on the media are still maintained. The leaders of 
Malaysia are laboring under an old paradigm that says you can have development or 
democracy, but not both. This fixed mindset is still inherent in Malaysia’s leaders, 
especially the ruling government of UMNO-led BN where the ethnic card is still being 
played to rule the country.  
The truth is, ethnic politics are no longer relevant in Malaysia’s politics. The 
people are now demanding good governance, with accountability, transparency and 
justice at the forefront of the Malaysian political scenario. The Internet and the new 
media are seen as the only channels that are free of government control. The online new 
media have restructured Malaysians’ access to information and ability to challenge the 
mainstream media that are controlled by the government. The new media technologies 
offer a clear opportunity for greater freedom of information and, potentially, 
democratization. 
Figure 12 below shows that Malaysia is ranked as one of the best in terms of 
media freedom in Southeast Asia. The lower score indicates the better freedom of press 
in the country; 2011-2012 shows freedom of press in distress in the region. Malaysia 
somehow has ranked ahead of other ASEAN countries like Singapore, Indonesia, 
Thailand and the Philippines. 
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Figure 12. Press Freedom Index 2002-2012: Malaysia Compared with ASEAN  
Source: data from Reporters Without Borders – the Press Freedom Index and researcher calculations520 
 
 
Political Participation Assessment  
This section focuses on the issues and present conditions faced by citizen 
participation and civil society organizations (CSOs) in Malaysia. Understanding civil 
society and citizen participation
521
 in politics is important for democratization in 
Malaysia. Using the observed analysis of academic works from daily newspapers, 
Internet bloggers, published academic journals and publications from experts and 
analysts of Malaysia’s civil society organizations (CSOs), this section explores issues and 
progress of CSOs in Malaysia, state relations with public participation in politics and the 
government, and issues that concern them every day. 
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The State-Society Relationship 
Citizen participation in Malaysia is characterized by state-society relations. Since 
the late 1990s, there has been active citizen participation in Malaysian politics. Analysts 
see this as a strategy for improving governance processes and for attaining good 
governance and democratization.  
The state-society relationship has become a useful indicator to understanding 
public engagement in politics. It is conventional wisdom in Malaysian politics that the 
state is dominant in the society. The relationship has been variously characterized as soft-
authoritarianism,
522
 quasi-democracy,
523
 statist-democracy,
524
 repressive-responsive,
525
 
semi-democracy,
526
 and many others examples found in Malaysian politics literature. 
These literatures describe how the state has managed the society through its 
policies and apparatus that regularly accommodate
527
 the different segments of society 
and, most of the time, shield itself from critics and opponents through state apparatus in 
the form of the restrictive laws that are sheltered by the nation’ Constitution.  
For example, Jesudason (1995) wrote about how the Malaysian state has the 
ability to protect itself from civil society influences; because, as an independent post-
colonial government, it inherited a well-developed state structure and institutional 
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 The state’s ability to offer patronage and successfully incorporate a wide array of groups has been a 
critical factor  in weakening the opposition. 
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patterns from the colonial state, which had been used to manage a society deeply divided 
along ethnic and religious lines, thus forging an identity of interests between the state and 
society in many areas of social life, with resulting limitations on the capabilities of civil 
society in Malaysia.
528
  
As a post-colonial state, Malaysia inherited a well-developed civil service and 
bureaucracy from the British. Economic growth experienced by the young nation-state 
after independence made Malaysia pursue a developmentalist strategy with the society, 
and this strategy has effectively blocked civil society organizations (CSOs)
529
 from 
providing direct services to the masses.
530
 The UMNO, since its establishment in 1946 
and being the dominant party in the ruling coalition, by default has been the main 
political party that sees to the needs and welfare of the people, especially the Malays. The 
UMNO has managed to provide patronage worthy of its dominance, making it possible to 
dispense various forms of assistance through various mechanisms. Thus, the Malays in 
return have given the UMNO their electoral support in every election since 
independence. 
In her book, Vidhu Verma (2002)
531
 focuses on the relationship between the state 
and society, which influences contemporary Malaysian politics, and which she sees is key 
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to understanding future political developments. She acknowledges that civil society is 
weak in Malaysia, due to the state limiting activities and development. However, she 
does not see this weakness as something permanent, because the civil society is 
undergoing a period of profound change in democratizing Malaysia. She predicts that the 
UMNO is losing its traditional power and credibility among the Malays as their main 
protection and, instead, they have turned to PAS as the savior.
532
  
The State of Civil Society in Malaysia 
Proponents of democracy claim that democratization is inevitable if a country 
achieves economic growth, because that will galvanize political mobilization. Thus, 
democratization is the outcome of the emergence of a civil society. Experts argue that the 
civil society factor is another explanation for the limited democratization in Southeast 
Asia in general, and Malaysia in particular. The paradox is that this claim is not realized 
in Malaysia due to the resistance of a strong state.
533
 
The conventional or liberal position on civil society claims that the general 
welfare of society and the process of democratization are enhanced when groups, 
organizations, and associations act as a shield to prevent the state from assuming too 
much control of the society.
534
 The failure on the part of a democratically elected 
                                                 
532
 Verma’s predictions were based on her observations during the 1999 general election when PAS made 
dramatic gains at UMNO’s expense. However, through the manipulation of issues, institutions, and 
personalities, UMNO has continued to dominate politics. While UMNO may face a greater challenge from 
PAS in elections in 2004 and beyond, it is perhaps too soon to say that the floor has inevitably been 
conceded to PAS. 
 
533
 Wolfgand Sachsenroder and Ulrike E. Frings, eds., Political Party Systems and Democratic 
Development in East and Southeast Asia (Aldershot, Hants, England, Brookfield, Vt. USA: Ashgate, 1998), 
278-9. 
 
534
 Larry Diamond (1994). 
 222 
government failing to address basic issues pertaining to the welfare of the citizens will 
bring a situation where the social forces play a more active role.
535
  
In the last two decades, citizen participation in Malaysia has been based on the 
ground of good governance (government accountability and transparency),
536
 electoral 
reform,
537
 and social justice.
538
 People participation was galvanized by the Reformasi 
movement in 1998. Reformasi (in Malay) is one form of social movements that have 
taken place in Malaysia, mainly as a response to the 1997 economic crisis and Anwar 
saga.
539
  
Civil societies in Malaysia do not fit the theoretical ideal of a democratic country. 
The Malaysian experience demonstrates the difficulty of assigning civil society as a 
positive role for democratization. According to Jesudason (1995), the broader historical 
process of state formation in Malaysia, in particular the origins of the state from external 
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implantation, has critically shaped the role of civil society and determined its 
development.
540
 
The ethnic factor is another way of explaining the vertical relationship between 
the state and society. Often in post-colonial politics, states have used ethnic and religious 
consciousness to gain legitimacy and sustain incumbency. The UMNO, while respecting 
other cultural rights of the non-Malays, has managed to position itself as the protector of 
the Malay culture and Islam, using this mechanism to sustain the vertical ties of 
dependency between the Malays and the UMNO elites. Hence, the state emerged as the 
champion in acquiring social prestige and gained power over the civil society.
541
 
Ethnic and religious consciousness have hurt the development of a civil society, 
because it is difficult for larger communal groupings to cut across ethnic lines to emerge 
and be powerful. For instance, the Perkasa, known as the ultra-Malays, will not negotiate 
for anything when it comes to Malay special rights; and the Dong Zhong, the ultra-
Chinese group that insists that Chinese schools have only Chinese teachers, accentuate 
existing, conflicting narrow ideologies that will not work in developing a vibrant civil 
society. 
A civil society in Malaysia is also characterized through its communal 
organizations. Some analysts say this phenomenon is the outcome of British divide-and-
rule policies; in other words, this colonial superstructure is still practiced by the state, 
even after independence. These communitarian organizations have continued to play an 
essential role in representing the interests of their respective communities. As a result, 
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their exclusivity and hierarchical structures have somewhat impeded the formation of 
cross-cutting civic organizations that promote equality and openness.  
A recent study shows that collaboration among Malaysian civil society 
organizations (CSOs) is difficult to find.
542
 Because Malaysia is a hybrid regime, 
combining both democratic and autocratic attributes in running the system, civil society 
activities are never autonomous and associational activities are heavily regulated by the 
state.  
The Societies Act of 1966 (revised in 1983) defines the relationship between the 
state and civil society. The Registrar of Society (ROS) is responsible for monitoring the 
activities of voluntary associations and is empowered to accept or reject any application 
to form new associations.
543
 Oppressive laws, such as the Sedition Act of 1948, Internal 
Security Act
544
 of 1960, and the Communications and Multimedia Act of 1998, have 
created a culture of fear for people’s participation in Malaysia. The government passed an 
amendment on the Official Secret Acts (OSA) despite heated protests from the National 
Union of Journalists and other key civil societies actors.
545
 Increased intolerance toward 
opposition views and dissidents on government’s policies have led to self-censorship and 
have limited the opportunity for peoples’ participation and civil society organizations 
                                                 
542
 Azeem, 2011. 
 
543
 Ibid. 
 
544
 Thanks to the efforts of CSOs, opposition political parties, and the Malaysian people, this Draconian 
Law was repealed in September 2011; the ISA will be replaced by two laws aimed at preventing subversive 
activities, organized terrorism and crime, to maintain peace and public order.  
 
545
 Azeem, 2011. 
 225 
(CSOs) activities. Thus, civil society in Malaysia operates under the “watchful eyes” of 
the state.  
As a multi-ethnic country, Malaysia has given the government grounds to restrict 
the activities of CSOs and warnings not to address certain issues that may incite ethnic or 
religious tensions, all in the name of maintaining ethnic and religious harmony. The 
government acknowledges that civil society is becoming increasingly influential. Yet, 
despite the recent active movements of citizen participation, the people are still hampered 
by stringent laws that restrict activities that the government designates to be subversive, 
especially protests against government policies. Laws like the University and University 
Colleges Act strictly forbid academicians, teachers, and students from entering into any 
political form of political participation. 
The Malaysian government has frequently resorted to using the ethnic card in its 
attacks on civil society activities that go against its policies. Despite passing laws, 
adopting policies, and issuing threats that discourage discussion of matters concerning 
ethnicities, supposedly because this is too sensitive a topic, the government has 
repeatedly used ethnic issues to delegitimize its opponents.  
This exploitation of the people’s ethnicities, say analysts, is not because of the 
heightened tension between ethnic groups in the country, but because the government 
wants to distract the people’s attention from the rifts happening within the government 
(e.g., internal divisions within UMNO).
546
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Positive Expectations and Progress of Civil Societies 
The civil society in Malaysia is relatively weak, compared to countries like South 
Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia. However, this condition is not stagnant. Civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in Malaysia are gaining momentum since Reformasi in 
1998 and are championing unpopular causes
547
 and criticizing the government’s 
policies.
548
 The Malay middle class, who once shied away from criticizing the 
government, has become more outspoken in criticizing the malpractices in UMNO. This 
development, over time, will open the door to a vibrant and effective civil society in 
Malaysia. 
Civil Society As an Electoral Force 
Remember the watershed election of 2008? The startling result revealed a 
political alternative besides the ethnic politics of the incumbent BN government. It was a 
civil society that mobilized the public toward achieving the alternative.  
Since the Reformasi movement in late 1990s, civil society organizations (CSOs) 
and activists have increasingly taken part in electoral politics, directly or indirectly. In the 
context of Malaysian elections, civil society refers to the opposition forces. Although 
these activists had played their roles in previous elections, the general election of 2008 
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took on a new scope. According to Weiss (2006),
549
 CSOs promoted issues rather than 
communal identity, and introduced new politicians without the baggage of old-school 
politics, which boosted expectations for accountability and provided a new and 
independent media to facilitate public participation.  
The ideas of reform and change owe much to the CSOs and activists, more than 
just the parties themselves. Political parties are much more confined in ideologies; 
whereas, activists operating within civil societies are less constrained. They are freer to 
go “outside the box” of the communal makeup and, effectively, cross ethnic and religious 
boundaries by focusing on mutually shared concerns. It is within Malaysia’s civil society 
that important new agendas were developed, from women’s rights and environmental 
conservation to approaches to Islamization.
550
 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the development of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) has been the new media, which indisputably altered the atmosphere and 
outcomes of the campaigns. The ability to access and publicize information is a 
fundamental need of a politically active civil society. A free media is the primary vehicle 
for both state and society to communicate their interests and concerns. Therefore, a plural 
array of nongovernmental, independent information sources, including print and 
broadcast media and increased access to Internet connections, is essential. 
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Conclusion  
Proponents of democracy may argue that people participation via active civil 
societies go hand-in-hand with democratization. However, in Malaysia this has not been 
the case. Public participation in politics and CSO activities still have too many challenges 
to overcome before a fully liberalized political system can be achieved. The limited 
options of a civil society may not just be the result of state control, but an overlapping of 
the interests of the state with other interest groups in the societies.  
This assessment indicates that the condition of CSOs in Malaysia suits the 
political paradox of being partly democratic and partly autocratic: having the rights of 
participating through suffrage and, at the same time, those rights being restricted by laws 
that were designed to restrict participation. This is not to suggest that reforms cannot take 
place in the future. From what I have observed presently, positive transformations of 
CSOs and citizen participation are taking place in Malaysia.  
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Chapter Nine: Assessing the Government’s Responsiveness 
This chapter addresses the question: Is the government responsive to the concerns 
of its citizens? A government elected democratically through election has an obligation to 
respond to its citizens who chose them to govern the country and take care of the people’s 
welfare. Good government is appraised through its responsive and effective governance.  
The Malaysian government has done a good job, so far, of effectively 
implementing its policies in infrastructure development, education and healthcare, 
poverty and inequality reduction, and economic development strategies.
551
 The 
government’s effectiveness at addressing these critical social issues has earned politicians 
a high level of public trust.
552
  
However, when it comes to the government’s responsiveness to demands and 
pressure from the people, this assessment has revealed that the government has used the 
complex nature of its socio-political composition to respond with repressive measures to 
stifle those who challenge the government’s policies, while simultaneously responding to 
demands that will benefit the state and society. 
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Three Factors Upon Which a Government Bases Its Responsiveness 
Three factors serve as the backdrop upon which a government bases its 
responsiveness to its citizens’ demands and concerns: (1) the regime is a “syncretic 
state,”553 (2) the system is both “repressive and responsive,” and (3) the “strong state” 
factor.  
The Regime Is a  “Syncretic State” 
This approach was made known by Jesudason (2001) in his discourse on the state-
centered
554
 model of Malaysian polity:  
…a product of a particular historical-structural configuration that has allowed the 
power holders to combine a broad array of economics, ideological and coercive 
elements in managing the society, including limiting the effectiveness of the 
opposition as a democratizing force.… The syncretic state operates at a 
multidimensional level, mixing coercive elements with electoral and democratic 
procedures; it propagates religion in society as it pursues secular economic goals; 
it engages in ethnic mobilization while inculcating national feeling; and it pursues 
a combination of economic practices ranging from liberal capitalism, state 
economic intervention, to rentier arrangements. These features are important ways 
a product of the externally implanted nature of the colonial state and the colonial 
capitalist economy.
555
 
 
  A syncretic state combines a variety of ideological orientations and political 
practices in managing the society. Thus, the management of a syncretic state can be 
challenging and crisis-ridden; but, if successfully done, it allows for a high degree of 
dominance. According to Jesudason, one of the interesting aspects of the syncretic state is 
its ability to mix democratic procedures and coercive practices. Both features are legacies 
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from the colonial period and were deep-rooted and implanted well when the post-colonial 
state took over; the ruling elites sustained the system that they believed useful for future 
state-building tasks.
556
 
According to Tilly (1985), the top-down process of state-building under 
colonialism made it possible for post-colonial states to “harbor powerful, unconstrained 
organizations that easily overshadow all other organizations within their territories.”557 
The legacies of democratic procedure, such as election, left by the colonial state, were 
adopted by the new ruling elites of the post-colonial state. The new elites assumed and 
maintained power through electoral and constitutional means. Hence, it was relatively 
convenient for the new ruling elites to maintain power through the electoral mechanism 
left behind by the colonial state. The vast power and resources left by the colonial state 
enabled the elites to integrate vertically significant groups in the society.
558
 
In Malaysia, class politics has declined due to the ethnically infused nature of the 
nation’s politics since post-colonialism took over.559 This is because the ethnic Malays 
have dominated the political landscape since the day they took over from the colonial 
master, thus the franchise of power being automatic for the Malays and restricted for the 
non-Malays. This is why it is more beneficial for the dominant ethnic group when issues 
of race are focused as the main political issue rather than class issues.  
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Ethnic politics continues to play an essential role in the constant process of giving 
meaning to the concept of a Malaysian nation. Thus, in 1993, when Mahathir Mohamad 
spoke to the United Nations General Assembly of the “multi-ethnic time bomb we 
inherited from the colonial past,”560 he clearly still considered the multi-ethnic character 
of Malaysian society to be its greatest fault line; which follows various rhetoric that 
stability and ethnic harmony are more important than freedom and rights.  
Democratic procedures, although highly manipulated by the political elites, 
nonetheless have given legitimacy to the dominant party in Malaysia. The ability of the 
elites to shape the electoral system has benefitted the UMNO-led BN (Barisan Nasional). 
William Case (1993) wrote that the way the Malaysian elites manipulate the semi-
democratic nature of the new state forges a greater legitimacy than what a full 
authoritarian system could do and that, by avoiding full democratic procedures, should be 
permitted to gain legitimacy.
561
 
The appearance of democratic legitimacy allows coercion to be used as an 
effective political strategy, especially if the coercion is protected by legal procedures. In 
Malaysia, the laws that constrain the peoples’ freedom and suppress their rights are well-
protected in the Constitution. For instance, the Emergency Ordinance of 1960 has been 
used against Kelantan, the opposition’s state government; and the Internal Security Act of 
1969 has been used to detain individual opponents and dissidents. Also, coercion had 
been used persistently in the past against the class-based opposition, especially against 
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parties of the Left; from the 1980s, the trend was used against Islamic opponents of the 
regime and political dissidents.  
The interesting factor is that, in Malaysia, coercion for the most part has been 
accepted by the general public as legitimate.
562
 Hence, the mix of coercion and electoral 
mechanism in Malaysia that protects the dominant party from collective resentment by 
the people, to the point that it hinders regime change.
563
 One of the accomplishments of 
the ruling coalition in managing the syncretic state has been its remarkable ability to 
combine a mix of ideological orientations, which has allowed political leadership to blur 
the lines between state and society.
564
 
The syncretic state also has successfully exploited ethnic issues to secure its 
dominance. Unlike in the European experience, where the long process of state 
development led to a relative cultural homogeneity of the population, from its beginning 
as a post-colonial state, Malaysia has not needed to homogenize the population for the 
purpose of governing; because the ethnic division is part of the original colonial 
scheme.
565
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However, since independence, to counter the ethnic issues, the Malay elites have 
included the need for cooperation with party elites from the Chinese and Indian 
communities. Also, through mobilizing ethnic attachments, high-growth policies and 
selective co-optation, the UMNO leaders have been able to contain absolute rebellion by 
the non-Malays.
566
 
The syncretic state managerial role in the economy toward all major ethnicities is 
mutually dependent for the government. Economic policies, while continuing to favor the 
Malays, have been modified from time to time to ensure that no long-term damage would 
be inflicted on the economy. Thus, the post-colonial syncretic state monitors internal and 
external economic and political conditions, so that the state as well as the society 
benefits.  
In sum, the syncretic state has significant capabilities of structuring state-society 
relations. The syncretic state that made possible authoritarian traits in the form of 
repressive laws, at the same time has allowed democratic procedures like elections and 
political participation as some form of legitimacy so that the state’s actions and policies 
would have a foundation for how the government could respond to challengers. 
 The “Repressive and Responsive” System 
In his analysis of Malaysia’s government and society, Harold Crouch (1996)567 
wrote that, despite the fact that Malaysia had undergone a successful socio-economic 
transformation since independence, it was still maintaining a conservative political 
system; the government was still led by the UMNO-led BN party, which ruled through a 
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mixture of repression, manipulation, and responsiveness.
568
 It is an ambiguous system, 
wrote Crouch, that in certain circumstances Malaysia is democratic and, in certain 
respects, the system has become more authoritarian. 
This is Malaya’s political backdrop since she was a colonial state. After 
independence, the mostly autocratic “strong state” institutions were sustained by the post-
colonial state to run the country. At the same time, the country also sustained its 
democratic Westminster model of democracy inherited from the colonial master. Thus, 
despite the state acquisition of enhanced authoritarian powers, the system was far from 
fully authoritarian. The same applies to democratic institutions and principles, which are 
strong and stable and at the same time maneuvered.
569
 The constitutional framework is 
democratic in form but cannot be described as democratic in practice, because it is 
combined with repressive controls. The power structure is authoritarian, yet the 
democratic political institutions (especially parties that contest in regular elections) force 
the government to respond to pressures from society.
570
 
The communal divisions in Malaysian society have also encouraged consultation 
and compromise. Although the Malays have dominated the government, they could not 
disregard the interests of other communities, for two main reasons: (1) the non-Malay 
communities were too large to be repressed continuously, and (2) the severe repression of 
non-Malays would have had disastrous economic consequences, because of the important 
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role of the ethnic Chinese in the domestic sector. Thus, the strength of the non-Malay 
communities meant it was far easier and, indeed, mutually beneficial for the 
representatives of the main communities to work together in the government.
571
 
The Malaysian political system was subjected to pressures that pushed 
simultaneously in authoritarian and democratic directions. On the one hand, the state 
exercised strong authoritarian powers to preserve political stability and the continued 
domination of the Malay elites. On the other hand, it was faced with forces that limited its 
powers, while regular competitive elections, although unfair toward the opposition, 
managed to force the government to respond to popular pressures. Thus, the authoritarian 
and democratic characteristics of the political system were not necessarily in 
contradiction to each other but were often mutually supportive.
572
 
The government frequently responded to challenges with a combination of 
repressive and responsive measures, reflecting its combined authoritarian and democratic 
character. A well-known example is Malaysia’s first bloody ethnic riots in 1969. The new 
government reacted in an authoritarian way, with repressive measures of emergency 
declaration, suspension of Parliament, and arrests of opposition activists. At the same 
time, the government responded to popular grievances within the Malay communities 
(the subject of the riots) by implementing affirmative action policies (e.g., the NEP) to 
reconstruct the society.  
Even though the policies after the 1969 riots were pro-Malay, nevertheless, the 
Malay leaders knew they needed their non-Malay coalition partners in order to maintain 
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an adequate level of popular support to win general elections. Therefore, the government 
had to be responsive to non-Malay interests, even though not as much as to Malay 
interests. Thus, despite the implementation of pro-Malay policies in response to the 
demands of the Malay community in the 1970s and 1980s, Chinese businesses continued 
to obtain licenses, permits, and contracts from the government agencies. The non-Malays 
continued to be employed in the government’s bureaucracies and state enterprises; non-
Malay students continued to obtain places in universities; Chinese and Indian children 
continued to attend Chinese and Tamil primary schools; and non-Malays continued to 
practice their cultures and religion.
573
 Although many Malay activists preferred the 
government to limit the rights of non-Malays in these areas, the government insisted on 
maintaining a substantial level of electoral support among the non-Malay communities 
and was, therefore, reluctant to pursue policies that would turn the non-Malays 
overwhelmingly against the BN government.
574
  
Critics claim that the Malaysian government became more authoritarian in 
responding to challengers in domestic politics. In the 1980s, many activists and 
government critics were detained under ISA
575
; two Supreme Court judges were 
dismissed by the executive body for challenging the Prime Minister for abuse of powers. 
The government has made a series of amendments to strengthen restrictive laws, such as 
the Printing Press and Publications Acts and Internal Security Acts (ISA) by removing 
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them from judicial review. In the 1990s, the government sacked its vice-Prime Minister 
for challenging the government’s policies, which provoked the Reformasi movement. 
Many protesters were detained under ISA,
576
 along with their leader, Anwar Ibrahim. 
Unprecedented protests against the government’s policies began during the 
Reformasi movement in 1998. Then, in 2007, for the first time, thousands of ethnic 
Indians, under the banner of Hindu Rights Action Force (HINDRAF), walked in the 
streets of Kuala Lumpur to protest the government’s discriminatory policies against them. 
This was followed by the BERSIH (clean) movements, in which the people protested 
against the government’s gerrymandered electoral system in Malaysia; the government 
overzealously responded by sending state police to use tear gas and water cannons 
against the protesters. The Malaysian government’s harsh response to the people’s 
demands cost the ruling party its two-thirds super vote in the Parliament in the 2008 
general election. The ethnic Indians cast their votes in favor of the opposition. The 
government was also harshly criticized by the international community and civil-rights 
movements for overreacting to this peaceful rally by the people. Amnesty International 
called the event “the worst campaign of repression in the country for years.”  
Consequent to the 2008 sea change in Malaysian politics, the authoritarian trends 
by the government were matched by civil-society mobilization and democratic 
competitiveness in the party system. Also, the government responded to the demand for a 
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free and independent media by stating that it would not impose regulations on the new 
Internet media. Thus, the Malaysian people had garnered a loophole. 
After the Malaysian government has used the “repressive and responsive” method 
continuously for many decades, in order to maintain the system, the question now is, Will 
this trend persist in the future of Malaysian politics? I argue that the method will persist 
for as long as the UMNO-led BN is still holding the power and using state apparatus and 
repressive laws to silence critics. 
The “Strong State” Factor 
A “strong state” is a dominant state or government.577 In most multi-ethnic 
developing societies, the state attempts to play a crucial role in managing the ethnic 
variance and reconciling the diverse ethnic interests by undertaking relevant policies and 
programs. In Malaysia, the state has used a wide range of affirmative action policies to 
manage ethnic issues, because the ruling elites have believed that a relatively autonomous 
and strong state is needed to manage a deeply divided society like Malaysia. As stated by 
Mahathir, “Only the government was able to determine, from information it received, 
what action was necessary to preserve the country’s stability and security.”578 Up to the 
present, the Malaysian government has believed it is the job of the state, rather than the 
public, to set priorities; that it is the state’s responsibility, and not the public’s, to 
determine what is good or bad for them. 
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Malaysia is a state in development,
579
 and a bleak feature shared by such states is 
the combination of their sometimes brutal suppression of civil rights,
580
 their apparently 
wide measure of legitimacy, and their generally sustained performance in delivering 
developmental goods. Such states are dominated by strongly nationalist developmental 
elites and combine varying degrees of repression and legitimacy in contexts where the 
civil society has been weak or weakened. These states concentrate considerable power, 
authority, autonomy, and competence in the central political and bureaucratic institutions 
of the state, notably their economic bureaucracies, and generate pervasive infrastructural 
capacity.
581
 The Malaysian state is the one that has determined incentives in order to 
ensure that domestic and foreign interests have been harnessed, both to pursue their own 
advantage and serve national developmental goals. 
In the case of Malaysia, building on the British legacy, the state’s capacity has 
been considerable; and even more so since the government undertook, from the early 
1980s onward, enhanced efforts to improve the performance of the public sector and civil 
service. The belief was that, in order to formulate national development strategies that 
would transcend narrow particularistic interests, the government and state bureaucracy 
must be autonomous and free from other social forces such as competing interests of civil 
society groups, working classes, and peasants. 
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According to Trezzini (2001), developmental states have to be either especially 
consensual or authoritarian since they need to be able to co-opt or suppress demands of 
outside interests other than the state because these demands might block change.
582
 The 
darker side of developmental state theory lies in the possibility of a strong causal 
connection between the state being both dominant and authoritarian. Analysts like 
Johnsons deny that there is connection between a developmental state and 
authoritarianism, saying that authoritarianism might solve the main political problem, for 
instance by mobilizing a population to sacrifice for the sake of the government’s 
developmental projects.
583
 
Making things worse, in a dominant state system, the public is not brought in 
when it comes to discussing the government’s policies. Thus, in the absence of any policy 
discussions, ethnic and religious sentiments prevail, with the end result being a shortage 
of public policy measures being used to evaluate the government’s responses and 
capacity. This scenario has been slowly changing since the 2008 election (as evidenced 
by the results of the recent April 2013 general election); however, there has not yet been 
any significant development on public consultation.
584
  
Within this framework, it can be concluded that the Malaysian government does 
not function like a Western democracy, although it does respond to certain kinds of 
political pressure. Government responsiveness exists, but through negotiation within the 
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central coalition and through existing government policies. The ruling government, thus, 
does not hesitate to pursue repressive strategies to outlaw particularly threatening or 
“extreme” demands and pressures from the people, especially anything that threatens the 
core system of ethnic accommodation.  
Decentralization Under Malaysia’s Centralized Federalism 
This section addresses the question, Are decisions taken at the level of 
government most appropriate to the people affected? Decentralization is often viewed as 
a shift of authority away from the central government toward state or local governments. 
In a democratic government, decentralization is imperative to strengthen democratic 
participation, representation and accountability, as well as improve the government’s 
efficiency and effectiveness.
585
  
The process of decentralization takes many forms; one is federalism.
586
 To 
understand how decentralization works in Malaysia, it is important to know how 
federalism is practiced, the arrangements made between the federal and state 
governments, and the issues that come with the arrangements.
587
  
Malaysia is officially a federalist state according to the Constitution
588
, and the 
relationship between the federal and the states was designed in the Constitution. 
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According to the Constitution, Malaysia has a multi-leveled system of government: (1) a 
federal government, (2) the thirteen state governments
589
 and three federal territories,
590
 
and (3) one-hundred fifty local authorities.
591
 The federation that Malaysia evolved into is 
a union of several states and their governments, under the scope of a central
592
 
government, with both the states and central government maintaining their autonomy 
over several “determined matters”593 which were designed into the Ninth Schedule594 of 
the Constitution and are specific responsibilities of the federal and state governments.  
Malaysia still maintains its federal status because it still meets the conditions that 
allow it to be called a federal country, meaning there still exists a division of powers and 
responsibilities between the central and state governments.
595
 However, the actual  
implementation of the functions does not conform to the standard patterns of federalism 
as accepted conventionally.  
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I argue that working decentralization into Malaysia depends on how federalism is 
practiced; which is in accordance with the system of the regime itself, which is “a limited 
procedural democracy” in a hybrid/mix political system. Consequently, federalism in 
Malaysia is not practiced in its full sense; rather, it is limited and centralized. The 
practice of federalism in Malaysia also depends on who is in control of the state: the 
ruling coalition parties (BN) or the opposition parties (PKR).  
Case (2007) claimed that Malaysia’s federation is a “minimalist federalism,” 
arguing that federalist arrangements in Malaysia facilitate the country’s semi-democratic 
political system, which helps the semi-democratic system in terms of patronage and 
democratic space in order to gain support and legitimacy.
596
 Watts (2008) termed the 
Malaysian federation an “executive federation” due to the highly dominant central 
government.
597
 Mohmmad Agus (2001), an expert on federalist systems, wrote that a 
country that is still observing federal principles although in a limited fashion is called a 
“quasi-federal” state.598 Harding (1996) also concluded that Malaysia is not a true 
federation but a “quasi-federation” because of the strong centripetal forces at work.599 For 
example in one of the opposition’s states, Kelantan, despite the control the central 
government had maintained in Kuala Lumpur, Kelantan’s state government still retained 
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some autonomy over land matters (see cases of Pergau hydroelectric dam and 
KESEDAR, land development schemes);
600
 Kelantan also has autonomy on issues 
concerning Islam.
601
  
The Five Factors That Impede Decentralization in Malaysia 
The following five main factors hinder the effectiveness of the decentralization 
process in Malaysia’s federalism: (1) Constitutional Provisions That Empower the 
Central Government Over the States, (2) Finances/Monetary, (3) Dominant One-party 
System and Party Politics, (4) Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies, and (5) 
Local Governments and Civil Service. 
1. Constitutional Provisions That Empower the Central Government Over the States  
A major characteristic of Malaysia’s federalism is its design in the Constitution 
(supposedly the highest law in the land), which is highly centralized and unfair
602
 toward 
the thirteen component states. The Malaysian Constitution grants the central government 
strong official powers over an extensive list of functions
603
 and is meant to be highly 
centralized. The distribution of powers for the state and federal governments is binding in 
the Constitution and will be enforced by courts of law. These provisions are seen as 
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accommodating federal dominance over the state governments in many aspects. In short, 
the federal government is so powerful that it can override state autonomy.  
The provisions
604
 in the Constitution allow the federal to take precedence over 
those of the states in case there happens to be conflict or inconsistency. These can be seen 
in many aspects, including land issues: Although land is a state matter, the federal 
government may acquire land for federal purposes by virtue of Article 83(1). Also, the 
National Land Council, formed under Article 91, formulates land policy through the 
federation and, although the states have a say in this body, the control lies with the 
federal government, because any legislation enacted contrary to the directions of this 
Council might be held to be unconstitutional.
605
 
On issues regarding laws, federal laws are much more significant than state laws 
and take precedence over state laws in matters of incompatibility. The federal can 
overrule state laws, but states do not have the constitutional capacity to overrule federal 
laws.
606
 On emergency laws, once a state of emergency has been proclaimed under 
Article 150, where the executive “is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the 
security, or the economic life, or public order of the federation or any part thereof is 
threatened,”607 Parliament may make laws on any matter, regardless of the Ninth 
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Schedule. In addition, during a declared state of emergency, the federal executive body 
can extend on any matter within the legislative authority of the state and give directions 
to the state’s government.608 On issues of membership, the Constitution ruled that the 
states do not have a right of say in the federal government’s decision to include new 
members in the federation;
609
 here lies a very significant indicator as to the strength of the 
bias of the federal government. 
2. Finances, Monetary 
The most significant negative biases against the states is on fiscal arrangements 
outlined in the Constitution. Financially, the federal government is dominant in Malaysia 
and the Constitution clearly allocates responsibilities to the federal and state 
governments. The pro-federal constitutional design of revenues and income from taxes 
gives the federal government the power to lead fiscal centralization against state 
governments.
610
 In addition, the fiscal arrangement is a factor of the states’ financial 
dependency on the federal government.
611
 For instance, the states may borrow money but 
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this is restricted to borrowing only from the federation, and borrowing from other 
financial sources is subject to federal government conditions and approval.
612
  
The financially dominant federal government of the UMNO-led BN (National 
Front) for many years has adversely affected the states’ rights in many ways. Taxation, an 
important source of state revenues, is monopolized by the federal government, leaving 
the states with whatever little is left; this behavior has perpetuated a “culture of beggary” 
by the states toward the central government for financial assistance. Critics say that the 
monetary advantage of the federal government allows them to hold the “purse strings” 
against the state and that this consequently weakens the states, especially those controlled 
by the opposition parties such as Kelantan and the five new states that have broken away 
from the federal since 2008.
613
  
According to Mohamad Agus (2001), the government sees no reason to allocate 
generous levels of funds to a state that is in the opposition’s hands. When PAS lost to 
UMNO/BN in 1978, the state’s debt stood at RM74 million. In the twelve years that 
UMNO ruled the state of Kelantan, the UMNO-led state government went on spending 
freely, accumulating state debt to RM711.67 million plus RM10 million in interest. When 
PAS assumed power once again in 1990, it inherited the large debt left by UMNO-BN. 
Also, the federal government made a decree that, until the state government (PAS), made 
payment, the federal government would cease new financial assistance to Kelantan. The 
central government knew the present state government could not be held responsible for 
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the debt made by the previous UMNO state government, but the issue was purposely 
highlighted by the central government to send a message to the people that, without 
financial assistance from the federal, no state government could function effectively 
without the federal, or risk the consequences of underdevelopment.
614
 
Despite these biases, the federal government obliged to provide two major grants 
to state governments: the capitation grant (based on population size) and the state road 
grant (based on size of the state). Hence, the distribution of revenue and financial 
resources are very pro-federal. The leader of the opposition coalition party, Pakatan 
Rakyat, has claimed that the federal government is discriminating against states that are 
governed by the opposition party; for example, the state of Selangor (controlled by PR) 
was given an unreasonable amount of the capitation grant allocated in the Constitution.
615
  
This dominant monetary position of the federal government has not meant well 
for the functioning of the federation. Politically determined and discriminatory payout of 
revenues among the states by the federal government headed, by the Prime Minister 
himself, is resented by many (e.g., scholars, analysts, the well–informed Malaysian 
public, the affected states themselves). This resentment and discontent were actualized in 
the twelfth and thirteenth general elections of 2008 and 2013.  
3. Dominant One-Party System and Party Politics  
The domination of a single party (i.e., UMNO-led BN party) that has ruled 
Malaysia since independence in 1957 has further weakened the federation and 
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decentralization in the political system. The political process that has allowed a single 
party, the BN, to control the center for more than fifty years has further facilitated a 
centralized federalism.  
In Malaysia, it is impossible to understand the dynamics and complexity of 
federal-state relations without understanding the political control exercised by UMNO. 
Most of the component states have been governed by UMNO-led BN coalitions since 
1957. Until the 2008 election, the UMNO-led BN government had retained power, with 
strong majorities at each federal election.
616
  
Mohammad Agus Yusoff (2006) wrote that the nature of federal–state relations in 
Malaysia is highly political. The federal government has always actively sought to ensure 
that state governments were formed from the same political party that ruled the center. 
UMNO successfully used its party apparatus for party discipline, organization, and 
financial incentives to align the center and state government.
617
 
Because the ruling party has usually won the general elections, and controlled the 
majorities in nine or more of the state assemblies, senators were appointed for their 
loyalty and service to the ruling party; thus, making the senate an important source of 
patronage for the ruling party. In practice, the senate has not defended state interests but, 
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instead, has become primarily a rubber stamp for government-sponsored legislation from 
the popularly elected lower house of Parliament (Dewan Rakyat).
618
 
In Malaysia, a pattern of strong central dominance varies, based on the federal 
government’s relationship state by state. The ruling coalition party (i.e., UMNO-led BN) 
that controls the central government plays a prominent role in state government. States 
under the ruling coalition party have an especially good relationship with the federal, 
which is also under the ruling coalition party (BN). As a highly centralized, tightly knit 
party, UMNO and its central apparatus have usually been able to prevail over a state’s 
own politicians and officials.
619
  
For example, in the history Malaysia federalism, the state of Kelantan has been 
ruled the longest by the opposition party (Islamic Party of Malaysia, or PAS). One of the 
ways to weaken opposition states is to reduce the state’s budgetary grants and revenues. 
Since 1990, the year PAS took over Kelantan from the UMNO-led BN government, the 
state government has been discriminated against by the federal government over 
numerous issues. The obvious and most crucial issue has been the distribution of state 
grants and revenues. For example, receiving an annual grant late from the federal 
government, decrease of foreign investments in state economic activities; and, recently, 
the federal government’s refusal to allow natural gas in Kelantan to be processed in the 
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state and, instead, it is transferred to the federal.
620
 Since Kelantan is led by the 
opposition party (PAS) and depends heavily on the central for its income, the federal 
government has been able to keep Kelantan functioning, but poorly developed in 
comparison to other Barisan-led states.  
The same pattern of policy discrimination is seen in the federal government’s 
actions toward the state of Terengganu when it was ruled by PAS in 1999 to 2004. 
Mahathir’s then administration ordered PETRONAS621 to annul oil royalties promised to 
Terengganu, on the grounds that the opposition party did not have the ability to manage 
such large funds annually;
622
 therefore, the task should be given to the central 
government. 
4. Implementation of Affirmative Action Policies 
A primary example of the affirmation action policies is the New Economic 
Policies (NEP) that was instituted after the 1969 ethnic riots to improve the economic and 
social conditions of the Malays, which further contributed to the expansion and 
consolidation of the federal government’s power.623 The enforcement of safeguarding to 
improve the position of Malays in public service, education, and industry were explicit 
policy goals. If decentralization were to be implemented, it presumably would hamper the 
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objectives and future goals of the government. Thus, in pursuit of implementing NEP, the 
federal government must be dominant in making decisions, or risk distractions and 
opposition from state and local governments, especially if they are under the ruling of 
opposition political parties. 
In addition, to meet the explicit target to restructure the society and eradicate 
poverty, the NEP also serves as the federal government’s strategy to induce ownership 
and control over state and local authorities. One of the many instances is through 
establishment of the Federal Land Development Authority (FELDA) and regional 
development authorities. FELDA was established with the purpose of helping the 
government carry out rural land development and to uplift the economic status and living 
standard of the rural community, especially among the Malays. According to Francis 
Loh, through FELDA, the central government is able to penetrate into state jurisdictions, 
which could enhance the power of the federal over state governments and local 
authorities.
624
 
One opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP), has offered to halt its 
plan to set up branches inside FELDA schemes if UMNO agrees to dissolve its hundreds 
of branches in the country. Critics claim that, in addition to developing rural lands for the 
Malays, the federal government is using FELDA for political purposes and that FELDA 
settlers are used for political gain, in terms of gaining voters for general elections. 
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According to Lim Kit Siang (1987), “In Malaysia, land is being used as a political tool – 
as incentive, pay-off, or reward to political supporters and opponents alike.”625 
5. Local Governments and Civil Service 
Under the Malaysian Constitution,
626
 bureaucratic and civil service in local 
government is the responsibility of the states. However, the federal government also 
exercises considerable power and influence over local government.
627
 Local governments 
in Malaysia usually function within a framework of being politically, financially, and 
economically subordinate to the federal government. Thus, this centralized relationship, 
has restrained local governments’ ability to engage freely with the local communities, 
and the system does little to encourage public participation at the local level.
628
 
This rigid bureaucratic culture, which is usually shaped by internal interests from 
the central and appointed state officials,
629
 is a factor regarding inefficiencies and bad 
public services. Thus, it is not unusual to hear public outcry and dissatisfaction with local 
government services. Various studies have revealed that, in addition to inefficiency in 
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delivering services, local governments lack a transparent method for public participation 
and consultation.
630
 
In a growing tendency toward recentralization, under the excuse of providing 
better services to the public, the central government is removing the traditional functions 
of local government by privatizing them. Critic claims that this as an effort to further cut 
back on local autonomy and make local governments rely more on central for help.
631
  
In addition, state and local government autonomy is burdened by extra tasks that 
are not designated to them in the first place, such as reducing urban poverty and urban 
crime. These extra and major tasks have highly taxed both state and local governments’ 
financial and human resources, resulting in poor job performance and constant criticism 
from the public for not delivering the best of services.
632
 
Undemocratic trends in the system hamper decentralization from being 
implemented. A clear example is regarding local government elections. Local council 
elections were practiced in the past, but were abolished in the 1960s. The abolition of 
local government elections took place when the Local Government Act was passed in 
1976. The abolition of local authority elections has allowed the BN to further penetrate 
the third tier of government, where their appointed councilors dominate municipalities, 
town councils, and district councils.
633
 In addition, there is clearly potential for political 
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interference and federal-state conflict if the federal appointee takes a different view of 
matters from that adopted by the state.
634
 
In the absence of a legitimate transfer of power via elections, the local leadership 
may become primarily accountable to itself and local elites instead of the people. Without 
elected local officials, further attempts to make local government more transparent, 
accountable and efficient may be in vain. In addition, by appointing state officials instead 
of them being elected by the people, the government has tarnished its record as well as 
denied the democratic rights of the citizens. 
Election 2008 and New Opportunities for Decentralization in Malaysia  
Results of the twelfth general election of 2008 showed the people’s resentment 
against the UMNO-led BN government. One of the factors was discontent over the 
federal government’s control over state autonomy. For more than fifty years, the federal 
government had consistently relied upon their power to amend the Constitution to enforce 
their view on any matters of dispute in the federal system. However, that power ended in 
2008, when they lost their two-thirds majority in Parliament. The BN can no longer 
amend the Constitution as they wish. The political effect of this is that federal-state 
relations are now more awkward and unpredictable than they have been for most of 
Malaysia’s federation history. Some of the states won by the opposition coalition have 
begun to use their legislative power to enact laws, such as the Freedom of Information 
                                                 
634
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(FoI) laws in Penang and Selangor, which is a sign of clear departure from central 
government policies.
635
 
There are now five state governments (i.e., Selangor, Penang, Kelantan, Kedah, 
Perak
636
) that are not under the control of Barisan Nasional parties. These states have 
now found their voice to challenge the federal-state relationship. The richest states in 
Malaysia (i.e., Selangor and Penang) have put more pressure on the central government 
for greater federalism, particularly on issues of the concentration of wealth at the federal 
level.
637
 In addition, since the 2008 election, local councilors are appointed by state 
governments without consultation with the federal government.  
The federal government continues to be in the hands of the incumbent coalition, 
and no formal restructuring of the federal system has yet occurred. Nevertheless, the 
changing political landscape in Malaysia since 2008, is granting greater autonomy to 
state governments. Hopefully, this will lead to better decentralization and better 
participatory democracy and public involvement.  
Conclusion 
Analysts of Malaysian politics, and proponents of federalism and decentralization 
of state and federal power, believe that federalism needs to be strengthened in order for 
democracy to be practiced in full in Malaysia. The federation is not without issues and 
challenges, but this does not mean federalism cannot be improved. In the case of 
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Malaysia, its social, political, and economic diversity are simply too deep for a centrally 
controlled regime to be practical.  
State and local governments in Malaysia operate in very centralized conditions 
where they are not free to interact with the public, which hampers encouraging public 
participation at the local level. The state subordination under the central government will 
impede transparency, accountability and participation, which are the principles of good 
governance. 
The virtue of decentralization, to strengthen democracy, is not being practiced in a 
full sense in Malaysia. Instead, it facilitates a mixed political system or semi-democratic 
system. One may even say that the semi-democratic model is shaping the operation of the 
federalist principle of decentralization in Malaysia.
638
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Chapter Ten: Final Analysis and Conclusions 
Political literature has focused more on fully democratic countries and their 
success stories. The functions of a “hybrid” political system have been less studied in 
political science and comparative politics. Therefore, this study focused on evaluating the 
positive and negative forces that affect political governance in a hybrid political setup, 
and analyzed the frequency of the interplay of the positive and negative components. In 
line with the claim that the Malaysian government is a paradigmatic case of a hybrid 
political system, a thorough assessment of Malaysia’s regime dynamics was necessitated. 
The International IDEA assessment framework helped with evaluating the 
performance of the Malaysian “partial-democracy” in a “resilient hybrid regime,” and 
also helped with assessing the quality of the regime’s governance. In this study, I applied 
both a descriptive and analytical approach to the research methodology in order to form 
three theoretical claims and apply them to this case study on Malaysia. 
This case study of Malaysian politics revealed an ambiguous style of governing, 
and displayed the approaches and variables in order to explain the complex issues and 
challenges of the political system. As highlighted in chapter two, no master variables 
were at the center of this analysis. Rather, I provided lists of important factors that are 
commonly used by scholars and students who study Malaysian politics.  
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Analysis Thesis One  
 
Figure 13. Positive Components in a “Hybrid” Political System 
 
 
The four positive components in Malaysia’s hybrid political system are: (1) 
elections (chapter six), (2) Internet and new social media (chapter eight), (3) peaceful 
social mobilization (e.g., HINDRAF and BERSIH movements in chapter six), and (4) 
elites strategies (chapters four, five, six). Elections in Malaysia are the main democratic 
attribute that has been loyally practiced by the regime for it to maintain the status 
“partially democratic.” Elections had taken place consistently since 1955. Critics may 
argue that since especially the 1980s and forward, elections have been badly tainted by 
“unfair practices,” especially against opponents of the ruling government (chapter six). 
However, proponents of elections in an “ambiguous regime” have claimed that elections 
open doors of opportunity for democratization and regime transition.
639
 Recent 
developments in Malaysia’s general elections, for example in 2008 and 2013, show that 
even in an unfair environment elections in Malaysia are competitive enough to allow for 
a change of government and, plausibly, regime change, too. 
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The Internet and new social media (chapter eight) in Malaysia is the most positive 
thing that could ever have happened in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup. The 
conventional media had always been under the control and monopoly of the ruling 
regime, rendering unfair and biased information to the people. The Internet media have 
become a source of alternative media, thanks to no regulations restricting it. The 
surprising surge of opposition challenges and participation since the Reformasi 
movement in the late 1990s was galvanized by the new Internet communication media. 
BERSIH and HINDRAF (chapters six, seven, nine) are two examples of peaceful 
social mobilization and show the importance of social forces to organize peaceful protests 
against the incumbent regime in Malaysia. The factor of social mobilization is important 
in a hybrid regime for affecting the strategic choices made by political elites. 
640
 In 
Malaysia, the people’s discontent and protests caused the incumbent to lose its two-thirds 
majority in Parliament (chapter six). This positive factor in a hybrid political setup should 
increase the likelihood of democratization in Malaysia. 
However, elite strategies in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup do not provide much 
of an effort to further democratize. This is because the ruling elites in Malaysia are too 
cohesive, with support from the patronage network and clienteles politics, which renders 
ineffective defection and cooperation with the opposition parties. The authoritarian 
attributes in a hybrid system are primarily protracted by the ruling elite’s capacity to 
maintain their elite cohesion by means of the policy concessions, distribution of 
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patronage and privileges, manipulation of political institutions such as legislature and 
parties to maintain elite unity, and the effectiveness of state coercive capacity.
641
 
Analysis Thesis Two 
 
Figure 14. Negative Components in a “Hybrid” Political System 
 
 
Electoral manipulation and gerrymandering are, unfortunately, traits in Malaysia’s 
hybrid political setup. However, these unhealthy practices going on for too long did 
trigger protests from the people, changing the dynamics of the general elections starting 
in 2008. The coalition of the political opposition has become more cohesive than ever, 
with the help of the vibrant alternative media. 
As a hybrid state, Malaysia acquires “highly developed coercive institutions.” The 
dominant party UMNO inherited a “sophisticated coercive apparatus” from the British, 
which allows them to monitor political activity throughout the country. With this 
mechanism of control, they have been able to put down challenges and disturbances 
resulting from dissidents and protestors against their policies (chapters five, seven, nine). 
The state in Malaysia is so strong that it is capable of tightly controlling civil society 
organizations and social movements. With repressive laws such as Societies Acts, the 
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state has been able to bar nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from engaging in any 
political activities for which they have not been officially registered. The UMNO also has 
made use of their Internal Security Acts, which enshrined a colonial-era principle 
whereby dissidents can be held indefinitely in detention camps without trial (chapters 
five, eight). 
The strong state has been supported by a dominant single-party rule in Malaysia’s 
hybrid regime, maintaining a stable parliamentary regime in which the state and the 
UMNO-BN party have regularly been returned to power. Notwithstanding its democratic 
appearance, as a hybrid regime, Malaysia has been marked by an “uneven playing field.” 
Opposition activities have been restricted by a range of authoritarian laws, with support 
from illiberal practices from the powerful state and the dominant single-party rule. 
The UMNO-BN has survived so far because of support from economic growth 
and the overwhelming resources concentrated in their hands (chapter six). As the ruling 
government, this party has used patronage and clienteles’ politics, favoring business and 
political allies. Also, money politics has been rampant during elections, to influence 
voters against the opposition parties. All of these practices became the source of rampant 
corruption and cronyism in the regime (chapter seven). Nevertheless, the centralized 
power vested in the ruling incumbent party UMNO-BN regime has held together a quite 
cohesive state apparatus and a firm grip on the economy, while at the same time paying 
much attention to disguising their authoritarian rule as a legitimate democracy. This 
assessment has shown the ruling party’s effort to preserve its core, namely that to 
maintain their power in the government they will resort to nondemocratic means.  
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This mixing of democracy and authoritarian practices in Malaysia’s politics is 
clearly shown in issues concerning individual liberties and civil liberties, such as freedom 
of the press. However, the components of positive democratic traits, such as social 
mobilization, can affect the electoral dynamics tremendously and may cause positive 
liberal outcomes. Today, we can see from the general elections in 2008 and 2013, the 
opposition’s coalitions and civil societies are more threatening to the ruling elite than 
ever before. 
The case of Malaysia has supported generally the growing theoretical claims of a 
resilient hybrid political system. This study has sought to unravel how and which internal 
factors in the hybrid political system have influenced the political situation in Malaysia, 
which also include the ruling party’s resiliency and longevity. 
Is political transition possible in Malaysia? In a press statement on the launch of 
his State of Democracy Handbook, Dr. Patrick Molutsi said: 
We can no longer simply assume that every nation that has rejected tyranny and 
turned towards elections is in ‘transition’ to democracy We need far more 
sophisticated tools for measuring the increasingly complex, varied and uncertain 
paths towards democracy that nations of the world are taking.
642
  
 
Alternative Findings 
The framework to assess the state of democracy in Malaysia, prepared by 
International IDEA, helped to evaluate the performance of the “partial-democracy” practiced 
in the country; it also helped to assess the quality of the regime’s governance. For example, 
this study found that factors of “good governance” (i.e., low corruption level, high 
government accountability and transparency, effective and responsive government, along 
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with decentralization) have further facilitated regime stability and sustainability. On the other 
hand, “bad governance” (i.e., rampant corruption, low government accountability and 
transparency, ineffective and unresponsive government, and centralization) has further 
aggravated regime instability and triggered regime transition. This study found that the 
notion of “good governance” can be a strong variable for regime longevity, and “bad 
governance” for a regime in decay; that good governance can plausibly legitimize even an 
illiberal hybrid state. The International IDEA assessment framework provided these 
important factors for assessing the conditions of the regime’s governance (see Figure 15). 
 
 
Figure 15. Elements of “Good Governance” and “Bad Governance” and their 
Positive and Negative Impact on Regime Survival. 
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Good and Bad Governance 
In the Index for good governance, indicators are deteriorating in Malaysia (see 
chapters seven, nine). The reasons are seen in the rampant practices of corruption, 
cronyism, and nepotism. Corruption and abuse of power have increasingly been common 
practices in Malaysia in recent years. The CPI index for Malaysia has dropped for four 
years consecutively since 2009 (chapter seven). Failed promises and policies to stop 
rampant corruption among government officers have been met with increasing criticism 
and protests from the people (i.e., Reformasi, BERSIH, HINDRAF movements). 
Evidence shows that ruling party’s electoral setbacks in the recent 2008 and 2013 
general elections originated from their bad governance. After decades of malpractice and 
corrupt activities by ruling coalition party members in UMNO-BN, the Malaysian people 
have increasingly grown more agitated, showing their frustration and anger with their 
votes. 
Challenges to the Research  
This study is the first time the International IDEA democracy assessment has been 
used for dissertation research. Originally, the participants for this assessment involved 
dozens of researchers from many sectors in society, including: academics, government 
officials, students, civil society groups, civil servants, members of business communities, 
advocacy groups, and stakeholders. Ultimately, I solely was the one assessing the 
research questions, through painstaking efforts in library and Internet research; the 
assessment answers were gleaned from various documentary reviews, academics and 
non-academics, e-research, review of non-official and official government and non-
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government documents, and Internet public forum. In some instances, the answers may 
have had elements of bias, but I tried to be professional as a researcher and confine 
myself to the theories and approaches employed in the framework prepared by the 
International IDEA. 
As explained previously, this study has analyzed the experience of the quality of 
democracy in Malaysia’s hybrid political setup. While I hope to contribute ideas to the 
debate on regime change in Malaysia, I also recognize the extraordinary theoretical and 
political complexity of the problems that I wished to analyze. In conducting the research, 
to find standard processes and variables to explain the subject matter of the study, I was 
confronted with difficulties in gathering as well as interpreting the data collected.  
I am well aware that the answers I have provided, within the context of the IDEA 
assessments framework, are far from complete and at times may appear too ambiguous. 
This may be due to the open-ended nature of this research and also the nature of 
uncertainty in the democratization and transitions paradigm. However, I believe that 
research of this nature, which tries to grasp and understand the real world and to interpret 
and sum it up in the form of descriptive narration, is not an easy endeavor. In short, this 
research is far from perfect and is subject to improvement in the future.  
This study was an effort to promote tools that citizens can use to evaluate their 
own regime type of democracy, and to generate public information about the problems 
and challenges and provide recommendations for improving policies. My objective has 
been to open a new vision of hybrid regime studies, beyond a pure democratic utopia. 
Therefore, I hope the readers will take this research as a point of departure, rather than 
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arrival, for studying democratization and regime change and will further explore those 
topics through empirical research.  
Conclusion 
Malaysia’s political system has been widely described as “partial,” “semi,” 
“quasi”, and an “illiberal” democracy; as well as soft-authoritarian, electoral 
authoritarian, and many other ambiguous descriptions. Analysts more or less agree that 
studies about Malaysian politics involve patterns of limited civil liberties, 
institutionalized control systems, and at least a reasonably manipulated electoral system; 
all driven by the strong state and its dominant one-party system that seeks to sustain its 
incumbency. The ruling party in Malaysia has been able to maintain its incumbency with 
support from its patronage politics, cohesion of its elites, historic loyalty of its military 
and police, the less than ineffective middle class and civil society organizations, and the 
weaknesses of the opposition parties. 
It is the existence of such mechanisms that effectively have made the “hybrid” 
regime more resilient, with its partially practiced democratic principles. These 
mechanisms have blocked a transfer of power and regime transition, despite the existence 
of democratic institutions and a degree of political freedom granted to the citizens of the 
country. Malaysia’s resilient hybrid political system, however, may allow civil society to 
operate and hold fairly competitive and open elections, though totally unfair toward the 
opposition parties. 
Nevertheless, it is the resiliency of the political system, or the configuration of its 
political setup, that has caused this regime to be remarkably stable overtime. Resilient 
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hybrid regimes do not stay in power through manipulation and repression alone. They 
often enjoy a degree of popular support because they can deliver public goods that some 
democratic governments are not capable of delivering. It is important to have good 
governance to support regime survival and stall democratization. The problem with the 
hybrid regime in Malaysia is that its “good governance” performance is deteriorating 
badly; and the people are tired of the rampant corruption, cronyism, and unaccountability. 
The main issue is not so much about changing the political system; it is actually about the 
people demanding clean and good governance. 
Scholars acknowledge that Malaysia’s experience marks the paradigmatic case on 
the pattern of resiliency and survivability of a hybrid political system. However, being 
claimed as a “halfway house” does not apply to the Malaysian case. This study shows 
that even an unfinished transition has opened up opportunities for participation and 
alternation of power through formal institutions such as elections. 
Some analysts agree that there are anomalies in studies of the Malaysian case, 
which make it more complex and challenging, mainly with the difficulty of applying just 
one theoretical chosen model to Malaysia’s political system. So, I have proposed that the 
reasons Malaysia is not acquiescent to a full democracy and regime change are very 
much related to the political configuration of the regime itself. The regime’s political 
setup, which combines both democratic and authoritarian attributes, creates a barrier to a 
democratic utopia. However, this does not mean there will be no room for opportunities 
that can lead to democratic openings and regime change. Therefore, I have suggested that 
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the hybrid regime configuration provides components that, on one hand, are positive for 
democratization and, on the other hand, negative for democratization.  
The findings of this assessment show how Malaysia’s hybrid political system has 
both advantages and disadvantages for democratization and regime change. The 
assessment answers support my thesis about the relevance of partially practiced 
democratic traits; for example, how elections, Internet and social media, elites’ strategies 
and popular mobilization, serve as positive components in a hybrid political system and 
cause it to be resilient, thus facilitating democratic openings and plausible regime change. 
On the other hand, the partial authoritarian traits (e.g., control system, state power, 
dominant single party, patron-clientelism, electoral manipulation and ineffective civil 
participation) are negative components that will hamper the progress of democratization, 
thus maintaining the regime’s incumbency and plausible survival.  
Nevertheless, I have found from this assessment that the main elements of good 
governance, if practiced by the regime even part and parcel, further facilitate the political 
system to either sustain it or transform it. The assessment framework lay the ground for 
analyzing the Malaysian government’s effectiveness, accountability, level of corruption, 
decentralization, and position of the military. The analysis shows that good government 
performance can help to sustain a regime and stabilize the whole political structure; “bad 
governance,” vice-versa. 
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Finally, as Jane Elliot wrote: “The wisest know that the best they can do … is not 
good enough. The not so wise, in their accustomed manner, choose to believe that there is 
no problem and that they have solved it.”643 
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Appendix 
 
Malaysia: Summary of Federal and State Government Functions 
 
 Federal  
 
State 
 
1. External affairs  1. Muslim laws and custom 
2. Defense  2. Land 
3. Internal security  3. Agriculture and forestry 
4. Civil and criminal law and the 
administration of justice  
4. Local government 
5. Federal citizenship and alien 
naturalization 
5. Local public services: boarding 
houses, burial grounds, pounds and cattle 
trespass, markets and fairs, licensing of 
theatres and cinemas 
6. Federal government machinery 6. State works and water 
7. Finance 7. State government machinery 
8. Trade, commerce, and industry 8. State holidays 
9. Shipping, navigation, and fishery  9. Inquiries for state purpose 
10. Communication and transport  
10. Creation of offense and indemnities 
related to state matters 
11. Federal works and power  11. Turtles and riverine fishery 
12. Surveys, inquiries, and research  
 
13. Education 
Supplementary list for Sabah and 
Sarawak 
 
14. Medicine and health 12. Native law and custom 
15. Labor and social security 
13. Incorporation of state authorities and 
other bodies 
16. Welfare of aborigines 
14. Ports and harbors other than those 
declared federal 
17. Professional licensing  15. Cadastral land surveys 
18. Federal holidays, standard of time 16. In Sabah, the Sabah Railway 
19. Unincorporated societies  
 
20. Agricultural pest control  
Additional shared functions for Sabah 
and Sarawak 
 
21. Publications  17. Personal law 
22. Censorship 
18. Adulteration of foodstuff and other 
goods 
23. Theatres and cinemas 19. Shipping under fifteen tons 
24. Co-operative societies 20. Water power 
25. Prevention of and extinguishing fires 21. Agriculture and forestry research 
  22. Charities and charitable trusts 
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Shared Functions 
23. Theatres, cinemas and places of 
amusement 
1. Social welfare 
 
2. Scholarships 
 
3. Protection of wild animals and birds, 
national parks   
4. Animal husbandry 
 
5. Town and country planning  
 
6. Vagrancy and itinerant hawkers  
 
7. Public health 
 
8. Drainage and irrigation 
 
9. Rehabilitation of mining land, and land 
that has suffered soil erosion  
10. Fire safety measures 
 
11. Culture and sports, housing 
  
Source: Malaysia, Constitution of Malaysia – Ninth Schedule (Articles 74, 77) on 
“Legislative Lists.” 
 
